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Multinational Companies operate in the political sphere where political risks are created. 
Political risk is an ever-evolving field with new risks emerging and old risks changing as the 
world continues to become more interconnected. Reputational risk has emerged as a field of 
study in recent years, commonly seen as a risk of risks, or realised political risk. Reputation 
has increasingly been ranked as the number one strategic risk facing multinationals, with 
threats to reputation stemming from several sources.  Events such as the British Petroleum oil 
rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in 2014 catapult the study of reputation and its risks. 
Although much of the literature and research on reputational risk has been conducted in the 
commerce field, the links to politics are evident.  
The ungracious political characteristics of many African countries present a political sphere 
that contains multiple risks. Despite possible risks, China continues to invest vast amounts into 
Africa, focusing on extractive industries. Reputation is reliant on stakeholder perceptions; 
Chinese companies’ main stakeholder is their government, whose influence creates prime case 
studies for reputational risk. Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Chinese Non-
Ferrous Metals Company (CNMC) are the two companies focused on in this study, regarding 
potential reputational risks posed to the Chinese government as the main stakeholder. CNPC 
has invested major resources in South Sudan, with CNMC focusing their investment in Zambia. 
Dissecting the reputational risks presented by these countries and their political spheres to the 
Chinese companies operating in them was the goal of this study.  
The analysis of reputational risk in this study has taken place using a qualitative model that 
measures four factors: who, where, what and how. Each factor is accompanied by a certain 
number of indicators that help achieve an overall risk ranking. This study found that there are 
more significant reputational risks facing CNPC operating in South Sudan. However, CNMC 
is not immune to the reputational risks presented in Zambia. Reputational risk forms part of a 
full political risk analysis. From the reputational risk perspective, South Sudan is seen as a 







Multinasionale maatskappye is werksaam in’n politiese sfeer waar politiese risikos ontstaan.  
Die studie van politiese risiko is ‘n ontwikkelende gebied waar nuwe risikos voortdurend 
ontstaan en ou risikos voortdurend verander as gevolg van die wêreld wat al meer 
gekonnekteerd raak.  In meer onlangse tye het reputasierisiko al hoe meer na vore getreë – dit 
word beskou as ‘n risiko van risikos of gerealiseerde politiese risiko.  Reputasie word al hoe 
meer beskou as die grootste strategiese risiko wat deur multinasionale maatskappye in die gesig 
gestaar word.  Verskeie bronne kan die moontlike oorsaak van reputasierisiko en bedreiging 
wees.  Gebeure soos die Britse Petroleum olietuig ontploffing in die Golf van Meksiko in 2014 
het die studie van reputasie en die gepaardgaande risikos in die kollig geplaas.  Die meeste 
navorsing en literatuurstudies ten opsigte van reputasierisiko vind plaas in die kommersiële 
veld, alhoewel die skakeling met politiek duidelik is. 
Die onverbiddelike politiese karaktertrekke van baie Afrika-lande bied ‘n konteks wat vele 
risikos inhou.  Ten spyte van hierdie moontlike risikos belê China groot bedrae geld in Afrika 
– veral in die ontrekkingsbedryf.  Reputasie is afhanklik van die persepsies van die beleggers.
Die belangrikste belanghebbende in Chinese maatskappye is die Chinese regering en dit bring 
mee dat gevallestudies vir reputasierisiko belangrik is.  Die twee maatskappye waarop hierdie 
studie fokus, is eerstens die ‘Chinese National Petroleum Company’ (CNPC) en tweedens die 
‘Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Company’ (CNMC). Die fokus is die potensiële reputasierisikos 
wat dit vir die Chinese regering inhou.  Die CNPC het groot beleggings in Suid Soedan gemaak, 
terwyl die CNMC hulle beleggings in Zambië geïnvesteer het.  Die doel van hierdie studie was 
om hierdie twee lande en hul onderskeie politieke omgewings te ondersoek en die 
reputasierisikos wat dit vir die onderskeie Chinese maatskappye inhou te identifiseer. 
Die analise van reputasierisiko in hierdie studie is deur middel van ‘n kwalitatiewe model 
ondersoek.  Die model meet vier faktore, naamlik: wie, waar, wat en hoe. ‘n Algehele risiko 
rangorde is verkry deur elke faktor met ‘n aantal indikators te verbind.  Die studie het bevind 
dat daar meer betekenisvolle reputasierisikos is vir die CNPC wat in Suid Soedan gebaseer is.  
Die CNMC wat in Zambië gebaseer is ook blootgestel aan reputasierisiko faktore. As deel van 
‘n volle politiese risiko analise moet daar ook ‘n reputasierisiko ontleding gedoen word. Vanuit 
‘n reputasierisiko oogpunt is Suid-Soedan die hoë-risiko beleggingsgeleentheid, terwyl Zambië 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Study 
1.1 Background 
The research undertaken in this thesis is anchored in the field of political risk analysis with a 
specific focus on reputational risk and the political connection thereof. Companies build their 
reputations up over long periods - reputation is an asset that cannot be bought and is fragile in 
nature (Dominguez, et al., 2016:2). Respondents from the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
500 companies ranked reputational risk as the most important risk their companies face. 
However, the time spent engaging in reputational risk and the management of these risks was 
less than engagement in other elements of their company (O'Callaghan, 2007:99). 
Reputation can be defined as “the result of external actors’ assessments of particular attributes 
or collective knowledge about a firm” (Gaudenzi, Confente, Christopher, 2015:250). These 
authors further define risk as an unfavourable event that can generate a negative deviation from 
an expected situation – including a smaller gain or greater loss than what was anticipated 
(Gaudenzi, et al., 2015:251). In this case, external actors are the stakeholders in a business, 
project or organisation. Stakeholders can be individuals, including the public or customers, 
groups or governmental organisations.  
Spence (2011:59) further states that the management of reputational risk is central to the long-
term success of companies. From these definitions, one is able to gain a basic understanding of 
reputational risk - it occurs when external actors negatively assess a company, which can result 
in possible negative consequences in the company's numerous business aspects. Stakeholders 
are the worthiest evaluators of reputation and reputational risk (Benn, Abratt, Kleyn, 
2016:828), primarily due to their contribution to and investment (monetary or otherwise) in the 
company.  
Reputational damage may result in the reduction of corporate value, a hindering of future 
opportunities as well as an increased cost of future business (Smith-Bingham, 2014:5). Deloitte 
conducted a reputation risk survey in which 87% of executives rated reputation risk as “more 
important” or “much more important” than any other strategic risks their companies were 
facing (Deloitte, 2015:5). Aon Global Risk Consulting1 conducted a more recent survey on 
 
1 Aon Global Risk Consulting falls under Aon plc, a global firm offering a wide range of risk solutions, amongst 




Global Risk Management that also indicated that damage to reputation and brand is the number 
one risk facing companies operating today (2017:3), reiterating the importance of company-
based reputational risk engagement and management. Aon projected that by 2020, damage to 
reputation and brand will remain ranked in the top 10 risks facing companies.  
 As companies invest and expand into new geographical locations, reputational risk is bearing 
greater importance than it has held in the past, as investments often occur in unfamiliar 
locations with unfamiliar actors. According to Frynas and Mellahi (2003:543), it has long been 
acknowledged in political and international relations literature that firms are active actors in 
the environment in which they function. Firms hold the ability to shape political and social 
environments in which they operate to their advantage. Therefore, how firms conduct business 
and shape their environments is continuously under scrutiny by various stakeholders and 
external actors.  
There are countless examples of incidents where reputational risk has become a harsh reality 
for certain companies. The British Petroleum (BP) oil spill of 2014 at the Deepwater Horizon 
rig in the Gulf of Mexico is one incident that has made reputational risk, as a field of study, 
more prominent. This incident is considered one of the most publicly visible examples of 
reputational risk caused by operational failures during the extraction process (Dominguez, 
Jimenez-Rodriguez & Fdez-Galiano, 2016:3). Not only was there a severe environmental 
impact caused by the spill, but shareholders and investors in BP perceive oil spills to be 
tremendously serious, with the potential to damage the firms’ position in global capital markets.  
De Beers2 is another company that realised the harm reputational risk can cause and chose to 
change their operational environment. De Beers left war-torn countries concerning the negative 
publicity they received regarding "conflict diamonds" (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:93). The United 
Nations (UN) (2000) defines “conflict diamonds” as “diamonds that originate from areas 
controlled by forces opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are 
used to fund military action in opposition to those governments”  De Beers received criticism 
from the West, including pressure from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which 
resulted in enduring pressure from stakeholders. The company chose to move to more stable 
African countries with fewer security and reputational risks, in order to maintain a strong 
reputation with public and shareholders alike. This incident is an example of where the 
country's reputational risk was high enough to negatively affect companies operating within 
 




their borders, which may cause said company to seek new locations where their reputation 
would likely not be tarnished. 
Multinational corporations (MNCs), like the aforementioned examples of BP and De Beers, 
have increasing pressure to improve their performance on social, political and environmental 
issues. Royal Dutch Shell has previously realised the reputational risks they had taken as a 
company, causing damage to their standing on these issues. Some of these incidents include 
having run operations in South Africa during Apartheid3, being accused of involvement in 
executions in Nigeria4 and a battle with NGO Greenpeace over oil dumping in the sea5 
(O'Callaghan, 2007:96). Royal Dutch Shell is the epitome of the costs involved in repairing a 
tarnished image, after having spent tens of millions of pounds sterling to reinvent itself as a 
socially- and environmentally-responsible company.  
Although reputational risk is a field of study that is often neglected within the field of political 
risk analysis, it bears great importance. Corporate reputation is commonly associated with 
marketing and public relations; it has been studied by accountants, sociologists and economists, 
yet political science is often notably unaccounted for amongst those studying corporate 
reputation. O’Callaghan (2007:100) finds this curious, as there have been extensively studied 
links between politics and markets, as well as governments acting as key stakeholders in 
companies.  
This study incorporates the above-mentioned aspects by analysing Chinese MNC’s and their 
operations in Zambia and South Sudan’s extractive industries, ultimately attempting to 
determine the reputational risk these countries hold to investors operating within their borders. 
The study hopes to indicate that reputational risk is something MNC’s expecting to pursue 
operations in a new territory need to consider seriously.  
1.2 Preliminary Literature Review  
According to Rice & Zegart (2018:6), twenty-first-century political risk is the probability that 
any political action can considerably affect a company's business. Political actions no longer 
only occur in traditional places such as government buildings or parliament, but can take place 
anywhere at any time, with the possibility of negatively impacting business. In the past, 
 
3 Royal Dutch Shell was the subject of protests in 1986 regarding business involvement with South Africa’s 
Apartheid regime. 
4 The company was accused of execution participation in 1995.  




companies and individuals did not have to be concerned about home-based political risks 
affecting their investments abroad or vice versa. In the world we live in today, investments can 
be carried out and managed on a global scale; the quantity of political actors that can affect the 
operations of multinational companies is therefore expanding and diversifying (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:180).  
Political risk matters on a macro (national and transnational) and a micro (local and regional) 
level in today’s world (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:3). Political risk is a multidimensional 
discipline, as one form of risk can lead to another – economic trends can influence political 
risk, just as political decisions can have economic consequences. Social conditions can also 
influence political risk. Furthermore, one cannot limit sources of political risk to the host 
country (the country where the investment is being made); risks can stem from the home 
country (the country investing). Risks can also stem from the international environment and its 
changes (du Toit, 2013:6). 
An increasingly common category of political risk is that of regulatory scrutiny or boycotts and 
demonstrations occurring in the home country of a company due to their investments abroad 
(Bremmer & Keat, 2009:180). Increased investment in emerging markets and developing 
countries that often touch on transnational issues can be considered the primary source of this. 
These transnational issues may include environmental issues, human rights, labour ethics, 
corruption and money laundering. Transnational issues are fast becoming the third rail of 
political risk, with these possible risks culminating in the reputation of a company, likely 
negatively affecting it (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:180).  
Political risk can affect reputation in a multitude of ways (McKellar, 2010:60). One way is 
when political actors feel hostility towards a firm, they hold the ability and influence with the 
public to vilify the firm. Firms can also become entrapped between political interests – an 
example is conflicting interests between NGOs and local contractors. An inability to identify 
political and social stakeholders in a firm can make the firm appear to be insensitive to social 
interests (McKellar, 2010:56). Furthermore, if a firm is perceived as not being able to manage 
political risk, their reputation can be harmed.  
Reputational risk is a concept that is used not only in the field of political risk, but also in the 
financial risk and corporate risk fields. Most of the literature and research surrounding 




Pricewaterhouse Coopers6 (PwC) publish yearly reports on reputational risk. There are also 
financial journals such as the Journal of Risk Finance7 and Risk Management Association 
Journal8 that publish works primarily focused on reputational risk. As a result, reputational risk 
is a concept that has varying conceptualisations and definitions across the numerous disciplines 
in which it is studied.  
As reputational risk has multiple definitions from multiple disciplines, measuring it and its 
actual effects on business is challenging.  Some authors and companies choose to measure 
reputational risk quantitatively, however qualitative measurements are more commonly used 
in the field of political risk analysis. Swanepoel, Esterhuysen, Van Vuuren and Lotriet (2017) 
developed a four-point matrix that measures reputational risk qualitatively, looking at four 
specific elements of risk – who, where, what and how. This model is similar to those that have 
traditionally been used in political risk analysis, despite its aim toward financial institutions. 
The model was created to help companies proactively track and improve their reputations, and 
political risks associated therewith (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:315).  
In order to choose a suitable method for measuring reputational risk, it must be defined. 
Dominguez et al (2016:1) states that “reputational risk arises when negative publicity, triggered 
by certain business events, whether accurate or not, compromises the company's reputation and 
causes an economic loss". This negative publicity or discontent towards a company can lead 
not only to a public reaction, but also to political actions aimed at the company involved (du 
Toit, 2013:16). Other authors acknowledge that reputational risk can be divided into both 
business and socio-political factors; this division broadens the scope of the study as well as the 
range of risk sources (Benn, et al, 2016:830).  
O’Callaghan (2007:109) defines reputational risk as “referring to a range of ‘threats’ that have 
the potential to undermine a corporation’s ability to function as a commercial enterprise and 
impair its standing in the community”. The author further divides these risks into two broad 
categories – those social and political in nature, and those business or commercial in nature 
(O'Callaghan, 2007:109). This definition makes the relationship between reputational risk and 
political science clearer, acknowledging that reputational risk sources can certainly be political 
 
6 PwC is the second largest professional services firms and is one of the big four auditing firms alongside KPMG, 
Deloitte, and Ernst and Young.   
7 The Journal of Risk Finance is a premier journal that is focused on the field of applied financial risk management. 




factors. It is repeated throughout existing literature that reputational risk is the number one risk 
facing companies (Aon, 2017:3, Benn, et al., 2016:829, O'Callaghan, 2007:99). This is 
especially true for companies in the extractive industries of natural elements such as oil, gas 
and mining. Fragoulie & Joseph (2016:33) further emphasise that the extractive industry is 
sensitive, and companies involved are gradually being faced with increased social and 
environmental accountability issues.  
Oil and gas production are associated with substantial social costs – social dislocation, conflict, 
air pollution, oil spills, injuries and, in some cases, death (Spence, 2011:59). There are also 
threats to the reputation of the company operating in the extractive industry stemming from 
different government regulations and policies, nationalization of property, terrorism, civil 
conflicts, strikes and acts of war (Fragoulie & Joseph, 2016:39). Environmental damage has 
been identified as a major risk source in oil, gas and mining extraction, as it can fuel ethnic and 
social pressures, and consequently generate negative perceptions about the companies involved 
in the creation or expansion of damage (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:45). An increasingly-informed 
public tends to punish corporations that they deem to be acting unethically or in an exploitative 
fashion (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:94). This punishment also occurs when corporations do 
business in countries with unpopular or discredited regimes, rebel groups, or during times of 
conflict. Many companies in the extractive industry enter areas of high socio-political risk to 
start operations either unaware or without considering how it may affect their reputation.  
Africa is well-known for being endowed with plentiful natural resources, which causes many 
countries and companies turning to Africa when searching for new locations to start extraction 
or exploration projects. Despite its natural resources and the influx of international investors, 
African markets are still considered to be developing and often show signs of high socio-
political risk. It has also been identified that in less developed African economies, political 
risks (and therefore reputational risks) are rooted in the host-country and its conditions (Han , 
Liu, Gao, Ghauri, 2017:123). According to Control Risks (2019)9, only seven countries10 in 
Africa present a low political risk environment with the majority ranking between medium and 
extreme risk environments.  
Regardless of Africa’s generally high-risk environment, African resources still attract great 
investment. Behind the United States of America (USA), China is the second-largest investor 
 
9 Refer to Appendix A for the Control Risks map. 




in the continent (Sow, 2018). China has focused much of its investment in the extractive 
industries of African countries and their developing economies. In 2018 China announced that 
it would be offering US$60 billion in financial support to Africa (Sow, 2018). China is 
increasingly investing in Africa and therefore more Chinese companies have, or are looking to, 
expand operations into African countries. Any decision regarding investing in a foreign country 
carries reputational risks, especially regarding sensitive extractive industries such as mining 
and oil. African countries are also synonymous with carrying levels of higher risk for investors, 
which may create higher reputational risks.  
Alastair Fraser (2008) stated that Chinese investment in Africa “squeaks” in around the 
boundaries of more established firms. The Chinese are willing to take up assets that Western 
stakeholders have reckoned to be unattractive and do not have the courage to incorporate in 
their businesses. Anthony and Hengkun (2014:79) agree with this – Chinese companies have 
pursued partnerships with countries that are generally considered high-risk or as having poor 
relations with the West. The example these authors make use of is Sudan. Bodetti (2019) 
indicates that this is still true, maintaining that China has built much of its reputation as a 
growing world power through the economic philosophy of risk-taking, hence continuing to 
invest vast amounts of money in Africa.  
Chinese state-owned companies such as Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
present an example of this risk-taking philosophy. CNPC has come to dominate South Sudan’s 
oil industry despite South Sudan’s continuing corruption, civil war, war crimes and support for 
terrorism abroad (Bodetti, 2019). CNCP entered South Sudan in 1995, long before the country 
became independent in 2011. Despite sanctions from other countries such as the USA, CNPC 
decided to stay in South Sudan to gain a monopoly over the oil reserves. Up to 98% of the 
country's profits depend on petroleum, allowing CNPC great influence in the country (Bodetti, 
2019). Despite holding this influence, the reputational risks of the CNPC choosing to stay and 
operate in South Sudan, despite their volatile political and social environments, must be 
considered. CNPC was less risk-averse compared to other companies in their entry into South 
Sudan but they were eventually affected by political, security and reputational risks (Patey, 
2013:3). The oil industry in Sudan was developed in a context of war, sanctions and political 
isolation (Abdalla, Siti-Nabiha, Shahbudin, 2013:2). This context has changed slightly but still 




China has also invested greatly in the extractive industry in Zambia - Africa's second-largest 
metal producer. Sino-Zambian relations go back to 1964 with their relations being solidified 
with the construction of the immense Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) (Lubinda & Jian, 
2018:207). By 2014, China had invested nearly US$4 billion in Zambia with a focus on mining.  
In 2018, the mining company NFC Africa, majority-owned by China Non-ferrous Metals 
Company Limited (CNMC), invested US$832 million in Zambia’s mining industry; this 
investment extended the company's lifespan by 20 years in Zambia (Mfula, 2018). Zambia’s 
mining industry can be volatile and unstable at times – as indicated by Control Risks (2019), 
Zambia carries a medium-risk for conducting business. Despite volatility and possible 
reputational risks posed to their company; China finds the profits of operating in the country 
worth continuing operations. Notwithstanding profits and company growth, Chinese 
companies must consider reputational risk seriously.  
The Chinese government is the largest stakeholder in these companies with their financial 
support coming from the government-owned bank, Exim Bank (Hugland, 2008:557). China 
has also changed their outlook on other factors of business that increase the pressure on firms 
to maintain a good reputation with the government. China evacuated over 35 000 citizens from 
Libya during the civil war in 2011 (Anthony & Hengkun, 2014:84), which was a turning point 
in China’s commitment to protecting the lives of its citizens living and working internationally. 
This promise to protect Chinese citizens has become a domestic priority, increasing pressure 
on any companies opearting in territories of high security risk to maintain a reputation that 
reiterates the domestic safety priority.  
As previously mentioned, with high investment in the extractive industry comes high risk to 
reputation. Chinese companies have not been immune to this. In 2010, Chinese managers at 
Collum Coal Mine shot 11 Zambian workers during a protest. This was only two years after an 
explosion at the Chambishi explosive factory, killing 21 Zambian workers (Elcoate, 2018). In 
2011, Human Rights Watch released a report on labour abuse, union-busting and poverty 
wages, incriminating subsidiaries of CNMC (Lubinda & Jian, 2018:218). These two incidents 
are examples of how these companies’ reputations are negatively affected, as well as their 
operations. Reputational risk can work in two main ways – there are reputational risks when 
conducting business in a foreign country that has a high socio-political risk, but firms may also 




As Chinese investors and projects continue to operate in Africa, they become further 
interconnected in local political and economic structures (Hugland, 2008:558). This increases 
the likelihood for conflicts as seen in the above examples, especially as most political and 
economic structures in African countries are very fragile to begin with.  Monitoring of Chinese 
firms operating in Africa has increased in order to avoid these conflicts, placing their 
reputations under higher scrutiny. These highly monitored Chinese MNCs have been faced 
with increased pressures to adapt to the “norms” of international investment practices as their 
integration into the global market increases (Li, 2010:13). As Chinese investments are exposed 
to increased political, security and reputational risks, they have had to develop and improve 
their risk management and mitigation tools. As these companies evolve, it becomes apparent 
that there are fewer differences between them and traditional Western companies than what is 
portrayed or anticipated (Patey, 2013:3). Reputation is, therefore, a remarkably important asset 
and aspect for all companies, whether they operate internationally or not. 
Considering the objectives of this study, and to answer the research question as set out further 
on in this study, the theoretical frameworks behind political risk analysis must be understood. 
Political risk analysis is grounded in a combination of problem-solving and decision-making 
theories. For Brink (2004:30) this is "generally assumed to be a theory underlying rational 
decision-making under uncertainty". Political risk is seen as an uncertain field due to the ever-
changing risk environment. Venter (1998:1) writes that the analysis of political risk is a tool 
that investors, in this case Chinese companies, can use to make reasoned and justifiable 
investment decisions. The decision-makers (risk analysts in this case) should anticipate future 
events, decide what mitigation is possible about these events, and make a choice regarding 
which events would produce a preferred outcome (Venter, 1998:1). Brink (2004:3) agrees with 
this - when threats are observed and measured, political risk analysts can mitigate them and 
anticipate any possible reoccurrences in the future. To manage the uncertainties of investments 
for the investor, political risk analysis is seen as a "rational attempt at problem-solving" (Brink, 
2004:3). The theoretical frameworks of political risk analysis used in this study will be 
expanded upon and conceptualised further in chapter two.  
1.3 Research Problem and Question  
The relationship between reputational risk and political risk analysis is not always made clear 
in the field of political science. However, reputational risk can stem greatly from home and 
host country political risks, holding great importance when completing a political risk analysis. 




These links will be made through analysing the reputational risks Chinese companies face when 
operating or planning to operate in Zambia and South Sudan’s extractive industries. 
Chinese companies are classified as emerging economy multinational enterprises. There is a 
dearth in the research on how these enterprises perceive political risk in other countries where 
they are investing or operating, given the significant home-government involvement in their 
international actions (Han , et al., 2017:122). This is the primary focus of this study – looking 
at how CNPC and CNMC perceive reputational risk in South Sudan and Zambia, given that 
the Chinese government is the greatest stakeholder.  
In this study, the reputational risks will be identified and assessed using a four-point matrix. 
This is based on the aforementioned matrix developed by Swanepoel, Esterhuysen, Lotriet and 
van Vuuren in 2017. This matrix qualitatively measures reputational risk and was specifically 
designed to measure the reputational risk of a South African bank operating in Mauritius. This 
matrix will be moulded in this study to assess reputational risk in the extractive industries of 
copper and oil and in the context of political risk analysis. It will also be investigated as to 
whether these companies have risk mitigation plans. Through examining the case studies of 
Zambia and South Sudan, it will be possible to see if there are similar reputational risks between 
these two cases. The matrix will be further explained and discussed in chapter three.  
The main research question of this study is: 
What are the reputational risks to Chinese companies conducting operations in 
extractive industries in Africa?  
In order to assist in answering this research question the following steps will be taken. The 
theoretical frameworks of risk will be considered to assist in the choosing of a model to identify 
reputational risk. This model will be adjusted to suit to this study and not be focused on 
measuring or assessing but rather identifying the reputational risks to Chinese companies.  
Explanatory propositions will also be subject to analysis in this study. This includes the idea 
that Chinese companies are less concerned with their reputation when compared to other 
traditional companies such as BP or Royal Dutch Shell. Following reputational incidents that 
have occurred in Zambia and associations with South Sudan, there are prepositions that China 
is ‘high risk for high reward', investing in high-risk countries to gain higher rewards. This 
preposition not only makes Chinese companies more attractive than other traditional companies 




chapter three will assist in analysing this proposition, and unpack the risks that Chinese 
companies are taking through operating in these countries and their risk environments. 
1.4 Rationale and Objectives of the Study  
The objective of this study is to bring attention to the importance of reputational risk when 
making decisions regarding investments in foreign countries, especially investments in the 
extractive industry and emerging markets. This study aims to identify the reputational risks 
specific to Chinese companies operating in Zambia's mining industry and South Sudan’s oil 
industry, notably CNMC and CNPC. This study intends to increase the understanding of 
reputational risk (from a political science perspective) and how to identify these risks (in a 
business setting). 
As previously mentioned, reputational risk is a field that has been neglected in political 
literature, but also greatly by companies themselves. Aon's Global Risk Management Survey 
(2017) gathered information from close to 2000 respondents in both public and private 
companies – most of, if not all, these respondents ranked reputational risk as the greatest risk 
to their companies. Despite the understanding of its importance, there is a clear disjuncture 
between the information presented and the action taken to identify and mitigate reputational 
risks. The study of successful risk management and defining it involves understanding the 
social and political processes surrounding corporate success and failure (O'Callaghan, 
2007:101). 
Another survey conducted on a smaller scale – 44 respondents of companies with a minimum 
of US$10 million revenue per company respectively – found similar results. Reputational risk 
is seen as a priority for managers, yet there are still limited ways to identify, measure and 
forecast reputational risk through possible prevention and mitigation (Gaudenzi, et al., 
2015:257). Reputational risk will retain its position as a top 10 threat to companies for the 
foreseeable future and requires further research in order for companies and stakeholders to 
learn how to manage these risks correctly. Despite the research that has been conducted on 
reputational risk, incidents continue to occur. This study strives to contribute a new outlook 
and perception on reputational risk and how to identify and forecast it more effectively and 
efficiently.  
This study also focuses on the most sensitive industry in political risk analysis – the extractive 
industry. There is tremendous reputational risk attached to companies involved in Africa’s 




companies, but to help them forecast these risks more productively and allow them to 
understand how they can mitigate reputational risks. Control Risks (2019) has included 
reputational risk under their political risk forecast considerations for their risk map. However, 
this is only a recent addition - the reputational risk still has much growing to do in the field of 
political risk analysis, both through academic research and literature, as well as within business 
settings.  
Outside of political risk analysis, this study will also contribute to contextualising Chinese and 
African relations further. Chinese engagement in Africa is a contentious subject; much of the 
literature focuses on this engagement from an African perspective but not from a Chinese 
perspective. Li (2010:5) believes that this relationship is over-scrutinised (by the public) but 
under-researched (within academia). Patey (2013:4) echoed this notion, also believing that 
changing the research angle to dissect how Africa is impacting China would refine the research 
on this topic. Nine years ago, Li already identified that Chinese operations in Africa are under 
the microscope of Western media (2010:5). These operations also challenge traditional 
Western engagement in Africa.  
This study therefore offers contextualisation of individual cases and furthers the research on 
Sino-African relations; it will contribute to the political science field by broadening the scope 
of research on reputational risk. The research conducted in this study will further help broaden 
the scope of traditional political risk analysis, as well as offer African risk analysis from an 
African perspective.  
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
This study aims to locate the reputational risks of Chinese companies, CNMC and CNPC, 
investing and operating in the extractive industries of metal and oil in Africa, through research 
that is explanatory and descriptive in nature. Neuman (2014:38) defines descriptive research 
as presenting a picture of the specific details of a certain situation, social setting or relationship. 
In this case, the details of Chinese companies' operations in South Sudan and Zambia will be 
descriptive research, looking at the how and who of operations. This research is also 
explanatory, building on descriptive research, to explain the reputational risks of these 
companies operating in South Sudan and Zambia. Explanatory research aims to look for causes 
and reasons (Neuman, 2014:40). In this case, the descriptive research – presenting a specified 
detail-oriented picture of the situation – will inform and allow the explanatory research – 




study attempts to create a double tiered study to further inform the place of reputational risks 
and the causes and outcomes in political science and its literature. 
The research design to be used in this study is both comparative and empirical in nature. This 
design requires examining existing data and analysing it to determine the causal circumstances 
surrounding reputational risks of Chinese companies operating in Africa’s extractive 
industries. The research design also includes a multiple case study design analysis, commonly 
used in the social sciences. Neuman (2014:42) argues that case study research has the following 
strengths: conceptual validity, heuristic impact, casual mechanisms identification, an ability to 
capture complexity, calibration, and holistic elaboration. These strengths allow for a 
tremendously broad topic to be narrowed down into more easily researchable problems, 
currently and for the future. Gustafsson (2017) agrees that multiple case studies allow for a 
wider discovery of theory and, therefore, research questions. 
The research methodology of this study is qualitative, relying on existing secondary data. 
Qualitative research is a tool used for explanatory research and is the most common method of 
research in the field of politics. Qualitative research allows for an in-depth examination of 
subjects and allows explanatory and causal links to be indicated (Ritchie, 2003:28), which goes 
in partnership with empirical research. Qualitative research and data also allow for new 
theoretical insights to be drawn up (Han , et al., 2017:126), which therefore provides better 
understanding of the topic, as well as more questions to be discussed. The secondary data used 
in this study consists of books, journal articles, reports, theses and databases, made available 
through the University of Stellenbosch.  
 A multiple case study approach can result in stronger and more reliable data than a single case 
study design (Gustafsson, 2017). Multiple case study design also allows the author to study not 
only similarities, but also differences between the cases. The multiple case study design used 
in this study is inclusive of a comparative aspect.  Comparative case studies are common in 
political science. Comparative case study design can recreate the logic of an experiment to 
study phenomena that cannot be easily studied using a normal experiment. This includes 
phenomena such as wars, coups, mortgage crises, and in this study, risk (Barakso, Sabet, 
Schaffner, 2014:179). Furthermore, comparative case studies embrace nuance and complexity, 
two factors that are common in risk studies (Barakso, et al., 2014:178). The comparative aspect 
of this study supports the multiple case study approach through using aspects from both 




discussed, expanded on and understood. This study has been approached in this manner in 
order to prove that it is necessary to view reputational risks from a political science perspective, 
in order to fully understand the economic and social consequences the risks may present. 
This research focuses on two case studies – South Sudan and Zambia. Chinese companies are 
extremely active in Africa, especially within the extractive industries. As mentioned, China is 
the second-largest investor in Africa, and has a different philosophy when it comes to risk-
taking in comparison to other countries. Chinese companies are also younger in their operations 
in Africa; companies such as Total or Royal Dutch Shell have been operational for decades in 
Africa, while Chinese companies have only recently made their mark on the continent. Royal 
Dutch Shell has experienced greatly realised reputational risks in Africa and as such, has 
developed risk mitigation and recovery tactics. This makes Chinese companies a better subject 
for this study as they have not yet developed risk mitigation and management techniques for 
their African business deals. 
South Sudan and Zambia have been chosen as the case studies for this study as they have both 
attracted great Chinese investment in their respective extractive industries. Zambian-Sino 
relations go back to the 1960s, showing a strong relationship between the two countries. China 
also decided to not withdraw from South Sudan after independence, unlike most other countries 
and companies, making it one of the few subjects still available for research in South Sudan.  
The unit of analysis for this study is individual Chinese companies, namely CNMC and CNPC. 
The two countries studied also allow for a comparison and contrast to take place.  Both South 
Sudan and Zambia have varying political risks that can affect the reputation of Chinese 
companies operating in these countries. With China’s growing investment and operations in 
Africa, this study is relevant to these companies now and for the future. 
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations of Study  
One distinct limitation of this study is the definition and conceptualisation of political risk 
itself. Political risk is a concept that has been defined multiple times by multiple authors 
throughout its history as a discipline. However, many authors have agreed that there has not 
been a consensus reached on a specific definition of the term (Alon, et al., 2006:624). These 
varying definitions will be expanded upon in chapter two to provide more context, as will the 
definition used in this study.  
Brink (2004:2) further adds to this discussion that the measurement and observation of political 




issue with political risk analysis; to counteract this subjectivity, designed political risk models 
are employed when measuring political risk. In this case, the employment of the four-point 
matrix (Swanepoel, Esterhuysen, van Vuuren & Lotriet, 2017), used to measure reputational 
risk, will assist in providing a more objective stance and act as a tool to counteract human 
subjectivity.  
The definition of reputational risk is also a limitation; there is no consensus on a definition of 
reputational risk, although many are available (Eckert, 2017:150). There are, therefore, 
numerous ways to measure reputational risk. Confusion in literature around an exact definition 
also leads to differing opinions on measurement methods (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:316); this 
will also be expanded on in chapter two, offering the numerous definitions available. Chapter 
three will further expand on measurement methods commonly used to measure reputational 
risk, the model created by Swanepoel, et al., and why this model is suitable for this study. The 
definition and measuring tool followed for this study will once again be made clear.  
Another limitation identified in this study concerns the information surrounding Chinese 
companies operating in Africa. The specific risk analysis methods or mitigation plans of these 
companies is not publicly available, and therefore, this study is conducted with limited 
knowledge of the specifics of Chinese companies' operations in Africa. To overcome this 
limitation, the author is creating her own risk analysis method in this study to measure 
reputational risk specifically. This model could be recommended to these companies or be used 
in addition to any other methods they do make use of.  The situation in South Sudan is one of 
extreme volatility and has an ongoing state of emergency that was declared earlier this year, 
2019. Information and actions coming out of South Sudan related to this study will therefore 
only be considered until July 2019. Any action after this could be used for further studies, 
however, would not fit into the timespan of this study. 
This study also makes use of secondary data and has no primary data collection. Secondary 
data is popular with social scientists, although the data has originally been gathered by someone 
else and the current researcher has no control over how and where the data was captured. When 
using secondary data, the researcher must consider the units in the data – time and place, 
sampling method, specific issues or topics covered. This will be addressed throughout chapters 




1.7 Outline of Remainder of Study  
Chapter two will expand upon the theoretical frameworks that form the basis of this study – 
problem-solving and decision-making theories; a conceptualisation of important terms will also 
be provided for better comprehension of this study. Terms such as political risk, country risk, 
reputational risk, political instability, home and host risk, and macro and micro political risk 
will be conceptualised. Conceptualising these terms will assist in understanding the model 
presented in chapter three and further helps to build the application of the case studies in 
chapters four and five.  
Chapter three will be divided into two sections. The first half of chapter three will introduce 
the 4-point matrix model used to assess reputational risk in the banking sector developed by 
Swanepoel, Esterhuysen, van Vuuren and Lotriet (2017). The second half of chapter three will 
expand upon the changes made to the model and why these changes have been made for the 
model to suit the extractive industry and therefore, this study.  
Chapters four and five will provide a contextualisation of Chinese companies operating in 
Zambia's copper belt and South Sudan's oil reserves respectively. The contextualisation will 
provide further insight as to why these two case studies were chosen for this study. 
Furthermore, this chapter will look more in-depth at the reputational risks of Chinese 
companies operating in Zambia and South Sudan. This will be achieved by using the model 
described in chapter three to measure and assess the reputational risk of South Sudan and 
Zambia.  
Chapter six will provide a conclusion to this study, evaluating the research completed and 
discussed in the previous chapters. A conclusion on both case studies will be reached 
individually, and a conclusion on the comparison between the two case studies will be 
discussed.  Further recommendations for future research on reputational risk and how it affects 
the operations of Chinese companies in Africa will also be provided through critically assessing 
the results from the analyses in chapters four and five.   
1.8 Conclusion  
This first chapter of this study has provided not only an outline of the chapters and research to 
come, but has also offered basic outlines regarding concepts related to and used in the study. 
Background information and a preliminary literature review have provided insight into what 
reputational risk is, why it is of importance in political risk analysis, and why the case studies 




reputational risks to Chinese companies conducting operations in extractive industries in 
Africa?" has been established. The steps to answer the research question have further been 
outlined in this chapter.  
This study is descriptive and explanatory in nature, making use of qualitative secondary data 
with a multiple case study design inclusive of a comparative aspect. Furthermore, this chapter 
has introduced the method that will be used to assess the reputational risk of South Sudan and 






















Chapter 2: Theoretical Grounding and Conceptualisations 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is set out to achieve three goals. The first goal is to explain the theoretical 
grounding of this study and the two theories that help drive political risk analysis – decision-
making and problem-solving theories. The second goal of this chapter is to provide a 
conceptualisation of important terms related to this study and the main research question. An 
in-depth conceptualisation allows for a greater understanding of terms such as reputation, 
political risk and reputational risk. This is important as it allows you, the reader, to have a better 
understanding of the chapters that follow, where these terms are used to help explain, answer 
and analyse the main research question of this study relating to Chinese companies, Zambia 
and South Sudan.  
The final goal of this chapter is to offer a contextualisation of risks that are traditionally specific 
to the extractive industry as the central subjects of this study are the mining and oil industries. 
This contextualisation is significant as it shows the relationship between reputational risk and 
the extractive industry. This section offers awareness into how this industry is more susceptible 
to micropolitical risks, one of these being reputational risk. This section specifies how the 
extractive industry is more vulnerable to damaging reputational understanding and carries 
greater reputational risk in general when compared to other industries. 
 As will be seen with many of these terms, there are multiple definitions, conceptualisations 
and debates surrounding them. The purpose of this chapter is to offer an overview of these 
debates around terms such as political risk and reputational risk. Furthermore, this chapter aims 
to bring these debates together to offer the reader greater insight into the fields being studied 
here – namely political risk, reputational risk and political risk analysis.   
2.2 Theoretical Grounding: Decision-Making and Problem-Solving Theory  
Much of the work that steers society’s course and economic and governmental organizations 
of society revolves around making decisions and solving problems (Simon, Dantzig, Hogarth, 
Plott, Raiffa, Schelling, Shepsie, Thaler, Tversky & Winter, 1987:11). Although this notion 
emerged during the 1980s, it can still be considered true today. Electing problems that 
necessitate attention, creating goals, finding and designing the correct courses of action, and 
evaluating and selecting alternative actions all make up this work that assists in steering society 




all commonly known as problem-solving (Simon, et al., 1987:11). Evaluating and selecting 
actions are commonly known as decision-making.  
Problem-solving and decision-making theories are mainly concerned with how people “cut 
problems down to size” (Simon, et al., 1987:11). This involves looking at how people apply 
heuristic techniques to help them handle complex problems that cannot be managed precisely.  
When looking to invest in a new project or expand into a new country, the investor may be 
uncertain of the best route to follow. These two theories and their relationship to political risk 
have stood the test of time and, even in the expansion of globalization, scholars involved in 
decision theory are still interested in the unpacking of political risk and political risk analysis 
(Sottilotta, 2013:13).   
To reduce the uncertainty related to new investments or expansion, an individual or business 
should take the steps involved in decision-making. These steps include conceptualising the idea 
to invest in or expand operations, creating a feasibility study of the possible outcomes, 
preparing detailed requirements, implementing the decisions made and finally, operating on 
the initial concept (Brink, 2002:46). When decision-makers have gathered enough information, 
they can change some uncertainties into risk, which can translate into action against these 
identified risks (Han, et al., 2017:124). Rational decision-making processes assume that full 
utilization of information and a rational ability to estimate the likelihood of alternative outcome 
have taken place (Lax, 1983:15). This purpose is served by adding a political dimension to 
decision-making processes, specifically regarding investments and future ventures by firms. 
Political risk analysis, according to Lax (1983:15), is seen as a crucial part of rationalizing 
decisions regarding investments.   
As mentioned, decision-making theory aids in making rational decisions during periods of 
uncertainty – in this case, political uncertainty. Decision-making theory is accompanied by the 
decision analysis process where one transforms decision problems into transparent decisions 
(Howard, 1988:680). This is achieved through formulating, evaluating and appraising before 
acting on the decision problem; this is viewed as a systematic procedure. An individual or 
business formulates an alternative that is logically consistent with the decision problem, 
evaluates this alternative and then an appraisal of the analysis can take place.  
This appraisal looks at why the alternative is not only logically correct but also persuasive 
enough that the decision-maker will act accordingly to the alternative presented (Howard, 




until the alternative is considered the most correct option for the decision-maker, and only then 
can the appraisal analysis stop. When formulating the decision, one has a set of “sensitivities” 
- one considers the choices (alternatives to the problem), the information presented (models or 
probability assignments) and preferences (value, time and risk preferences) (Howard, 
1988:681). After this has taken place the analysis of the alternative can begin.  
The work of political risk analysis is also centred on problem-solving theory (Lambrechts, 
Weldon, Boshoff, 2011:108). Problem-solving theory allows risk analysts to understand and 
forecast political risks that could potentially pose a problem to the profitability of a chosen 
investment. A political risk analyst can analyse and compare the various options to try and 
manage the uncertainty of the investor – this is a rational attempt at problem-solving (Brink, 
2002:46).  Together, these two theories allow for political risk analysis to act as an important 
tool for executive decision-making (Sottilotta, 2013:1). This tool can be used in guiding new 
investments and expansions in different economic sectors (Lambrechts, et al., 2011:108). 
Risk analysis and quantification are provided to offer input to an underlying “decision 
problem” (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981:25-26). This “decision problem” involves risks as well as 
other costs and benefits. Risk should therefore always be well thought-out within a decision 
theory framework. Through making use of the decision-making tool that these two theories – 
decision-making and problem-solving – offer, an awareness of the risks (problems) can be 
created. Once awareness is created, steps can be put into place to assist either avoiding or 
profiting from the problems (Brink, 2002:46). This is where risk mitigation tools assist in 
safeguarding against risks and helping firms either avoid, manage, or profit from risks.   
2.3 Risk  
Unlike a concept such as instability, risk is not a tangible thing; it can be defined and assessed 
in various ways. Some assess risk as a potential loss in financial flows, as possible 
underperformance in business operations, or as a negative incident that cannot be measured 
under uncertain circumstances (Gaudenzi, et al., 2015:251).  Some use statistical probability to 
define risk, while others look at the potential loss in relation to the potential gain (Han, et al., 
2017:123).  Kaplan and Garrick (1981:12) refer to risk as involving both uncertainty and loss 
or damage that might be experienced. These authors state that risk is often seen as probability 
times consequence; however, they prefer the notion that risk is probability and consequence, 
believing that the definition of probability times consequence may be misleading (Kaplan & 




risk as seen by Kaplan and Garrick – oil and gas companies may compete for the rights to an 
extraction industry in a certain country. During the decision-making process, the companies 
vying for the rights to extraction are in a state of uncertainty, however, they are not facing risks 
– there is probability that they may not get the rights but there are no consequences to this 
decision. There is only probability but no consequence which implies no risk as indicated by 
Kaplan and Garrick.  
According to Bremmer and Keat (2009:4), risk is the probability that any given event will result 
in a measurable loss to a certain extent. For these authors, risk is made up of two factors – 
probability and impact. The authors refer to questions such as “how likely is this risk to occur?” 
and “how big of an impact will it have?” to determine the probability and impact (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:4). Yet, it can be tough to answer these questions or determine where the risk is 
originating from or being created. A risky event is part of a causal chain – a certain cause (or 
causes) can increase the probability that an event will occur, then resulting in business loss 
(Bremmer & Keat, 2009:4). Once the event has occurred, it will carry consequences that 
depend on who is exposed to the risk event.  Benn et al (2016:830) see risk as the product of 
social, organisational and managerial processes that have the potential to create negative 
consequences for a firm. This is different to some of the previous definitions in that it relies on 
mistakes being made within the company, rather than defining processes both within and 
without the company as the other definitions suggest. 
Risk can also be portrayed as expectations concerning future instability - expectations that have 
a market value and possibly determine future profits (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:545). While 
current conditions are not seen as risks, risk rather originates from changes in/to the current 
conditions (Lax, 1983:8). Risk is therefore a subjective observation of how instability could 
affect a firm in the future; risks are assessed to forecast the likelihood of different types of 
instability. A definition of risk that is more appropriate for this study, and the overall subject 
of reputational risk, is "an unfavourable event, capable of generating a negative deviation from 
an expected situation, such as a smaller gain or a greater loss than expected" (Gaudenzi, et al., 
2015:251). This is a more appropriate definition than those previously discussed as reputational 
risks can result in negative results or consequences in different business areas. This idea will 
be clarified once again when defining reputational risk later in this study.  
Lax (1983:8) identifies that with risk, an individual or business is able to calculate probabilities 




(2003:546) agree with this, affirming that risk suggests that there is a capacity to form a 
judgement – even if it is subjective – about the probability of different types of instability11. 
Once an assessment is made one can safeguard against these risk(s). Kaplan and Garrick 
(1981:12) reiterate this point further, stating that "risk is never zero", although safeguarding is 
awareness, and awareness of risk reduces risk. Risk assessment, when part of the investment 
decision-making process, is project-specific and can be firm- or even product-specific but is 
inevitably an important step in the process (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:542). 
One should note that there are not only negative implications of risk. When a thorough risk 
analysis takes place, opportunities where risk may result in growth, even if there is a possibility 
of losses, must be acknowledged (du Toit, 2013:6). As stated, risk should be constructed as 
being firm- or project-specific as it depends largely on the goals and resources of a given firm 
or project (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:546). These authors believe this firm- or project-specific 
risk assessment should be done rather than a country risk analysis – a term to be conceptualised 
further along in this chapter. This section ends with the notion that risk is a subjective 
judgement that is made on the probability that an event may occur, realistically assuming that 
an event that will carry a consequence or impact on all parties involved. 
2.4 The Evolution of Political Risk  
As previously mentioned in chapter one, political risk is a difficult term to define. Throughout 
political literature, there are multiple definitions offered by multiple authors. However, one 
consensus can be taken away from the literature – that there is no consensus on a definition of 
political risk (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249, Alon, et al., 2006:624). Political risk was initially 
introduced as a component of country risk. This was done to help explain the causes of 
insolvency of a country that was not a direct result of financial or economic factors (Sottilotta, 
2013:1). Country risk and political risk are two terms that were once considered to be 
synonyms.  However, country risk analysis is of a much larger scale than that of political risk12. 
A country’s political risk and country risk are also not necessarily connected as a country can 
have a low country risk and a high political risk.  
 
11 Even though there are 20 years separating these articles, the definition and ideas surrounding risk have not 
changed in a significant manner within the necessary literature. 
12 Country risk analysis uses tools such as the balance of payment sheets or country creditworthiness, whereas 




Country risk incorporates total risks – non-business or business – that a country offers to 
foreign investors and firms (Brink, 2002:29). The main actors concerned with country risk are 
countries that are petitioning for loans and then banks, states or monetary organizations that 
are willing to provide these loans. Howell (1998:4) indicates that country risk analysis includes 
examining the economic and financial characteristics of a system to forecast conditions in 
which foreign investors will likely encounter problems in certain national environments. Thus, 
political risk is a specific relation of country risk (Brink, 2002:29). Country risk implies a 
country’s inability to repay loans if granted, whereas political risk refers to a country’s 
unwillingness to repay the loans (Brink, 2004:23). 
The term political risk has evolved greatly since the 1960s with events throughout history 
changing the reception of political risk (Sottilotta, 2013:2). Events such as the Suez Canal 
crisis13, the 1973 OPEC oil crisis14, the 1979 Iranian Revolution15, debt management in the 
1980s16 and attacks on the World Trade Centre in the 1990s17 affected political risk and the 
perceptions of it. These events have all had large impacts on the perception of political risk by 
the business world and transformed the face of global politics. Political risk is influenced by 
the passages of law, the shortcomings of leaders and the rise of popular movements – all factors 
that can either politically stabilize or destabilize a country (Bremmer, 2005:52). 
 
13  This crisis involved forces from Great Britain, Israel and France launching a joint attack against Egypt in 1956 
to rid the country of General Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule. The attacks failed and marked the decline of Great 
Britain's colonial rule in the Middle East. The result was the vital Suez Canal being nationalized by Nassar, 
replacing the Anglo-French company that ran the canal prior to the attack (Al Jazeera, 2008).  
14 1973 saw the smaller, militarily weaker and less developed nations acting though the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to create an embargo on oil (Issawi, 1979:3). Supply was affected and prices were 
pushed up greatly by oil-producing countries, heavily affecting the global economy. 
15 The Iranian Revolution led to the last royal family of Iran being ousted (Ansari, 1999). The royal family had 
been supported by the USA as a result of Cold War politics. The monarch's government was replaced with the 
Islamic Republic and had strained relations with the West for many years thereafter. 
16 In the 1980s, the world was facing imbalances, high inflation, unemployment, current account deficits and lower 
commodity prices. Many Latin American and African countries entered the 1980's with high levels of debt (United 
Nations, 2017:51-52). They could not repay their debt due to high debt service payments; these countries were 
pressured into adopting programmes that required drastic changes in political and economic management.  
17 Ramzi Yousef planted a bomb that he hoped would bring down one of the twin towers in New York (Foden & 
Reeve, 2001). Although his plan failed, 6 people died and over 1000 were injured. Many believed that the attacks 




A firm’s domestic political environment can affect its operations, making the concern of 
political risk as important for locally based firms as it is for international firms; political risk 
generally tends, however, to focus on investment abroad (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:1). 
Most firms are comfortable and familiar with their domestic political environment as most 
executives are aware of and understand the home-based political processes (Lax, 1983:4-5). 
Foreign political circumstances and events are generally not understood as well; this makes 
these political conditions aboard riskier and less predictable. 
It is important to define and measure political risk, as any firm that wishes to pursue business 
opportunities in one or more foreign countries is susceptible to political risks and the 
consequences thereof (Alon & Herbert, 2009:136). Defining and measuring political risk is an 
evolutionary process for both academics and risk analysts; political risk is a dynamic field, 
having and continuing to change constantly. Political risk is regarded as "highly complex and 
multidimensional phenomenon" (du Toit, 2013:5). Political risk is hard to define due to its 
nature of being a process and not necessarily a sudden event. Risk is not fixed and can evolve 
(du Toit, 2013:5). This can be seen in the evolution of political risk definitions and 
conceptualisations as explored in this chapter. 
As with any risk, political risk can have positive or negative outcomes for different entities 
(Alon & Herbert, 2009:130). There can also be differing consequences for different firms, as 
not all political events that may have negative effects on one firm will necessarily have negative 
effects for all international firms in all situations (Kobrin, 1979:67). Bremmer (2005:52) echoes 
this notion, maintaining that the impact of risks depends greatly on the investment that is being 
undertaken. Every investment also needs a specific analysis – a hedge fund manager would be 
more concerned with a development that might impact the markets tomorrow, whereas a CEO 
investing aboard would be interested in a longer-term analysis. 
The above notion is illustrated by Frynas and Mellahi (2003:548) and their example of the 
Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970. This civil war created issues for onshore oil production being 
conducted by international oil companies, yet it created an opportunity for other firms as they 
could expand their offshore oil production during the time of political instability18. There were 
 
18 Political risk and political instability are related concepts yet should not be confused. Political instability is a 
criterion to measure the probability of political risk occurring and, like political uncertainty, is a property of 




negative implications created for some firms, due to the risk created by the civil war, and 
opportunities created for other firms. It is argued by Van der Lugt and Hamblin (cited in du 
Toit, 2013:5-6) that Chinese firms have this outlook on risk and political risk (of possible 
opportunity) when investing in Africa. For these firms, risk can equate to gains and lead them 
to invest in countries with higher political risk, including the case studies of this study - South 
Sudan and Zambia.  
Political risk is often thought of as a relationship between the host government and foreign 
business companies - the main sources of political risk are generally considered to be 
nationalization and expropriation (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:1). In the past, it was also 
common for country risk to be synonymous with political risk (Alon, et al., 2006:626). 
However, this viewpoint has changed as the field has evolved. Specific projects, companies, 
and even industries face different risks within a country, risks that cannot be solely analysed 
using a country-risk model. Furthermore, the views of nationalization and expropriation as the 
main sources of political risk has also changed (Alon, et al., 2006:626). The increase of risk 
related to terrorism since 9/1119 has forced this change in thought. 
Handel and West (1975:11) define political risk as "the risk or probability of occurrence of 
some political events that will change the prospects for the profitability of a given investment". 
These authors later noted that political risk is both investor- and investment-specific. Lax 
(1983:9) chooses to define political risk as the probability that the goals of a venture will be 
affected by changes in the political environment. It is the probability that political changes will 
create a change in the investment climate that is regulating the venture. This definition was 
given during the time of debt management20 when investment and debt programmes were being 
implemented. The structural adjustment programmes required many policy changes in 
numerous countries to qualify for loans, inherently changing their political environments.  
Llewellyn Howell (1998:3) offers a similar definition to Handel and West (1975), and Lax 
(1983), defining political risk as the possibility of a political decision or event in a country 
inducing change in the business climate. This effect can result in investors losing money or not 
 
political event taking place. An example of political instability is an unexpected change in government leadership 
that may or may not hold political risk for international business (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250). 
19 The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York changed how foreign affairs and security were viewed 
by the government (Bremmer, 2005:52). The attacks changed risk calculations all over the world and spurred a 
new political risk outlook. 




generating the profits they had expected. This definition was provided after the World Trade 
Centre21 attack in New York that saw investors exercising caution when pursuing new 
investments in the USA, due to one event that proved to be a great security and political scare.   
The most common category of definitions of political risk is related to government or sovereign 
actions (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249). These definitions focus on the unwanted costs of government 
or sovereign actions. Kobrin (1979:67) states that these unwanted actions can include 
interfering with or stopping business transactions, altering terms of agreement, or causing a 
seizure of solely- or partially-owned foreign business property.  A second category looks at 
political risk in terms of events (Kobrin, 1979:67; Fitzpatrick, 1983:249). These incidences 
may include political acts or restrictions imposed on a specific industry or firm, or even a 
combination of both. 
A third category of definitions offered looks further into the impact of the surrounding business 
environment on political risk rather than political risk in isolation. In accordance with this 
category, political risk in business occurs when discontinuities, which are difficult to forecast, 
occur in the business environment as a result of a political event (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250). These 
events are considered a risk as they have the potential to affect the profit (or other goals) of a 
firm. These environmental factors can include instability and direct violence, restrictions on 
operations due to expropriation, discriminatory taxation or public sector competition (Kobrin, 
1979:67).  
The fourth and final political risk definition category looks at political risk in an environmental 
context, like category three, however there is no detailed definition or conceptualisation of 
political risk. Those that assign themselves to this category do not search for a definition of 
political risk; it is rather acknowledged that a source of risk to international firms originates in 
the political environment or the general environment (Kobrin, 1979:67; Fitzpatrick, 1983:250). 
This category simply acknowledges that political risk indeed exists in the international 
environment, but the category does not pursue the nature of these political risks in any detail 
or depth. The research explained here took place during the aftermath of the 1973 OPEC oil 
crisis in which the world was thrust into economic and political turmoil. The 1970s also saw 
 




the unfolding of the Cold War22 where political decisions were starting to impact the actions 
of business and investors at a higher rate than previously seen.   
Political risk changes according to different eras, home and host countries, and firms and 
organizations involved (Alon, et al., 2006:626). This is illustrated through the evolution of 
political risk definitions as indicated above and further on in this study. Political risk is now 
seen as a broader concept that is grounded in and influenced by many environmental aspects 
(Alon & Herbert, 2009:128). A widely-accepted definition used by many scholars looks at 
political risk as "the governmental and societal actions and policies, originating either within 
or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of 
foreign business operations and investments" (Alon, et al., 2006:625). However, Alon 
acknowledges that this definition is not complete and chooses to add an economic dimension 
to this definition. The economic climate of a country is an incredibly important source of 
political risk - the relationship between politics and economics has long been acknowledged, 
therefore the risks involved cannot be separated. Adding an economic dimension also offers a 
more accurate definition of political risk, as most firms include economic variables in their 
political risk analysis models (Alon, et al., 2006:626; Alon & Herbert, 2009:129).   
Bremmer and Keat (2009:5) define political risk as the probability that political action will 
result in changes in economic outcomes. Robert McKellar (2010:3) offers a concise definition 
of political risk: “potential harm to a business operation arising from political behaviour”, 
which echoes the definition offered by Bremmer and Keat. Stottilotta (2013:6) additionally 
offers a similar definition to these authors, defining political risk as the probability that the 
profitability of a venture can be negatively affected by conditions ascribable to unforeseen 
changes in the domestic or international political arena, or due to governmental policy choices 
affecting the international investor’s property rights.  
Frynas and Mellahi (2003:546) maintain that to develop a full understanding of political risk 
one must evaluate the different sources of risk/uncertainty. In their article, five types of 
uncertainty are expanded upon – political uncertainty, government policy uncertainty, social 
uncertainty, macroeconomic uncertainty and natural uncertainty (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:546). 
 
22  The Cold War was a period of tension between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies, from 1946-
1991 (Blakemore, 2019).  During these 45 years, there was an arms race, proxy wars involving many allies and 




For this study, political, policy and social uncertainty are of importance as they hold the 
potential to affect reputation. Political uncertainty relates to threats and opportunities resulting 
from "potential or actual changes in the political system". These threats can include war, 
revolutions, coup d'états, change of government, or incidences of political upheaval - political 
risk is perpetually connected to political change (Truscott, 2006:20). When a manager makes 
a probability judgement relating to an uncertain political event in the host country, they are 
converting a political uncertainty into a political risk (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250). 
 Policy uncertainty can come from instability in government policies that hold the ability to 
impact the business environment. Social uncertainty comes from the beliefs, values and 
attitudes of the general population that are not involved in government policy or business 
practices (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:547). Social uncertainty can manifest in social unrest, 
demonstrations, riots and the like. Brink (2002:29) adds that political risk indicates a degree of 
impact that governmental policies and societal actions transpiring within (internal risks) or 
outside (external risks) the host country can have on foreign firms’ operations and investments. 
Brink not only acknowledges that political risk can stem from both host and home countries, 
but also that societal actions, as a result of social uncertainty, play an important role.  
As shown, there is a plethora of definitions and debates surrounding the conceptualisation of 
political risk. Rice and Zegart (2016:6) provide the preferred definition that will be used for 
this study – "twenty-first-century political risk is the probability that a political action could 
significantly affect a company's business". This definition emphasises the increasingly 
important role of risk generators that originate from outside the typical places such as capitals, 
army barracks and party headquarters. This definition is supported by a strand of research that 
looks at political risk as a multifaceted phenomenon that can arise from various home and host 
country sources (Han, et al., 2017:124). These sources of risk are also no longer the traditional 
ones as mentioned by Rice and Zegart – Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), sustainable 
development and treatment of local employees are all factors that have become sources of 
political risk. The main takeaway from the definition of Rice and Zegart is that political actions 
that may impact business can occur everywhere.  
2.5 Political Risk Analysis 
In order to fully understand the suitability of the four-point matrix used for this study, a 
background to political risk analysis is necessary. Political risk analysis aims to bring attention 




2014:309). As is mentioned in the definition of political risk by Rice and Zegart23, these levels 
or origins of political risk are no longer from traditional areas, but political risk can occur 
anywhere and everywhere. This is what political risk analysis currently considers. Models are 
created that consists of the political and social characteristics of a country. The variables 
chosen, why these variables are chosen, the number of variables and the weights given to each 
variable are decided by the theory held by the model builders (Howell, 2014:308). Brink 
(2004:42) further argues that improvement in the field of political risk analysis requires 
industry-specific, time-specific and investment climate-specific analyses to take place, which 
is part of the aim of this chapter. 
The aim of conducting a political risk analysis is to gain and provide information to the investor 
upon the nature and level of political risk involved in their business ventures. This allows the 
investor information on which to base their investment decision and pursuit of operations (du 
Toit, 2013:7). Political risks analysis is not an exact science and it is not possible to accurately 
predict it; one can merely forecast political risk. This is done through basing evidence on 
scientific theories or empirical evidence (Brink, 2004:27). The political risk analysis’ quality, 
methodology, and the quality of data used all influence the reliability and validity of the 
forecast being made (du Toit, 2013:7).  
When conducting a political risk analysis, researchers must be aware of the relationships 
between variables and indicators. Several models studied by Howell (2014:312) listed the 
extent of democracy and involvement of the military in politics as two separate indicators. 
These two variables are, however, interrelated and can be combined into one indicator. This is 
the basis of deciding which indicators can be eliminated or combined with others in order to 
prevent the assessment becoming distorted.  
There are many models that have been created for political risk analysis, with some being 
qualitative and others being quantitative. Qualitative models consider soft factors24 whereas 
quantitative models consider hard factors25 (Boshoff, 2010:29). For the best possible analysis 
 
23 Refer to page 39.  
24 Soft factors include uneducated or unemployed politically-mobile workers, depletion of scarce resources or 
levels of adult literacy (Boshoff, 2010:19). Soft factors focus on events that could contribute to political risk but 
are not clear and observable.  
25 Hard factors consider states of emergency, political instability, disputes, failed states, and ideologically 




to take place a model should be a combination of both soft and hard factors. The main argument 
for the use of qualitative approaches is that the political situation and risk factors are considered 
in context (du Toit, 2013:7). Specific situations can be considered in the context in which they 
take place and problem-solving theory can be applied to the situation. A wider range of 
information can also be gathered when applying the qualitative approach.  
Both a strength and weakness to qualitative models are that the analysis relies on the analytical 
skills of the analyst. The analyst has subjective judgement (as all humans do) that can see 
anomalies that quantitative methods might not; however, subjectivity can also harm the 
analysis (Boshoff, 2010:30). Despite this, qualitative models are still preferred as there is great 
difficulty in representing social situations mathematically for a quantitative approach. 
Reputation depends greatly on the perception of stakeholders and reputational risk often arises 
from social situations. The context of political and social situations in South Sudan and Zambia 
are under consideration for this study and therefore contribute to reputational risk. A qualitative 
approach allows for this context to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, as indicated, when 
considering political and social factors, a qualitative model is the best option. These factors 
contribute to reputational risk and therefore, the choice of a qualitative model is the most 
suitable option for this study.  
2.6  Reputation  
Any firm planning to start operations or amidst operations mainly aims to achieve a profit as 
failing this is harmful to the firm. If a firm maintains this outlook, it is possible for them to lose 
sight of other factors that may be less tangible, but are equally as important for a business to 
succeed (McKellar, 2010:4). An example of this skewed outlook is “realised political risk” that 
can damage a firm’s reputation. Reputation is a broad concept and an exact definition depends 
greatly on the discipline in which one is creating an analysis (Dominguez, et al., 2016:1). 
Within the strategic management discipline, reputation is seen as a resource, yet from the 
sociological perspective reputation is seen as an outcome of shared socially constructed 
perceptions.   
Firms across the world will have a set of important assets that allow the firm to pursue 
successful business ventures. These assets may differ in different sectors of business, but three 
general assets can be identified across the board – people, reputation and performance 
(McKellar, 2010:57). Reputation, as an asset, is of substantial importance to firms as it offers 




from their competitors (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:315). McKellar (2010:59) defines a firm's 
reputation as "character as perceived by key stakeholders, including owners/stakeholders, staff, 
investors, partners and societies in which the firm operates". In this case, societies include 
NGOs and media outlets who monitor businesses ethical performance.  
Reputation allows a firm moral gravitas and credibility, two undoubtedly important sources of 
influence, when seeking support for new business ventures (McKellar, 2010:59). However, 
reputation is an intangible asset and not an easy concept to define, making it difficult to measure 
or evaluate (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:315; Dominguez, et al., 2016:1). Nevertheless, it is widely 
agreed upon that a loss of reputation can affect competitiveness, business and/or societal 
positions, stakeholder loyalty, media standing, income, public image and legitimacy of 
operations (Benn, et al., 2016:830; The Reputation Institute, 2019). A poor or damaged 
reputation can lead to shareholders believing that disaster awaits a firm and that the firm may 
not be capable of withstanding the disaster (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:314).  
Despite the difficulty with defining and measuring reputation, it is a fundamental asset that 
offers tangible benefits to businesses (Dominguez, et al., 2016:1). These benefits include 
premium prices for products, lowers costs for capital and labour, greater employee loyalty, 
greater scope for decision-making and greater goodwill standing in critical situations, among 
others. Furthermore, a good reputation boosts investment from various stakeholders in a given 
company and relates to a greater overall return (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:314). Rebuilding a 
reputation amongst stakeholders can also be a costly and lengthy activity; in the worst-case 
scenarios, reputational capital26 can never be regained.  
Truscott (2006:6) adds reputation as a "cross-cutting risk" to the category of political risk. 
According to this author, reputation refers to how those who wish to interact with, or already 
interact with, a firm, perceive the organization (Truscott, 2006:6). Those who wish to interact 
with, or already interact with, a firm include customers, shareholders, lenders, employees, 
government, other businesses and organizations such as NGOs. 
Professionals in the extractive, as well as risk professionals, have reached a consensus that 
reputation is a very important concept to those firms involved in the extractive industries 
(Fragoulie & Joseph, 2016:34). Firms must manage risks across their industry to protect their 
reputations; unless risk management takes place, a loss of share value, consumer boycotts, 
 





lawsuits and greater industry regulations can emerge. This reputation-based research argues 
that reputation risk management is essential for companies, such as oil companies, to endure 
and be profitable in the long run (Fragoulie & Joseph, 2016:1). Reputation and the extractive 
industry are closely intertwined and are hence the focus of this study.  
2.7 Reputational Risk – the Risk of Risks  
Finding an exact, or agreed-upon, definition of reputational risk in the existing literature is not 
an easy task. As with political risk, there is no consensus on a definition and there are a wide 
variety available (Eckert, 2017:150). This is also due to reputational risk being used across 
multiple disciplines such as finance, accounting and politics; there are, therefore, various 
outlooks on the subject as well as attempts to create a consensus on the definition, to be used 
across all disciplines. However, across these disciplines, there is consistency regarding the idea 
that reputational risk is the risk of risks (Eckert, 2017:150). Underlying risk events often lead 
to an additional reputational loss (Deloitte, 2015:8). This section aims to bring definitions of 
reputational risk from various disciplines together and outline the definition that will be 
followed for this study. 
The Comité Européen des Assurances27 and Groupe Consultatif Actuariel European28 define 
reputational risk as follows: 
"[r]isk that adverse publicity regarding an insurer's business practices and associations, whether 
accurate or not, will cause a loss of confidence in the integrity of the institution. Reputational 
risk could arise from other risks inherent in an organization's activities. The risk of loss of 
confidence relates to stakeholders, which include, inter alia, existing and potential customers, 
investors, suppliers and supervisors" (Eckert, 2017:150).  
According to this definition, the damage due to loss of reputation relates to a poorer perception 
of the company by stakeholders.   
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision29 likewise offers a definition of reputational 
risk: 
“[t]he risk arising from negative perceptions on the part of the customers, counterparties, 
shareholders, investors or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain 
existing or establish new business relationships and continued access to sources of funding. 
 
27 The European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation 
28 Actuarial Association of Europe  




Reputational risk is multidimensional and reflects the perception of other market participants” 
(Eckert, 2017:150).  
This definition focuses on the damage of reputation due to business loss, leading to a change 
in the behaviour of the stakeholders. This change in behaviour is generally caused by poorer 
perceptions of the business post-loss.  
O’Callaghan (2007:109) affirms that reputational risk comes from a range of "threats" that hold 
the potential to weaken a firm's ability to function as a corporate enterprise and damage its 
community standing. Deloitte (2015:8) reviews the three primary drivers of reputational risk 
as security, ethics/integrity and products/services. This concurs O’Callaghan’s definition 
focusing on a range of threats. Reputational risk differs from other risks in that it incorporates 
completely "manmade" products of social interaction and communication (Benn, et al., 
2016:829). Reputational risk is identified by Swanepoel, et al. (2017:314) as a risk that is harder 
to manage than others, yet it is a principal asset of most firms. Swanepoel, et al.  choose to use 
the following definition in their paper:  
“[r]eputational risk is the likelihood of loss or decline in the reputation of a firm in a manner 
that negatively affects the perception that the social environment has on the firm and to be an 
effect of direct or direct loss in the value of the firms” (Lizarzaburu 2014, cited in Swanepoel, 
et al., 2017:314-315).  
Fomburn, et al. (2000:88) defines reputational risk as the "range of possible gains and losses 
in reputational capital30”; they further suggest that since reputational capital depends on 
stakeholder support, every stakeholder group is a possible source of reputational risk that needs 
to be managed correctly in order to lower reputational risk within a given firm.  
According to O'Callaghan (2007:109), reputational risk can be divided into two categories – 
risks that are social and political in nature, and those that have to do with business. Social and 
political sources of risk to reputation relate to community standards of behaviour and are 
typically external to the firm; examples include environmental standards, exploitation of 
labour, indifference to health and safety issues, abuse of human rights and a lack of concern 
for local community problems. In terms of business-related reputational risk, product recall, 
service failures, poor decision-making or infighting are all considered to be possible sources. 
Business-related reputational risks are naturally internal to the firm itself. 
 
30 A company’s reputational capital is the value of the company that is at risk in daily interactions with 




Dominguez, et al. (2016:1) share a different view to that of O’Callaghan; these authors believe 
that the “triggers” of reputational risk are normally internal. This outline of reputational risk 
disregards the social and political sources of risk as outlined by O’Callaghan. Furthermore, 
Dominguez, et al. believe that reputational risk causes an economic loss for the firm but do not 
consider the other negative consequences31 as outlined by Benn, et al. (2016:830). For this 
study, the definition and conceptualisation of reputational risk and its sources as given by 
O'Callaghan (2007:109) will be used to guide the research, focusing on threats that could 
potentially affect a firm’s business ventures.   
As previously mentioned, O’Callaghan (unlike other authors) divides reputational risk into the 
two categories of business sources and social and political sources. Identifying that there are 
different sources of risk is necessary for this study as it narrows down the scope of research 
and guides this study more easily. Furthermore, this study is anchored in the field of political 
science and, even more broadly, the social sciences – having a specific category of reputational 
risk that focuses on these fields is helpful to this study and future research that might take 
place32. O'Callaghan also offers a definition that emphasises that there is a large range of 
threats, not just a few or common threats, that can affect reputational risk – this definition 
compliments the definition of political risk followed in this study where Rice and Zegart (2016) 
also emphasises that risk generators can occur everywhere and outside the realm of typical 
places. 
2.8  Home and Host Country Political Risk  
Political risk has both internal and external sources of origin (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). 
External sources originate outside the host country; examples may include conflicts or 
cooperative efforts between the host country and other countries. A specific example, that has 
previously been mentioned in this study, is the incident where Chinese miners shot and killed 
11 Zambian workers (Elcoate, 2018). In this case, Zambia is the host country, while Chinese 
nationals (China being the home country) created the source of political risk. Internal sources 
of political risk originate within the home country; examples include governmental activities, 
 
31 Negative consequences include competitiveness, business and/or societal positions, stakeholder loyalty, media 
standing, income, public image and legitimacy of operations (Benn, et al., 2016:830; The Reputation Institute, 
2019). 
32 As previously mentioned, the majority of studies on reputational risk come from financial and economic 
backgrounds; these risk professionals generally approach the topic in a different manner to those in social sciences, 




power struggles between local religious/social groups, and social and economic conditions. 
When De Beers decided to stop operations in certain African countries, it was due to the 
internal sources of political risk within those countries – civil war, religious and social tension. 
It is not only the host country that holds risks to investments; the investor, or nature of the 
project itself, can present certain risks to the investment and its managers (Brink, 2004:20). 
Local firms who enter joint ventures with foreign firms can also be subject to risks from the 
host country (Brink, 2004:20). These risk possibilities are not considered under the country 
risk analysis, but under a political risk analysis, again illustrating the difference between the 
two as expanded upon previously. 
 Micro political risk sources can originate in the host country, the firm's home country, the 
international environment or a combination of these (Alon & Herbert, 2009:130). For this 
study, there will be a focus on the host countries – South Sudan and Zambia. The firms' home 
country is China and it should be acknowledged that risks may also originate from the 
companies themselves. Looking at the micro political risks that have arisen out of the host 
countries is the focus of this study, assessing these risks from the home countries perspective.  
2.9  Macro and Micro Political Risks  
Political risk can be divided into micro and macro scopes. With micro risk, changes in the 
environment in which the business operates only affect select fields of business activity or 
foreign firms with certain characteristics (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250). With macro risk, changes in 
the environment are directed at all foreign firms or investors (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250; Kobrin, 
1979:68; Howell, 2014:312)33.  Macro political risk can see changes in government, or general 
political instability, affect all the firms in a country whereas micro political risk – caused by 
problems of funding of a public corporation, for example – only affects specific industries, 
firms or projects (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:546).  
Political risk can operate and be studied at macro or micro levels. Relationships and interactive 
processes are principally concerned regarding macro-level events; these create a political 
climate in which nations and NGOs operate daily, with the ability to create a political risk to 
firms (Truscott, 2006:5). If there are poor political relations between nations, responses on a 
micro (or local) level may disrupt business. On the micro-level, political risk can be separated 
 




into firm-specific risks and country-specific risks, with firm-specific risks targeting a particular 
firm (or industry). 
Micro political risk is not independent of macro political risk - they are intertwined and share 
some common determinants in the economic, social and governmental environments (Alon & 
Herbert, 2009:129). Additionally, the two risks are similar in that they both originate from 
internal and external sources. However, they are different in that some aspects of the firm will 
either increase or decrease its political risk exposure (Alon & Herbert, 2009:128). Therefore, 
micro political risk is considered more important to foreign firms - an analysis of micro political 
risks offers greater relevance and specificity to potentially harmful business ventures. The most 
prevalent and encountered risk is, in fact, micro political risk. Micro political risk is 
discriminative towards certain firms either due to the industry that they are operational in, or 
the characteristics attached to a specific firm (du Toit, 2013:6).  
Each industry in a country has a specific set of micro political variables that hold a greater risk 
to firms operating in that industry. The energy industry can be affected by variables including 
environmental activism or potential war, whereas the banking sector is affected by variables 
such as the balance of payments (du Toit, 2013:6). Often industries of strategic importance, 
such as natural resources extraction or banking, are more regulated than those of more minor 
importance, such as retail, exposing them to greater political risk (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129).  
Micro political risk requires the unit of analysis to not only be the target country, but also the 
firm’s nationality, the industry in which the firm operates, the specific project it is pursuing, as 
well as the relationship between the target country and the investor (Alon & Herbert, 
2009:127)34. When completing a macro political analysis, the unit of analysis is just the target 
country. Micro and macro political risk also have considerably differing effects. Macro 
political risk can lead to dramatic effects - a government being overthrown or a change in the 
economic system leads to major fluctuations affecting all firms in the country. Micro political 
risk effects, while considerable and unpredictable, will not lead to major changes such as 
expropriation or nationalization (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). Micro political risk effects tend 
to lean more towards policies regarding price controls, mandates for resources, limits on 
foreign employees and so forth.  
 
34 This study will thus be doing a micro political risk analysis – looking at not only the target countries (South 




The differentiation between macro and micro political risk is traditionally discussed within the 
context of decisions made by the government, however, it can also be applied to country 
characteristics. An example of this is where ethnic conflict and divisions might affect a 
manufacturing facility that is located near the division but would likely not directly affect the 
financial investors and stakeholders of the host country (Howell, 2014:312). 
For this study, the definition of micro political risk as outlined by Alon & Herbert will be used. 
Alon & Herbert (2009:130) consider micro political risk as the "uncertainty associated with 
outcomes or events from political processes, which have potential and specific consequences 
for the firm that is either contemplating entry into or has already entered another country". 
These political processes have the potential to originate from environmental factors both within 
and outside the foreign host countries (South Sudan and Zambia) and can either positively or 
negatively affect the firms’ (CNMC and CNPC) operations, assets or financial situation. 
2.10 Risky Business in the Extractive Industry  
Extractive industries, including those of oil and mining, are the most sensitive of all 
international corporate activities due to natural resources being part of a country’s national 
patrimony (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:2). Investing in the extractive industry can affect a 
country more than other investments in other industries as it can lead to greater international 
prestige and power for the country. Furthermore, it can lead to greater prosperity for the 
country. However, as a result of this, the extractive industries are indeed vulnerable.  
Multiple risks can affect the extractive industry, including corruption, taxation, governmental 
regulations, civil and labour unrest, political instability, environmental activism, war, external 
threats and terrorism (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:2). Many of these risks hold the potential 
to damage or affect a firm's reputation. When considering the oil industry specifically, one 
finds that many oil-rich countries have asserted their authority over their resource through 
nationalization thereof or reserving production rights to the national oil company or specific 
partners (Spence, 2011:70). As a result, firms have had to travel further and work harder to find 
and create successful oil projects. In many of these new areas, there are fewer laws, 
governments are often corrupt or inefficient and violent conflict is currently making it harder 
for these firms to operate and are making them the target of greater risk.  
The mining industry is faced with similar risks to those of the oil industry as outlined above. 
Resource nationalism is seen as one of the greatest risks facing the mining industry, however, 




important risks to bear in mind (Thomas, 2013:2). Mining companies also have limited ability 
in choosing where they start projects, companies are forced to go where they find resources, 
and so projects tend to occur in more challenging environments. As with the oil industry, this 
exposes these companies to greater risk.  
It is not a rare occurrence for firms that are involved in the extractive industry to have to 
"implant" themselves in the environment and community in which they operate; extractive 
operations can continue for years, possibly disrupting the host country's environment or local 
communities (McKellar, 2010:54; Spence, 2011:77). Due to this "implanting", firms in these 
environments are faced with greater risk from on-ground opposition from locals. Host-
government led initiatives can occur, possibly leading to localised unrest or conflict, which 
would consequently negatively affect the company's operations and reputation. This is one 
example of how much more vulnerable extractive industries are when operating in unfamiliar 
territory. 
Extractive industries are susceptible to dramatic changes and less drastic changes such as newly 
elected governments. After the Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez was elected in the early 
2000s, foreign firms involved in the oil industry in Venezuela were faced with government 
expropriation of their assets (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:20). Chavez pushed his populist ideology 
and many firms left the country as they lost the ability to be profitable. After the world 
economic crisis of 2008, Venezuela’s overreliance on oil caught up with them as they became 
especially vulnerable to oil price shocks as a result of the crisis. Due to Chavez’s policies and 
the expropriation of assets35 international firms have not been able to re-enter Venezuela and 
lost a great deal after his election. The countries petroleum is now run completely by 
Venezuelan companies that still struggle. Countries that do not uphold contracts or nationalize 
industries (such as that of oil extraction) earn a certain reputation and will have less investment 
in the future, as can be seen in the case of Venezuela (Jensen & Johnston, 2011:663).  
Regarding extractive industries, a leader’s decisions can affect the industry itself as well as 
political and reputational risks thereof. If a country's leader chooses to rewrite contracts, for 
example in relation to oil and gas extractions/production, the revenues produced by the industry 
are affected, and reputational costs are realised (Jensen & Johnston, 2011:663). An action like 
this can lead to downgrading in risk ratings, and a change in stakeholders and future investors' 
perceptions of the leader's willingness to uphold and honour contracts. Jensen and Johnston 
 




(2011:663) further suggest that if a country is flush with rents from natural resources and 
extraction projects, the government is less sensitive to actions that result in their reputation 
being harmed. 
Within the same industry, different firms exposed to the same political event may be affected 
differently due to the firm's capabilities and resources (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:544). These 
resources include technical abilities, government connections or historical advantage. Due to 
these differences that affect some firms more than others, micro political risk (the subject of 
this study) is biased towards certain firms; this could be because of the industry that the firms 
operate in or other characteristics attached to the firm (du Toit, 2013:6). This also explains why 
firms in the extractive industry are more vulnerable to political risk, specifically micro political 
risk, of which reputational risk is a major part. 
As mentioned in the preliminary literature review of this study and previously in this 
subsection, risk is persistent to companies in the extractive industry and, more specifically, risk 
to reputation is a large aspect of conducting this type of business. Every stage of the process 
involved during the extraction project, from negotiation to the completion or abandonment of 
the project, is subject to reputational risks (Fragoulie & Joseph, 2016:34). The sensitivity of 
extractive industry to reputational risks is what makes the industry an important one to be 
subject to a study focussing on reputational risks. 
2.11 Conclusion  
This chapter has been laid out to help create a clearer understanding of the theoretical 
grounding of this study, important terms necessary to conduct the analysis and answer the 
research question, and to provide an outline of the links between the extractive industry and 
reputational risk. The terms as outlined in the chapter are important to understand as they build 
the foundation of the research question and the chapters to follow. The risks specific to the 
extractive industry, reputational risk and political risk are the main topics of the chapters to 
follow where Zambia and South Sudan will be investigated further. 
Both decision-making and problem-solving theories guide many of the decisions made in 
society daily – including political risk-related decisions. These theories help investors make 
rational and defensible decisions through a thorough analysis of the issue at hand, the possible 
solutions and evaluation thereof. Political risk is a subject of great contention, however one 
main idea can be taken away from existing literature: political risk is an important and ever-




Zeegart (2016:6) will guide the political risk analysis that will take place in the following 
chapters. 
Reputational risk, like political risk, is a difficult topic to define and measure; multiple authors 
and multiple debates across multiple disciplines all offer different insights into what 
reputational risk is. However, as outlined by O'Callaghan (2007:109), reputational risk holds 
strong links to politics and the two are substantially intertwined. Finally, the extractive industry 
is far more vulnerable to reputational risks when compared to other industries due to the nature 
of the operations that take place and how these operations take place. 
Chapter three will look at the model that will be used to analyse the reputational risks to 
Chinese companies operating in the extractive industries in South Sudan and Zambia (CNPC 
and CNMC respectively). Chapter four will analyse the reputational risks of Chinese 
companies in the mining sector in Zambia, with chapter 5 being the analysis of Chinese 















 Chapter Three: Towards a Reputational Risk Model  
3.1 Introduction  
As has been established, corporate reputation and reputational risk are two very important 
concepts for businesses to consider and pay attention to when examining possible business 
ventures. Managing and measuring corporate reputation is crucial in helping a business succeed 
in the long term. However, as mentioned in chapter two, reputation and reputational risk are 
not easy concepts to measure due to the multiple definitions and conceptualisations 
surrounding corporate reputation. Quantitative methods36 are often used to measure corporate 
reputation, more so than qualitative methods. The techniques used to measure and assess 
corporate reputation and reputational risk have not kept up with the fast-paced and continually 
changing business environment in which firms operate today (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:313).  
Swanepoel et al. (2017) created a matrix to assess and measure reputational risk both nationally 
and internationally. This model follows a qualitative method and comprises of four key features 
– who, where, what and how. Each of these features is evaluated using a template, which can 
then form a final assessment termed by the authors as a “reputational heat map”. The authors 
measured the reputational risk of a South African retail bank operating in Mauritius to create 
the matrix. The study was conducted after a rigging scandal involving six major international 
banks – Bank of America, Royal Bank of Scotland, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC), Citibank, JP Morgan and Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) (Swanepoel, 
et al., 2017:315). These banks incurred an ZAR20bn fine for rigging foreign exchange rates a 
mere two years after they had been caught rigging the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR)37. The reputation of financial institutions impacts many people as most individuals 
have bank accounts and entrust these institutions with their money.  
The model created by Swanepoel, et al. (2017) is used as a basis for a new model that has been 
designed for this study. This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the matrix created by 
Swanepoel et al., its suitability to this study and what exactly the model measures. Adjustments 
will be made to the model for it to better suit this study with some aspects being kept and others 
eliminated due to irrelevance. The final product will be the model that will be used in chapters 
 
36 Examples of these methods include reputation quotient or identity measures. An explanation of these methods 
is provided in section 3.3.  
37 The LIBOR is the most commonly used benchmark for short term interest rates worldwide (The Intercontinental 




four and five to assess the risks to reputation of conducting extractive operations in South 
Sudan and Zambia. The final model used in this study is an interpretation of the original model 
and is more suited to the extractive industry. Furthermore, this study’s model is an 
interpretation that is designed from a political risk lens, whereas the original model was 
anchored in the field of economics and financial sciences.  
3.2 The Original Four Point Model’s Suitability  
 According to Swanepoel et al. (2017:314), reputation and managing reputation are essential to 
the long-term success of a company as it is a driver of company performance.  Due to this 
notion reputational risk has become a significant topic of research within the last five decades. 
This increase in its significance can be due to an increase in competition, the development and 
expansion of global media or communication channels in which reputationally sensitive 
information can be disseminated, and/or customer power and their willingness to switch 
suppliers (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:314). These authors created a reputational risk assessment 
technique encompassing four key aspects: who, where, what and how. The authors believe that 
this assessment technique can be used in any institution, with their study focusing on the 
aspects that affect a bank's reputational risk.  
Howell (2014:310) considered 14 key political risk assessments in his article, created by 12 
different international firms38. Between these 14 rating systems, there are 33 attributes and 11 
decision variables listed, although none of them mention reputation or reputational risk. The 
attributes can be divided into external factors, nature of government and politics, and societal 
character. This demonstrates that between them, none of these assessments can be used to 
measure or assess reputational risk. This echoes the notion that measuring techniques for 
reputational risk are limited. Despite the importance of reputation, assessment techniques are 
not readily available.  
Traditionally, reputational risk models focus on the financial performance of the firm and have 
often been critiqued for being a “single uni-dimensional measurement item” or being over-
focused on the perception of a single stakeholder (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:316). The most 
 
38 These firms include The PRS Group Inc., Business Environment Risk Intelligence, Economist Intelligence 
Index, Moody’s Investor Services, Control Risks Group, Economist’s Method, S.J. Rundt & Associates, Standard 




commonly used models to measure and assess reputational risk are ranking measures, 
reputational quotients and identity measures.  
Ranking measures is the most conventional measure of reputation and comprises of rankings 
as outlined by global media. Media rankings are often performed by Fortune’s Annual Survey 
of CEO’s, the Financial Times’ Most Respected Companies, Management Today’s Most 
Admired Companies and Asia Business’ Most Admired Companies (Swanepoel, et al., 
2017:316-317). This assessment of reputation involves respondents being asked to rate a 
competitor’s reputation in terms of a certain set of attributes. This assessment of reputation is 
based on the respondent’s perception making it a qualitative method. This method is critiqued, 
once again, for the uni-dimensional operationalisation, the use of a single stakeholder’s opinion 
and financially focused criteria (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:317). Furthermore, this method cannot 
capture all the factors of corporate reputation.   
Reputational quotient (RQ) is a quantitative approach that makes use of personality as a 
measurement tool in order to assess a firm’s reputation (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:317). 
Theoretically, RQ is better than reputational measures as emotional appeal is included, 
however it is also subject to criticisms. The scale is critiqued for the overemphasis on rational 
elements, a lack of conceptual definitions and the emotional appeal dimensions.   
The final measure mentioned is that of identity measures. Identity measures choose to make 
use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, predetermined dimensions and inductive 
approaches (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:317). Methods include interviewing employees, desk 
research, content analysis and a triangulation method39.  
As mentioned, these models have all been subject to criticisms and are not suitable for this 
study. The four-point matrix created by Swanepoel et al. (2017) is the best option as a basis for 
a model to be created for this study. The original model utilises qualitative data from which 
assessment and analysis can take place; it further places a focus on individuals, processes, place 
and type of business – these factors assist in making the model more complete and more 
inclusive of factors that relate to reputational risk as well as traditional political risk models. 
 
39 The triangulation method involves a case study, in-depth interviews and nine factors being identified, and a 





An additional model that is not mentioned by Swanepoel et al. (2017) is the RepTrack Model 
developed by the Reputation Institute40. The RepTrack Model consists of 7 “drivers of 
reputation” – innovation, workplace, governance, citizenship, leadership, performance and 
products/services (The Reputation Institute , 2019). This model is used to assess and 
benchmark a firm’s reputation against its peers in its operational industry. The Institute 
considers the emotional bond between the company and its stakeholders, which means that this 
model is not suitable for this study as there is not an assessment of the Chinese company’s 
reputations being studied, but rather the risks to reputation of conducting operations in Africa’s 
extraction industries.  
The four aspects of the Swanepoel et al. (2017) model each have different criteria and 
characteristics that are linked to it. Data is gathered and then each characteristic is rated as 
carrying a high, medium or low risk. The authors conducted their study by attaining data from 
a bank in South Africa, performing the assessment of reputational risk by looking at the 
following: clients that the bank services, the intermediaries it makes use of (who), the 
jurisdiction of where the bank operates (where), the products/services they sell (what) and the 
manner in which they conduct business (how) (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:322). Although this 
matrix covers some of the most important business particulars, it is not completely suited to 
evaluate the extractive industry and requires an addition of other aspects, which will be 
explored further on in this chapter.  
3.2.1 “Who”  
The “who” aspect of the matrix is concerned with the risk that any counterparty may pose to 
the reputation of the firm (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:318). For the original matrix, indicators such 
as client profile, source of wealth, client intent and underlying beneficiary owner are inspected. 
This aspect of the matrix focuses on the client’s identity and helps establish what kind of 
transactions the client is likely to take part in. This also allows the banks to flag any transactions 
that might be of a suspicious nature. The “who” aspect relies on secondary qualitative data 
analysis using tools such as Know Your Client, internet searches or media screenings.  
In the context of the author's study, these tools allow the bank to identify their higher and lower 
risk clients. Higher risk clients amount to a greater reputational risk exposure for the institution 
due to activities and dealings which these customers might undertake. Business activities, 
 
40 The Reputation Institute was launched in 1999 and assists in helping international firms build credibility. Clients 




ownership structure, amount and type of transactions conducted and transactions in higher-risk 
dominions can all lead to the institution ranking the client as a higher risk client (Swanepoel, 
et al., 2017:319). Identifying these clients within the banking sector is important as they can 
present a greater risk of being involved in money laundering or terrorism financing 
(Swanepoel, et al., 2017:319). The higher risk clients may also have relationships with 
politically exposed people that can result in high-risk transactions occurring that are politically 
motivated. Being associated with clients like this can result in penalties and a negative 
reputation for the bank.  
The template for the “who” aspect makes use of four categories to be assessed: know your 
client, source of wealth, client intent and ultimate beneficial owner (Swanepoel, et al., 
2017:322). These four categories are measured according to a five-point scale41. Know your 
client looks at possible controversial clients; source of wealth considers where the wealth of 
the client comes from – corruption, gambling or other possible criminal activities; client intent 
considers attributes such as tax avoidance; ultimate beneficiary owner looks at who will finally 
receive the wealth or assets once the original client has passed away. All four of these 
categories are interlinked – if a depositor’s money is stolen, the value of the money of the 
banks’ balance sheet will be forfeited, resulting in reputational damage to the bank (De Smet 
& Mention, 2011 cited in Swanepoel, et al., 2017:322). According to the model template used 
to assess the “who” aspect, each business unit in the business needs to evaluate their clients 
and who those clients are conducting business with for the whole business to be protected 








41 1 indicates a low risk, 2 a low-medium risk, 3 medium risk, 4 medium-high risk and 5 high risk (Swanepoel, et 
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Table 1: Template of "who" assessment. Source: Swanepoel et al (2017:323) 
3.2.2 “Where” 
The “where” aspect of the original four-point matrix considers the location of the client’s 
residence and where they trade/do business (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:319). This is an imperative 
aspect for the authors as tax havens, offshore tax abuse and ineffective anti-money laundering 
laws are of utmost concern to financial institutions. Not only do these issues effect tax fairness 
but legal compliance issues too. Lost tax revenue can contribute to a country’s annual deficit, 
thereby negatively affecting its economic strength and economic indicators. Money laundering 
also often covers up the primary source of profits of crime (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:320).  
According to Swanepoel et al. (2017:320), a bank should be based in a country that has high 
economic strength, political stability and low levels of secrecy. The quality of jurisdiction of a 
financial centre need to be high, as should international compliance, for the location to not pose 
a negative reputational risk to the bank. The matrix template used to assess the “where” aspect 
is made up of seven individual factors: location, tax, operational costs, quality42, regulatory 
compliance43, track record and ease of doing business (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:323). These 
 
42 In their analysis, the authors looked at economic strength driving standards of quality (GDP/capita), access to 
skills and resources, political stability of jurisdiction (World Bank governance indicators), actual and perceived 
secrecy (financial secrecy index) and global ranking as a financial centre (global financial centre index) 
(Swanepoel, et al., 2017:328). 
43 Under compliance, the authors looked at Anti-Money Laundering (AML) compliance in association with the 




factors are measured according to the jurisdiction (country) where the business is located. In 
the case of this study, the jurisdiction is South Sudan and Zambia, respectively. The categories 
will measure the reputational risk to the Chinese companies operating in these jurisdictions. 
This study’s template measures according to a five-point scale, but it is measured inversely of 
the other templates44.  
Differentiating proposition As a jurisdiction to clients in Africa 
Location  
Tax  
Operational Costs  
Quality  
Regulatory Compliance  
Track Record  
Ease of doing business  
 
Table 2:  Template of “where” assessment. Source: Swanepoel et al (2017:323) 
3.2.3 “What”  
In today’s world, the “ethical obligations” of the sellers and providers of products and services, 
including financial, are under great public debate, lobbying and scrutiny (Swanepoel, et al., 
2017:320). In the financial field, these services can refer to the purchase, selling or dealing of 
investment bonds, stocks, cash, mutual funds or other products. These services are sold through 
means of investment advice which is seen as decision-making under uncertainty (Swanepoel, 
et al., 2017:320). As seen in chapter two, political risk analysis also makes use of decision-
making theory, specifically focusing on offering decision-making assistance under uncertain 
circumstances. For the decision-making to occur for investment advice to be realised, the 
personal attributes of the client must be observed and understood.  
Under the template used to assess the “what” Swanepoel et al, consider the appropriateness of 
the bank’s products; the social purpose and the nature of the products will be looked at. The 
 
standards, double tax treaty status, information sharing status and compliance with the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FACTA) (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:328) 





social purpose assessment includes the commercial purpose and the suitability of the service. 
The nature of the services considers whether it is within the bank’s capability and whether the 
product fits in with international regulation expectations (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:324).  
 
Table 3: Template of “what” assessment. Source: Swanepoel et al (2017:324) 
3.2.4 “How” 
The “how” aspect refers to how business is conducted within the institution and with the clients 
themselves – in essence, the way the products and services are being delivered. According to 
Swanepoel et al. (2017:321) greed, self-interest and profit maximisation can add to ethical 
misconduct within the business or institution. On the other hand, a client is paying for services 
being provided by the business and therefore has the right to full loyalty and transparency from 
the business. Any conflict of interest between the provider and client should be avoided; there 
should be equal treatment and no bias shown due to personal relationships, beliefs or other 
types of compensation (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:321). Furthermore, all illegal or unethical 
behaviour or activities should be discouraged by both the client and business. Risk and reward 
should also be offered to the client as accurately as possible, fully allowing them to make a 
sensible decision regarding their personal transactions, never compromising secrecy for 
personal gain.  
The matrix template of the “how” category is subdivided into two categories – business 
practices and the systems and tools of the bank (Swanepoel, et al., 2017:324). The focus areas 
of business practices are whether the bank engages in business practices that ensure 




Products    
Suitability of products given client’s risk profile, 
objectives, mandate and level of sophistication  
   
Products and services in line with regulators’ 
expectations  
   
Are products and services within the bank’s 
capability to appropriately recommend, monitor and 
manage? 
   




sustainability in the eyes of the stakeholders, and alignment of interests between the clients and 
bank. The systems and tools of the bank examine reporting actions and whether management 
personnel manage risk suitably within the institution. 




Engage in business practices that ensure 
sustainability from the perspective of all 
stakeholders  
   
Align interests between clients, bank, colleagues 
(e.g. through pricing and performance measures)  
   
Provide transparent, clear, accurate and timely 
reporting (internal and external) 
   
Management insurance that is adequate to manage 
risks appropriately and in a timely manner  
   
 






















Who Know Your Client  Medium risk 3 3 
 Source of Wealth  Low risk  1  
 Client intent  High risk 5  
 Ultimate Beneficiary 
Owner  
Medium risk  3  
Where  Quality  4.15 1 1 
 Compliance  4.2 1  
What  Products  Low risk  1 1.4 
 Suitability  Low/ Medium 
risk  
2  
 Expectations Low risk  1  
 Capabilities Low risk  1  
 Purpose  Low/Medium 
risk  
2  
How  Sustainability Low/Medium 
risk  
2 1.5 
 Interests Low risk 1  
 Reporting Low risk  1  




Table 5: Final four-point matrix with the author’s original study results (Swanepoel et al., 
2017:332) 
3.3 Towards a New Reputational Risk Model  
The Swanepoel et al. (2017) model provides a qualitative assessment technique for reputational 
risk that is for the most part suitable for this study. However, as the model was originally used 
for a study considering the reputational risk of a bank, certain adjustments need to be made so 
the model can suit not only the extractive industry but this study too.  
3.3.1 “Who” 
The greatest change to the original matrix model (Swanepoel, et al., 2017) falls under the “who” 
factor. The original model looks at who the bank is conducting business with and any risks 




managers, fund managers, wealth, insurance, stockbrokers and asset managers – to complete 
forms. If this factor were to follow the original model, South Sudan and Zambia would be 
collecting information on China and the risks of conducting business with China, which is a 
different study to the one being conducted here, and would be looking at the reputational risk 
of the company. Alternatively, this study is considering the reputational risks of the countries 
themselves – South Sudan and Zambia. For the “who” factor and its indicators to suit this study 
the inverse of the original model will be done - Chinese companies will be considering the risks 
of operating within South Sudan and Zambia and not the other way around as is done in the 
original model.  
Understanding the government (“who”) you are dealing with in these business ventures is 
assuredly important. If a government is partaking in human rights violations or corrupt 
practices with the money the firm is parting with for their products, the firm is exposed to 
reputational risks. The source of wealth of these governments should not be controversial, 
neither should their intent with the wealth be. A poor intent with wealth can lead to grievances 
from citizens that manifest into civil unrest or public protests.  
 Another change that will occur under the “who” factor is the elimination of the ultimate 
beneficial owner indicator as it is specific to the banking sector and there is not a beneficiary 
of assets in the extractive industry. The other indicators will remain under the “who” factor as 
will their measurement guidelines45.  
  Control deficiencies  
 Know Your Client Source of Wealth Client Intent 
South Sudan     
Zambia    
    
 
Table 6: Revised template of “who” assessment 
 




3.3.2 “Where”  
It is argued by Alon et al. (2006:631) that 21st century investors in the oil and gas (extractive) 
industries are swayed by risk of wars and external threats, taxation systems, terrorism, civil and 
labour unrest, corruption, government regulations, repatriation restriction, political instability, 
energy vulnerability and environmental activism. Control Risks (cited in Boshoff, 2010:52) 
also identifies four main risk factors for the extraction industry: politics and governance, 
security, reputation and social issues, and infrastructure and health. Oil drilling and exploration 
is also not solely determined by the geology of a country; factors connected to institutional 
quality and governance of the sector are also reasonably important (Cust & Harding, 2013:3). 
The same can be said for mining, as it is also an extractive activity.  
The World Bank Group (2019) defines regulatory quality as the “perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”. The regulatory compliance by government therefore 
plays an integral role in promoting a good reputation for companies wanting to invest in any 
given foreign country. Abdalla et al. (2013:3) specify that there is indeed a lack of literature on 
whether regulatory frameworks in countries, such as South Sudan, encourage oil and gas 
companies to pursue environmentally and socially responsible practices, hence the importance 
of this indicator and why it must remain in the updated model. 
Many of the indicators used under “where” in the original matrix are not necessary when 
moulding the model to suit this study. Tax is often included under regulatory compliance while 
operational costs, quality, track record and ease of doing business would be considered under 
other sections of a full risk assessment - reputational risk merely makes up one aspect of a full 
risk assessment.  The inclusion of tax under regulatory compliance, and the multiple factors 
that are taken into consideration for this indicator, is the reasoning behind the renaming of the 
model aspect to regulatory environment for the analyses to come later in this study. The original 
model ranks these indicators inversely from the rest, with 1 being high risk and 5 being low 
risk. For simplicity and easy-to-follow data, this indicator for the new model will fall in line 
with the others and remain with 5 being high risk and 1 being low risk. This allows for a final 






Differentiating proposition As a jurisdiction to clients in Africa 
Location   
Regulatory Compliance   
 
Table 7: Revised Template for “where” assessment 
3.3.3 “What” 
The “what” factor refers to the services that the bank is selling. In the context of this study, the 
banks are South Sudan and Zambia. The products that they are selling are oil and copper, 
respectively. These are two products that are heavily regulated by the ruling government 
through legislation in order to keep some form of control over their natural resources, and is 
also due to the national patrimony that is attached to natural resources. Most of the original 
model is suitable to this study however; one elimination should be made. The indicator of 
suitability of products given a client’s risk profile, objectives, mandate and level of 
sophistication will be eliminated for this study. This indicator again focuses on the client, in 
this study the Chinese companies, which are not the focus of this study – the countries and their 
products are the focus under the “what” factor. Products and services being in line with the 
regulators’ expectations is also eliminated from this factor. The regulators’ in this case are 
South Sudan and Zambia; including this indicator would change the focus of the study to their 
expectations when it is in fact focused on China’s expectations.   
 
Table 8: Revised Template for “what” assessment  
3.3.4 “How” 
The “how” factor is an important one for firms to look at when engaging in business ventures 
with new countries and partners. How the other party involved in the business deals conducts 




Products    
Are products and services within the “bank’s” 
capability to appropriately recommend, monitor and 
manage? 
   




themselves and parts with their products can affect the reputation of the firm. For this study, 
the other parties involved in the business deals are South Sudan and Zambia. Being associated 
with a country that partakes in poor or corrupt business practices can easily damage a firm’s 
reputation and further project the reputation that the firm is willing to look past these 
discrepancies in the future.  
The indicator pertaining to the alignment of interests between clients, bank, colleagues (e.g. 
through pricing and performance measures) is the only indicator eliminated for the revised 
model. This indicator is not appropriate as the parties involved have different interests and 
motives for conducting business. The Chinese companies’ interests are aligned with gaining 
natural resources, while South Sudan and Zambia are interested in gaining profits and boosting 
their economies. Pricing and performance measures are also not measurement tools that are 
used for the extractive industry and is specific to the banking sector. Furthermore, in the 
extraction deals between Chinese companies and South Sudan or Zambia, there are no other 
“colleagues” involved, as workers from either the host or home country are used and the deals 
are conducted directly between the company and the country, with no involvement of third 
party members.  
Business practices that ensure sustainability from the perspective of all stakeholders is a key 
indicator in the “how” factor. As previously established, stakeholders and their perception of 
the firm are key to the long-term success of the business and its operations. Sustainable 
business practices refer to more than purely sustainable environmental practices; examples that 
will be looked at include technological, social and organisational features. Factors include 
creating value from waste, renewable and natural processes use, energy efficiency, encouraging 
sufficiency, functionality, developing scale-up solutions and repurposing for society and the 
environment (Bocken, Short & Evans, 2014:48). Business practices must be socially 
responsible, economically feasible and environmentally friendly in order to be sustainable 
(both environmentally and socially), not only one of these aspects. This may differ from the 
original model’s idea of sustainable business practices, where the unit of analysis is a bank, but 
should remain as it is a good indicator for companies operational in the extractive industry. 
Social and environmental responsibility are two great sources of reputational risk, while 





Transparent, clear, accurate and timely reporting is also key to maintaining a good reputation 
and keeping reputational risk low. If there are non-transparent or corrupt reporting that occurs, 
the firms involved are placed at risk of damaging their reputation through association with 
these business practices. Management insurance is therefore important for the management of 
any business in order to cover risks that they may be exposed to; this is especially important 
for businesses involved in the extractive industry. Management insurance comes from within 
the business and not from the host country where business is being conducted. Therefore, 
management insurance is an indicator that is not appropriate for this study.  
 
Table 9: Revised Template for “how” assessment 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter was set out to achieve two goals. The first goal was to introduce and allow for an 
in-depth analysis of the original model designed by Swanepoel et al. (2017). The second goal 
of this chapter was to indicate the changes made to the original model, why these changes have 
taken place, and to present the final model that will be used for this study. The conceptualisation 
of political risks analysis presented in chapter two offers insight into why the Swanepoel et al. 
(2017) model is suitable as a basis for this study. There are shared common indicators between 
the four-point model and many other political risk models, as well as a qualitative approach, 
which the preferred approach for political risk analysis. Furthermore, hard and soft factors can 
be identified under the Swanepoel et al. (2017) model and, as indicated by Boshoff (2010), a 
combination of these factors is desirable for the best possible analysis to take place.  
Certain indicators from the original model have either been combined, as in the case of the 
“where” factor or eliminated completely as they are not required for this study. The main 
difference in the models is under the “who” aspect and inverting the assessment – looking at 
the countries and not at the firms. As mentioned, this falls under a different study. The four-




Engage in business practices that ensure 
sustainability from the perspective of all 
stakeholders  
   
Provide transparent, clear, accurate and timely 
reporting (internal and external) 




point model has also been adjusted accordingly to suit the extractive industry. This model will 
now be used to measure South Sudan’s reputational risk in chapter four and Zambia’s 

























Chapter 4: Reputational Risk Analysis of CNPC in South Sudan 
4.1 Introduction  
South Sudan’s history, both the distant past and current events, is a complex one. South Sudan 
is the youngest African country, having only gained independence from Sudan in 2011 
(Abdalla, et al., 2013:2). Despite gaining independence, the country has experienced turmoil, 
conflict and many struggles in the attempt to achieve peace. South Sudan is certainly not an 
ideal investment climate for companies and has recently seen many Western companies flee 
due to sanctions and human rights violations. Companies conducting business in South Sudan 
were concerned with many issues, amongst those, their reputation. This fleeting history and the 
current struggles facing the country are the primary reasons that South Sudan maintains an 
extreme political risk rating46 and a high-security risk rating47 (Control Risks, 2019).  
Despite the history and complex problems facing the country, South Sudan does retain 
investments from countries including China, Malaysia and India for one reason: oil. South 
Sudan has the seventh greatest natural oil reserves in Africa and twenty-eighth in the world 
(African Development Bank Group, 2018:10). South Sudan currently faces political and civil 
insecurity, security challenges, poor economic and social infrastructures, a lack of political will 
and governance issues. Additionally, the country faces an overreliance on its oil industry for 
revenue, exports and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (African Development Bank Group, 
2018:1). The high reputational risk associated with investing in South Sudan prevents further 
exploration projects from being pursued by other investors aside from China, Malaysia and 
India. The CNPC is the greatest investor in South Sudan’s oil industry, holding approximately 
86% of shares (African Development Bank Group, 2018:6). This notion will be explored 
throughout this chapter, by completing a full reputational risk analysis of South Sudan’s oil 
sector from the CNPC’s perspective.  
 
46 Control Risks (2019) looks at the prospect of government interference and political instability, and the possible 
effect these two issues can have on the business environment in which a company operates. Their political risk 
assessment looks at general political stability, policy, corruption, reputational risk, expropriation, contract 
intervention, international sanctions and sovereign debt.  
47 Security risk considers the financial, physical and human assets of a company. Furthermore, the ability and 
disposition of the countries security forces to protect the company’s assets and personnel is evaluated (Control 




4.2 Where did South Sudan come from?  
Conflict and South Sudan are inextricably linked; to understand this, the history of how South 
Sudan came into existence eight years ago needs to be explained48. For centuries, racial and 
religious relations have been tense in the East-Central area of the African continent, specifically 
Sudan and its neighbours – issues such as language and diffusion of cultures have always been 
at the centre of the conflict. Tensions have often revolved around the Arab-Muslim North and 
the African and Christian South with multiple civil wars49 breaking out (African Development 
Bank Group, 2018:5). The division between Sudan and South Sudan can be traced as far back 
as 1930. During British colonial rule, policy was ordered in which southern Sudan was 
administered independently from the north (Kumsa, 2017:516). This was done to develop 
South Sudan as a Christian, English state with an English-based education system. Sudan was 
declared an independent state in 1953 and held its first general elections that same year; 
politicians in the south continued to rally supporters in the hopes of creating a federal 
democratic state that would be separate from Sudan. Continuous pressure for federalization 
lead to the government handing power over to the military in 1958, thereby establishing the 
longest period of military rule in the country’s history (Kumsa, 2017:518).  
The South Sudan Liberation Front formed in retaliation to the military government and 
continuously fought to become an independent state in the south areas of Sudan. Continued 
religious and ethno-racial tensions led to the emergence of the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), a political organisation that has a military wing known as the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Kumsa, 2017:520). SPLM was formed in 1983 and by 1990 
the movement controlled most of southern Sudan. Confrontations between the SPLA and the 
Sudanese army started in May 1983; neighbouring countries – Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda – 
all entered the conflict in support of SPLM in 1998.  
The end of the second civil war saw the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in 200550. Oil and revenues from oil were a contested subject in the agreement, which had two 
main principles: South Sudan’s right to self-determination, and a separation of state and 
 
48 For a map of South Sudan please refer to Appendix B.  
49 The first civil war took place from 1955-1972, known as Anya-Nya I. A second civil war broke out in 1983, 
lasting until 2005, known as Anya-Nya II.  
50 In the CPA, it was estimated that nearly two million people had died as a result of the 18-year civil war, due to 
either direct violence, starvation or disease related to the conflict. Half a million refugees had to move into 




religion according to the legal systems permitting both Islam/Shari’a and Christian/secular 
traditions (Kumsa, 2017:521). The people of southern Sudan were given five years of self-rule 
and the right to hold a referendum on whether southern Sudan should remain part of Sudan. 
January 2011 saw 99% of the population vote in favour of independence and in July 2011, the 
Republic of South Sudan became the world’s youngest country (African Development Bank 
Group, 2018:6). Independence resulted in South Sudan gaining control of three-quarters of 
Sudan’s oil reserves. In December 2013, South Sudan witnessed the outbreak of yet another 
civil war, with violence erupting between the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan – the 
Dinka ethnic group and the Nuer ethnic group (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). A cease 
fire was negotiated at the end of 2018; however, continued attacks and violations have 
continuously occurred. The situation is ongoing in South Sudan with complete peace not 
having been achieved yet51. CNCP’s role and investment in South Sudan will be explored next, 
demonstrating why an analysis has been done on this company.   
4.2.1 CNPC in South Sudan  
Drilling for oil dates back to the 1960s and 1970s in Sudan, but production only began in the 
1990s (Cust & Harding, 2013:12). CNPC first entered South Sudan in 1995, 15 years before 
independence was achieved. During the first 10 years of engagement, Sudan had a large 
influence on the company as it was one of CNPC’s first key international ventures (Patey, 
2013:2). CNPC could enter Sudan with relative ease in 1995 as the country was facing 
international sanctions from the USA, creating limited competition from other major oil 
companies from the USA and Europe52. Most Western companies stayed away from these 
investment opportunities, not only because of pressure from home governments, but further 
allegations of human rights abuses also put too much at stake for these companies, their 
business ventures and their reputations (du Toit, 2013:15).  
The country’s oil reserves became an important production source for CNPC and created ample 
revenues and profits. The signing of the CPA in 2005 changed the relationship between CNPC 
and Sudan; after it was signed, Sudan became a restriction on CNPC’s operations and not a 
 
51 As mentioned in this study’s limitations section, due to the ongoing situation in South Sudan, information will 
be considered until July of 2019 for this study.  
52 The USA introduced sanctions in 1997. The sanctions included a trade embargo and freeing of Government 




vehicle of growth. This was due to consequences of reputational, security and political risks – 
risks that had become the norm facing companies operational in Sudan.  
After South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, the CNPC led a consortium with 
Malaysia’s Petronas and India’s Oil and Gas Corporation (Vasselier, 2016:15)53. The new 
economic opportunity that presented itself resulted in increased investment and an increased 
number of Chinese nationals moving to work in South Sudan54. However, this optimism did 
not last long; after an eruption of violence in December 201355, CNPC had to reduce and 
reconsider their plans for exploration in the country. The South Sudanese government also 
closed most of the oil fields due to violence during this time. In 2016, China was importing 
46% of South Sudan’s oil via Port Sudan in the Republic of Sudan (Vasselier, 2016:15). CNPC 
had not, by this point, restarted exploration for new fields or construction of new pipelines in 
South Sudan.  
CNPC has increased community relations with South Sudan, specifically in the capital Juba; 
CNPC funded the building of the Protection of Civilians Camp 3 and assisted in rebuilding the 
Juba airport after the civil war. The company also used funds to build a new computer lab at 
Juba University, whilst offering scholarship opportunities to students (Anthony & Hengkun, 
2014:88).  Despite these contributions, the South Sudanese citizenry does not hold the best 
perception of CNPC. This will be expanded upon under Know Your Client, as will the various 
risks presented by this factor. The rest of the reputational risk analysis of CNPC in South Sudan 
will follow on from this.  
4.3 Reputational Risk Analysis of South Sudan  
A reputational risk analysis will now be conducted for CNPC business ventures in South Sudan. 
The risks that CNPC has taken to remain in South Sudan, and the rewards it is hoping to reap, 
can be seen through an exploration of their involvement in South Sudan. CNPC is also the 
largest MNC operating in South Sudan with the most to lose if anything goes wrong. South 
 
53 Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) is the only state company involved in the South Sudan oil industry, 
however it only holds minirotiy shares in production due to low technical expertise and financial backing (African 
Development Bank Group , 2018:6).  
54 In 2016, seven thousand Chinese nationals were working in South Sudan and more than fifty Chinese companies 
were operational (Vasselier, 2016:15).  
55 Conflict broke out over internal SPLM leadership issues (African Development Bank Group , 2018:10). The 




Sudan’s infancy as a country makes data collection a challenge, with sources such as the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom Map not including a score or ranking for South Sudan. The 
qualitative data that is available must been analysed to contribute to the ratings given in this 
chapter.  As discussed in chapter three, every risk factor has multiple indicators which will be 
rated accordingly out of five points, and justification for these ratings will be provided. Finally, 
an overall rating out of fifty points will be presented to indicate whether South Sudan is a high-
, medium- or low-risk investment opportunity from a reputational risk analysis perspective.  
4.3.1 Who   
4.3.1.1 Know Your Client  
Historically, South Sudanese relations with China have been decent, with the South Sudanese 
government often expressing thanks to China for maintaining investment in their oil fields. At 
the time of independence, CNPC stood a chance of losing their contracts and having to cease 
operations in South Sudan. The new government had an anti-Chinese sentiment as it believed 
that CNPC had been supporting Khartoum, the opposition, during the civil war (du Toit, 
2013:15). Despite these feelings, CNPC’s contracts were renewed, a positive indicator for the 
relationship between CNPC and the South Sudanese government. The government insisted that 
CNPC build offices in Juba, something that CNPC agreed to do (Anthony & Hengkun, 
2014:80). This was a sign of goodwill between the two actors. 
 Despite a comfortable history, the relationship has changed since 2016, when two Chinese 
peacekeepers were killed in Juba (Vasselier, 2016:15). Several other peacekeepers were 
wounded and the embassy was evacuated. Continued social tensions and economic downturn 
have since seen a rise, with South Sudanese citizens being unhappy with Chinese citizens 
currently working in South Sudan. Small-traders, shop owners and other industry entrepreneurs 
have all moved to South Sudan, increasing the Chinese population outside of the oil industry 
(Anthony & Hengkun, 2014:80). Due to negative sentiments stemming from South Sudan’s 
public and government’s opinion of CNPC, all Chinese citizens and companies are placed at 
an increased risk. The Minister of Finance at the time of independence, David Athorbei, added 
further fuel to the fire by characterizing CNPC as exploitative of South Sudan’s resources 
(Vasselier, 2016:15).  
After the break out of the civil war in 2013, further pressure was added to the Chinese 
government and Chinese businesses as the Chinese government appeared to be supporting the 




escalated massively and 400 Chinese oilfield workers had to be evacuated out of Bentiu and 
Malakal by the South Sudanese army for secutiry reasons (Vasselier, 2016:17). 2015 saw 
further clashes between the warring South Sudanese and Sudanese parties in the oil fields, 
where Chinese workers are stationed (MVO Nederland, 2019)56.  
The anti-Chinese sentiment that is strongly presented in some African countries is not the case 
in South Sudan but there are hints of it. Some of the African anti-Chinese sentiment also stems 
from the way in which China presents its support for certain parties or people. This is not a 
reputational risk that stems from South Sudan, but rather China. 
Risk Rating: 3 (Medium risk) 
4.3.1.2 Source of Wealth  
South Sudan is the world’s most oil-dependent economy with 60% of its GDP being created 
by oil (The World Bank, 2019). Government revenue in South Sudan is nearly entirely created 
by oil, equating to 90%, with 95% of the country’s total exports being oil (African 
Development Bank Group, 2018:1). In January 2014, oil production was at 163 000 barrels per 
day, creating revenue of approximately $20 million monthly. By 2019, this figure had reached 
180 000 barrels per day (Dumo, 2019).  South Sudan’s greatest source of wealth is its oil fields, 
although they were controversially gained through independence from Sudan.  
This overreliance on oil as a source of wealth has created constant issues for South Sudan and 
the companies operating in the oil industry in the country. Dependence on a single export 
commodity can expose the economy to shocks stemming from changes in world prices, global 
demand, domestic insecurities and fluctuations in oil production (African Development Bank 
Group, 2018:10; du Toit, 2013:9). South Sudan has been subjected to frequent disruptions in 
oil production due to various reasons. 2012 saw conflict between South Sudan and Sudan shut 
down oil production, as a result of a dispute over sharing of oil revenues, and South Sudan 
failing to pay transport fees to Sudan, leading to an economic downturn of 51.5%.  Not only 
did South Sudan suffer, but CNPC also experienced a significant revenue loss (Patey, 2013:3). 
As previously mentioned, CNPC is the majority shareholder and investor in South Sudan, 
contributing much to its wealth. Further investment in the country from other companies has 
been low due to the volatile environment. This is evident from Total’s actions, who has been 
in possession of a license to conduct oil exploration and operations in what is now South Sudan, 
 
56 MVO Nederland runs the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Risk Check, an assessment tool useful to 




since 1979.  They suspended operations in 1985 after the eruption of violence during the civil 
war. In 2012, the company announced that it would be restarting operations and exploration 
however activity is yet to restart (Cust & Harding, 2013:14).  
 The 2012 conflict was resolved when South Sudan agreed to pay an SD 9,1057 per barrel in 
transit fees to Sudan and US$15 a barrel under the Transitional Financial Arrangement (African 
Development Bank Group, 2018:10).  Further eruptions of violence from 2013 onwards 
stemming again from civil war have resulted in oil production remaining low and therefore 
profitability of any companies in South Sudanese oil fields remaining low.  
Additionally, South Sudan maintains a negative current account balance. South Sudan is a net 
borrower and depends greatly on aid from other countries; over US$4 billion in aid has been 
sent to South Sudan at the time of writing, with very little to show for the donor’s resources 
(African Development Bank Group, 2018:16). However, most of this aid has gone to benefit 
the government in the capital city of Juba. Government checkpoints are often used as extortion 
sites of funds from agencies that are transporting humanitarian aid goods and  government fees 
to attain work permits are unreasonably high (African Development Bank Group, 2018:19). In 
addition to this corruption, rent seeking58 is also extreme in South Sudan, massively occurring 
in state institutions, creating another questionable source of wealth for the government. Black 
market rent-seeking has been apparent through gains in currency exchange, oil subsidies and 
land-raiding rights being traded for military alliances (African Development Bank Group, 
2018:9).  
The Chinese government pressurises Chinese firms to maintain a clean bill when it comes to 
any forms of bribery or corruption. CNCP is a state-owned enterprise and therefore, the 
Chinese government is a stakeholder. The trust and opinion of this stakeholder are vital to 
CNPC’s reputation. Interviewees in Han et al (2017:133) stated that the South Sudanese police 
and the judiciary have great discretion and are tough towards foreign investors – fees and fines 
can be levied to them for “different reasons whenever they want”. This can be interpreted as 
corruption if reasons for the fees and fines are not given. 
 
57 The currency of Sudan and South Sudan is the Sudanese Pound – represented as SD.  
58 Rent seeking is when an individual or an entity (like the state) wants to increase their wealth without creating 
benefits for society. Rent seeking does not encourage productivity in the economy. The manipulation of the 




The sources of South Sudanese wealth present reputational risks to the companies operating in 
the country, especially CNPC, being a major shareholder and investor. The violent events of 
2012 that caused the shutdown in production and exports not only shows the fragility of the oil 
extraction and production industry, but also the risks to companies operating in the industry. 
By operating in a country where countrywide shutdowns and low levels of production may 
occur due to volatility, disagreements and violence are indeed called into the decision-making 
process by a company’s board and their area-based operational reasonings must be clear. 
Furthermore, choosing to remain in a country where humanitarian aid is extorted to benefit the 
government can greatly harm a company’s reputation. The corruption that is widespread in 
South Sudan also incredibly increased the reputational risk of the CNPC, as one of their main 
stakeholders is their own government.  
Risk Rating: 5 (high risk) 
4.3.1.3 Intent with Wealth  
South Sudan’s intent with wealth is, in the least, debatable. The government’s budget’s main 
emphasis is on security spending, with 58% of total government spending being on the national 
security workforce. During the oil shutdown in 2012, the SPLA had over 230 000 soldiers with 
an additional 80 000 men and women in police, prison and wildlife security sections (African 
Development Bank Group, 2018:14). Military expenditure averaged US$516 million from 
2006-2018; to contrast this spending, expenditure on health and education is roughly 6% of 
total government spending (World Bank Group, 2018).  South Sudan is home to the largest 
humanitarian crisis spill over in the world, making the financing priority on military resources 
a questionable decision. Furthermore, as mentioned under the previous section on source of 
wealth, humanitarian aid is often used to benefit the South Sudanese government and not for 
the intended purposes. This also presents an argument for poor wealth management, and bad 
intentions of use wealth that is given to the country through international aid.  
The wealth created by oil in South Sudan is also poorly managed, with most oil-based revenue 
being placed in poorly managed and supervised South Sudanese bank accounts (Vasselier, 
2016:16). According to Transparency International (2018), South Sudan is ranked 178/180 
countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) with an overall score of 13/10059. The 
average score for all countries in 2018 was 43/100 (Transparency International, 2018). South 
 
59 The CPI ranks 180 countries according to their perceived levels of public sector corruption. The scale is 1-100 




Sudan is continuously rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, which is an 
indication of poor institutions and poor leaders in positions of power where extensive theft and 
corruption by government officials occurs (Cust & Harding, 2013:14).  The African 
Development Bank (2018:9) agrees with this notion of poor management, stating that political 
elites consistently divert state resources into their own hands. Government officials have 
diverted over US$4 billion, approximately one-third of all oil revenues from 2005-2011, with 
no actions taken to prosecute them as legal and anti-corruption systems are weak in South 
Sudan60.  
GAN Integrity61 (2016) stated that South Sudan had still not signed any anti-corruption 
conventions, even after the realisation of existing government-based corruption; there is no 
supporting evidence that they have since Gan Integrity’s report in 2016. More recently, South 
Sudan scored a 50/100 for anti-corruption mechanisms on the Africa Integrity Indicators map, 
which shows that the country is attempting to eradicate the phenomenon (Global Integrity, 
2019). On the percentile ranking of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, South Sudan ranks 
at 1% for control of corruption and 0% for government effectiveness (World Bank Group, 
2019). These are some of the figures that contribute to South Sudan’s ranking for this indicator.  
South Sudan experiences extreme corruption levels, poor management of oil revenues and 
humanitarian aid, and high military expenditure. This results in limited community 
development and service delivery capacities as no funds are made available for these issues. 
CNPC is exposing themselves to corrupt practices and individuals by operating in South Sudan, 
making it possible for shareholders and the public to associate them with corruption. This 
creates a negative perception of the company and therefore, a negative reputation. The 
mismanagement of funds and financing priorities in South Sudan also opens the company up 
to negative perceptions, as the mismanagement of funds is public information. Most of the 
South Sudanese population does not get to share in the benefits of the oil revenues although 
economic growth is spurred by the oil industry. This can increase political grievances towards 
the government, possibly resulting in civil violence or further instability (du Toit, 2013:9). This 
instability inherently increases the risks the company exposes itself to.  
Risk Rating: 4 (medium-high risk)  
 
60 In 2012, President Kiir fired all ministers to try end the corruption plaguing the country, however, this action 
left the country without a cabinet for 10 days (African Development Bank Group , 2018:9).  





4.3.2.1 Location  
South Sudan is in East-Central Africa. The country is neighboured by Sudan, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. These 
neighbours all maintain ratings of medium to extreme political risk, with Central African 
Republic rating extreme, Sudan high and DRC high (Control Risks, 2019). Security risks from 
these countries further rate from medium to high.  
South Sudan gained 75% of Sudan’s oil reserves when gaining independence, although the 
country is completely landlocked. South Sudan is therefore reliant on Sudan’s oil export 
pipelines and ports (African Development Bank Group, 2018:1). The 2012 shutdown of oil 
production as a result of conflict between the two countries, and South Sudan’s reliance on 
Sudan’s location on the Red Sea, makes the country more vulnerable to any decisions or 
changes Sudan makes. The border between the two countries is still not completely defined 
and areas along the border are still under dispute; many oil fields are located in contested border 
areas between Sudan and South Sudan. The agreement signed on the oil transport fees also 
addressed a fourteen-mile area of dispute, located on the border of Southern and Eastern Darfur 
(North Sudan) and Western and Northern Bahr al (South Sudan) (African Development Bank 
Group, 2018:8). Unfortunately, South Sudan did backtrack on this agreement62 leaving the area 
under dispute to this day. This means that some oil fields are still contested but most of the oil 
fields are under South Sudan’s control. Some of the regions may be under South Sudan’s 
territory, however it does not mean government exerts complete control in these areas. There 
are still significant oil regions where the South Sudanese government does not exert clear 
control (Anthony & Hengkun, 2014:82). These areas are controlled to a larger extent by SPLA, 
which is not a government entity. At times of conflict, it is not the South Sudanese army that 
will evacuate CNPC workers and officials, but rather SPLA solidiers. This forces CNPC to 
play the safety of their employees in the hands of an organisation that does not belong or have 
ties to the government or any official entity.  
The location of South Sudan places CNPC in a position of reliance on Sudan’s transit system, 
which makes the company especially vulnerable to conflict and disputes between the two 
countries, as was seen in 2012. Since this conflict, there has been an agreement put into place 
 
62 South Sudan reneged on the agreement due to pressure from local elites, whose pressure the presidency required 




to prevent any future disputes regarding oil transit systems; it is in the best interest of both 
countries to maintain this agreement. Although South Sudan is surrounded by high-risk 
countries, nothing has occurred in recent years that would pose reputational risks to CNPC. It 
is in the areas of South Sudan that the government does not exert control where reputational 
risks arise for CNPC. The ongoing contention of oil fields also increases security risks, which 
is a great source of reputational risk for the company.  
Risk Rating: 3 (Medium risk) 
4.3.2.2 Regulatory Environment  
A major shortcoming of firms, including CNPC, is that they have limited knowledge about the 
legal and regulatory environment of the foreign countries in which they choose to operate (du 
Toit, 2013:14). This lack of knowledge may increase reputational risk exposure as any 
problems would be made public; in today’s globalized world, information travels faster than 
what MNCs would want. Many African countries, South Sudan included, have poorly 
developed institutional and regulatory environments63 (Abdalla, et al., 2013:4; Han, et al., 
2017:130). A volatile and poorly imposed regulatory environment can subject Chinese MNC’s, 
like CNPC, to unreliable interpretations of regulations (Han, et al., 2017:133). This makes 
understanding the reputational risks stemming from the legal and regulatory environment of 
importance to companies. Most regulations in country’s regarding the oil sector are written in 
order to protect their resources and their environment. As has been shown through multiple 
reputational risk disasters, the environment is a topic that holds major reputational risk 
globally; not adhering the environmental regulations, or doing a poor job of practicing them, 
can lead to great public dissatisfaction and pressure from shareholder groups.  
The following legislations discussed in this section were part of the CPA signed in 2005. The 
Sudan Interim Constitution was established and stated that these acts will be followed by Sudan 
as a whole (therefore, both the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan). At independence, South 
Sudan started the process of creating an interim constitution that was valid until 201564 (Cust 
& Harding, 2013:16). South Sudan updated the Petroleum Resources Act 1998 as the 
Petroleum Act 2012; despite additions of anti-corruption requirements in the act, it is still 
poorly enforced by government (GAN Integrity, 2016). The new act also calls for transparent 
 
63 According to the research done in Abdalla et al (2013:4), Ethiopia and Kenya are the only countries in Africa 
with a legal framework for strategic environmental assessments.  




and competitive practices, yet no licensing rounds have been conducted since its 
implementation (Cust & Harding, 2013:21). Besides this act, South Sudan has not added in any 
further legislation regarding oil production and the environment. The acts and legislations 
regarding oil that were introduced before independence are still important to consider – as 
previously mentioned, it was followed by South Sudan during the period of transition to 
independence and CNPC was active during the establishment of most of these acts.  
One of the first legislations that was introduced in Sudan regarding the environment was 
enacted in 1975, predating the discovery of oil; it is known as the Environmental Health Act. 
The act states that dumping, discharging or disposing of any substances into rivers, lakes, wells 
or other water sources, that may cause harm to human or animal health, is banned (Abdalla, et 
al., 2013:7). However, this act does not mention the oil industry specifically and has not been 
updated to include the oil industry since its inception. The Petroleum Resources Act was 
inducted in 1998 and remains as the main legislation that regulates the petroleum (oil) industry 
in the country. The main matters of the act pertain to the country’s ownership of oil and 
restrictions on companies regarding exploration and production thereof. Any environmental 
consequences were not considered as a priority, with only a short mention of companies being 
required to protect the environment and prevent pollution.  
The Environment Protection Act was written into legislation in 2001, in which five 
environmental objectives were laid out, and the Higher Council for Environment and Natural 
Resources (HCENR) was called to be established (Abdalla, et al., 2013:8). The HCENR was 
established in 1991 as the Environment and Natural Resources Supreme Council and was 
joined with the Ministry of Environment and Physical Development in 1995. The Ministry, and 
as a result the Council, still struggles today as it does not have access to funds, technical or 
professional capacity to carry out the responsibilities as set out in the Act. The government has 
not set out to rectify this as they lack the will to do so – the priority of the government is to 
encourage investment from foreign and local entities, not environmental protection (Abdalla, 
et al., 2013:9). The act also has a lack of detail in the regulations that are meant to guide the 
environmental requirements in different industries.  
The final act that was added into environmental legislation occurred in 2005 – the Regulations 
for Protection of the Environment in the Petroleum Industry (Amendment) (Abdalla, et al., 
2013:10). Out of all environmental legislation in the oil and gas sector, this is act is the most 




company pursuing operations. The ministry maintains the ability to expel any company as a 
penalty for violations. Most large oil companies have established health, safety and 
environmental units along with community development units (Abdalla, et al., 2013:11). 
However, the regulations have not been updated and managers of health, safety and 
environment believe that they are not enough as this Act also has provisions that are 
incomplete.  
The Resource Governance Index (RGI) developed by the Revenue Watch Institute is a tool 
created to assess oil industry policies and governance in South Sudan (Cust & Harding, 
2013:20). In 2013, South Sudan ranked 50/58 countries assessed with a score of 80/100 which 
is a high placement due to the ambitious legal agenda the country designed surrounding its oil 
industry. This category does, however, only measure policy and legal setting, and does not 
focus on enforcement. Laws in South Sudan are not enforced, and many gaps exist in the 
country’s legislation (GAN Integrity, 2016). Penalties are also not often applied for 
noncompliance of laws.  
Lack of institutional65 quality and enforcement pose high levels of reputational risk to 
companies, such as CNPC, wishing to be operational in South Sudan. Quality and enforcement 
of regulations and legislations can help determine the security and stability of investments 
(Cust & Harding, 2013:7). According to the World Governance Indicators (World Bank Group, 
2019), South Sudan has a 2.9% rank for regulatory quality and a 1.4% rank for rule of law. It 
is necessary to note here that this is a risk that CNPC has mitigated against through entering 
into joint ventures with the government of South Sudan and other investors (du Toit, 2013:14). 
As mentioned previously, CNPC entered consortiums with Petronas from Malaysia, ONGC 
Videsh from India, Sudapet from Sudan and GNOPC. The Chinese government is still the 
majority shareholder with 86% ownership of CNPC.  
Risk Rating: 4 (Medium-high risk) 
4.3.3 What  
4.3.3.1 Product 
The product focused on in this section of the study is oil. As we now know, South Sudan gained 
75% of oil reserves from Sudan at independence and a relatively mature oil industry. South 
Sudan estimated that it had 3.75 billion barrels of proven oil reserves at the time of 
 




independence (African Development Bank Group, 2018:10). This places South Sudan at 28th 
in world capacity and 7th on the African continent. A new oil discovery was also made in South 
Sudan this year – the first since independence. The new field discovered contains an estimated 
5.3 million barrels, with the Dar Petroleum Company66 operating the new field (Dumo, 2019). 
Despite this discovery, South Sudan is yet to maximise its oil output as current output does not 
measure up to regulators and CNPC’s expectations of the product. Oil production in South 
Sudan shows a downward projection, with an expected production ending in mid-2030s. The 
government recognizes that there is a need to increase recovery rates, discover new fields and 
encourage more exploration activities67.  
As was indicated and discussed in chapter two, natural resources are a part of a country’s 
national patrimony. Being operational in the extractive industry already increases CNCP’s 
exposure to risk greatly but operating in a country that is in a state of fragile peace and has an 
extreme overreliance on oil increases this risk even more. Corruption, poor governmental 
regulations, civil unrest/on ground opposition, political instability, environmental activism and 
war are common threats that face the extractive industry and CNPC faces most of these threats 
in South Sudan. Reputational risks are attached to these risks that CNPC is facing in South 
Sudan, partly due to the product that is being dealt with. Extractive industries do immediately 
carry higher risk than others, however being operational in a fragile states’ extractive industry 
that depends on oil for 90% of government revenue is even riskier.   
Risk Rating: 5 (High risk) 
4.3.3.2 Capability to Manage Product  
The capability of the South Sudanese government to manage the oil industry should be of 
concern to CNPC. The oil shutdown of 2012, previously discussed in this study, presented an 
example of how the government lacks control and capabilities. An interviewee in Han et al 
(2017:134) refers to how construction or exploration sites were in areas that were affected by 
the civil war and they cannot return to these sites for further exploration/extraction. CNPC 
experienced significant labour and capital costs in the cease in production (Cust & Harding, 
2013:14). The civil war has exacerbated South Sudan’s inability to manage its product and 
 
66 Dar Petroleum Company is a consortium of oil companies with CNPC being the greatest shareholder.  
67 This is something that can only be achieved when the country is considered a safer investment climate, which 
it is not due to the ongoing corruption and poor institutional and regulatory capability. This is, then, an indication 




forces CNPC to have to deal with economic and security issues (Bodetti, 2019). Not only is 
production severely affected by war, but safety of workers is also at risk – CNPC had to 
evacuate their offices in 2013, and in 2018 when 14 of their oil workers were killed. The loss 
of life is a huge harm to company reputation. If there was better management of the oil sector 
factors, this could be avoided. These incidences mentioned here also exposed CNPC’s policy 
deficits in terms of security (Patey, 2013:3). This put CNPC’s reputation at further risk. 
The poor capability of the government in managing their product often leads to the company 
having to take on these responsibilities and engage on the ground level; although this should 
be done regardless,  it is harder in South Sudan as oil agreements are cloudy (Moro, et al., 
2014:13). The government should be responsible for managing engagement between CNPC 
and locals, as it is their product that is being sold, but the company’s infrastructure being used 
for extraction and production. If the ground-level engagement goes wrong, it is seen as the 
company’s issue, even though the government should take responsibility. Interruption of oil 
activities, seizing of vehicles and machinery, or other confrontational efforts are made by locals 
in order to pressure companies into engaging. Government authorities have a poor relationship 
with locals in South Sudan, especially in oil producing areas, which stems from 
mismanagement of the oil industry and a lack of trickledown effect to the locals. This creates 
grievances from the locals towards the government and CNPC.  
The regulatory environment indicator also investigated the capability of the government to 
manage its oil sector. The government has created an ambitious agenda to help manage the 
sector but external factors, such as articles 52, 59, 82, 94 and 100 of the Petroleum Act (2012) 
still not being implemented up to two years later, contradicts these ambitions (Moro, et al., 
2014:13).  
South Sudan lacks the capability to manage its main product – oil. This lack of capability poses 
high reputational risks to CNPC; it is exposed to poor management of regulations, having to 
take over responsibilities of community engagement, and poor management of the sector in 
general that affects operations, especially during times of conflict. These poor capabilities have 
led to the loss of CNPC workers lives which causes great harm to the company’s reputation. 
Shareholders can question why CNPC chooses to operate in a country where lives are placed 
at risk due to the host government’s poor capabilities to manage their own natural resources.  




4.3.3.3 Commercial Purpose of Product 
South Sudan has very little commercial purpose for oil as they export most of what they 
produce in order to create revenue for the country. The purpose of the revenue created from 
the oil has been discussed under Intent with Wealth. This lack of commercial purpose, 
therefore, carries no reputational risks for CNPC.  
Risk Rating: 1 (low risk) 
4.3.4 How  
4.3.4.1 Sustainable Business Practices  
Sustainable business practices consider socially responsible, economically feasible and 
environmentally friendly aspects. Regulatory compliance covered one of these aspects in detail 
– looking at the regulations and laws South Sudan has in place to protect the environment from 
impacts caused by the oil industry. As previously indicated, the Petroleum Act, that was 
updated in 2012, exists and currently has mention of companies needing to prevent pollution 
and protect the environment. Bar this Act, South Sudan has little in the way of official laws to 
protect the environment. Furthermore, any laws that are in place are poorly enforced. From an 
environmental perspective, South Sudan does not implement sustainable business practices. 
The country is still focused on building its economy and doing this by all means necessary.  
Moro, et al. (2014:102) conducted a study68 of the effects of the oil industry in the Upper Nile 
Region in South Sudan.  The report found that people were no longer able to practice 
agriculture in the area, soil excavation is rampant, and villages are often lost in order to make 
space for oil-based exploration activities. A three-year study conducted in Unity State also 
discovered that there is polluted groundwater due to mud that is contaminated by chemicals 
used in oil exploration (MVO Nederland, 2019). The water is therefore no longer safe for 
human consumption; this may be considered as an issue of the companies and that they are the 
ones at fault, however, poorly administered regulations allow companies to pursue exploration. 
These are not sustainable business practices on behalf of the government of South Sudan and 
are crucial to consider as it is often the company that is considered the “bad guy” and their 
reputation that is harmed. There is responsibility on both sides – the host government (South 
Sudan) and the excavation company (CNPC).  
 
68 The study was done under the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (and now South Sudan). The Coalition 




The report additionally found that when there are violations by the companies and 
compensation is to occur, the communities are unaware of this and do not pursue compensation 
(Moro, et al., 2014:106). This has been taken advantage of by the government. The poor legal 
systems that characterize South Sudan ensures that these provisions are never provided, and it 
is easy for the government to take advantage of this, which can be seen in South Sudan’s case. 
The oil industry in South Sudan is also struggling to project economic feasibility to companies, 
hence a lack of investment. This report also highlights the poor social practices of the 
government. Socially responsible business practices should aim to benefit communities, the 
population and the environment. Through the lax legal systems, provisions to benefit 
communities are not provided when they should be. The report also highlights the lack of care 
for the environment in South Sudan by the government.  
In 2010-2011, approximately 350 000 barrels of oil were produced per day; by 2012 production 
had dropped to 100 000 barrels per day due to the oil shutdown (Cust & Harding, 2013:12). 
After the ceasefire was signed in 2018 ending the five-year civil war, the government was intent 
on reaching the pre-war production of 350 000 barrels a day (World Bank Group, 2018). Oil 
fields had also been shut down during the civil war and exploration was thus interrupted by the 
war and instability, with infrastructure also being damaged during the war.  The pre-war goal 
has been pushed back for production expectations to 2020 with the country currently producing 
180 000 barrels per day (Dumo, 2019). Cust and Harding (2013:13) predicted a 40% reduction 
in oil production between 2011 and 2016 and a complete seize of oil production by the mid-
2030s. This highlights the economic feasibility, or rather economic implausibility, of oil 
extraction and production in South Sudan.  
South Sudan lacks socially, and environmentally responsible business practices and the 
economic feasibility of its oil sector is uncertain.  If there is increased investment, the oil sector 
may be able to last longer than the predicted time of the mid-2030s. Nonetheless, operating 
with a government that does not offer sustainable business practices is harmful to CNCP’s 
reputation. Socially responsible business practices are key as South Sudan is scrutinised by the 
media for their humanitarian crisis. The lack of socially responsible business practices in the 
country are seen across the world and therefore harms the reputation of CNPC that chooses to 
stay operational, despite the lack of benefit to the population and lack of intent of the 
government to be socially responsible to their citizens. Environmental activism is also a huge 
source of reputational risk. Associating with a government that does not adhere to 




rating for this indicator is not high but rather medium-high as the economic feasibility of the 
oil sector is currently satisfactory – the discovery of the new oil field this year assists in this. 
In the future this will have to be re-evaluated, taking into account any possible discoveries of 
oil fields.  
Risk Rating: 4 (Medium-high risk)  
4.3.4.2 Transparent and Timely Reporting 
The RGI scores and ranks countries according to both the governance of their sector and their 
transparency. South Sudan received the failing score of 31/100. As stated, the ambitious 
legislations helped the country score higher, however, it failed in reporting practices and checks 
and balances – the government releases “almost no data on the oil sector” (Cust & Harding, 
2013:21). The Petroleum Act of 2012 also requires the state-owned company Nilepet to publish 
audited reports yearly but there has been no follow-through of this. Before South Sudan’s 
independence there was a joint committee on oil revenue that would release information on 
production volume, prices and value of oil exports’ Cust and Harding (2013:21) found however 
that these reports stopped in 2011 after independence was gained. These timely reports 
indicated a dedication to transparency and offered important information to investors, including 
CNPC.  
Interviewees in Abdalla et al (2013:15) also referred to a lack of transparent reporting in the 
oil industry. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) experts are delegated to conduct studies 
by companies such as CNPC. These experts additionally stated, “Even we as the team of 
EIA…, suffer from a lack of transparency, or, sometimes they might direct you to see the 
positive aspects rather than the negatives ones” (Abdalla, et al., 2013:15). The former 
Secretary-General of the HCENR had the same issues, emphasising the difficulty of access to 
information in order to perform the council’s necessary duties and processes.  








4.4 Overall Risk Evaluation  
This table is a visual representation of the above reputational risk analysis of South Sudan.  
Indicator  Risk Rating 
Know Your Client  3 
Source of Wealth  5 
Intent with Wealth  4 
Location  3 
Regulatory Environment  4 
Product  5 
Capability to Manage Product  5 
Commercial Purpose of Product  1 
Sustainable Business Practices  4 
Transparent and Timely Reporting  4 
Overall Risk Rating  38/50 
 
Table 10: Overall Reputational Risk Evaluation for South Sudan.   
Source: Author’s Analysis  
South Sudan’s overall rating would place it as a high-risk country regarding reputational risk. 
Under every factor South Sudan has a median ranking of high risk, which can be attributed to 
its poor institutions and instability due to the recent civil war. The civil war may have ended in 
2018 but the effects are still present in South Sudan. The heighted security risks and poor 
decision-making by the government results in increased risk for nearly every indicator.   
4.5 South Sudan’s Outlook: Worth the risk?  
CNPC may be viewed as less risk averse than many Western companies and therefore they 
have chosen to continue operations in South Sudan. However, CNPC has been affected by 
reputational risks by conducting operations in South Sudan and will continue to be exposed to 
reputational risks along with other political risks. South Sudan presents high or medium-high 
levels of risk in 7/9 indicators. This contributes to South Sudan’s overall risk rating being high. 
Entering joint ventures with other oil companies has assisted CNPC in mitigating some risks. 
although South Sudan is still considered a controversial investment choice and a fragile 




Controversy is the best word to describe South Sudan while it is still avoided by many Western 
companies, as is seen by Total’s hesitance to restart exploration activities. Cust and Harding 
(2013:4) found that institutions and policies that are implemented by government impact 
exploration activities and the possibility of discovering new oil fields. The poor regulatory 
environment of South Sudan is further impacting their economic feasibility. CNPC is known 
for following a philosophy of high risk for a high reward, however, as indicated in economic 
feasibility under sustainable business practices this high in reward might not last for much 
longer or may be interrupted as it was in 2012. The decision to remain in South Sudan may not 
harm CNPC’s reputation amongst the public, but the public is not the only shareholder in 
CNPC nor the biggest, the Chinese government is. Choosing to remain operational in a country 
that is unable to produce according to expectations due to a poor regulatory environment and 
inability to manage its product will negatively affect CNPC’s reputation with the Chinese 
government. The company is a state-owned enterprise and support for the company can 


















Chapter 5: Reputational Risks Analysis of CNMC in Zambia 
5.1 Introduction  
Zambia’s political settlements and economic phases have been led strongly by Zambia’s 
number one mineral resource – copper. Zambia is the world’s seventh-largest copper producer 
and the second largest on the African continent (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:1) Colonial rule 
saw the beginnings of copper mining in Zambia with favourable commodity prices; 
independence in 1964 introduced a Zambianization of the workforce, a multi-party state and 
continued favourable commodity prices. From 1973 onwards, nationalization was 
accompanied by a one-party state, followed by a period of heavy debt due to depressed copper 
prices. After the debt burden of the 1980s, a multi-party state emerged once again and thus so 
did the privatization of the mines (Bebbington, et al., 2018:18). This was all part of a policy 
prescription to help the country recover under the continued unfavourable copper prices. It was 
only at the turn of the 21st century that Zambia experienced positive economic growth from 
favourable copper prices. Since this period of privatisation, Zambia has become a more stable 
country with a multi-party political regime and positive economic growth.  
Control Risks (2019) rated Zambia as a medium political risk country and as a low security 
risk environment. This studier environment has led to there being greater Western investments 
- companies from Canada, Switzerland and Britain have all invested in Zambia’s mining 
industry since the turn of the century (Reuters, 2018). Chinese Nonferrous Metals Company 
Limited (CNMC) is, therefore, not the highest investor but still maintains an 80% shareholding 
in two major copper mines – Luanshya and Chambishi. However, China is the largest client 
for copper in the world, creating a high dependency on China for exports of the mineral. Zambia 
currently faces a poorly diversified economy, threats to foreign presences – especially in the 
mining sector – and high debt levels (Euler Hermes, 2019)69. Various threats to foreign 
presence can be seen in the anti-Chinese sentiment that has recently spread across Zambia, 
presenting a threat to Chinese operations and Chinese nationals residing in Zambia. These 
points will be expanded upon further through the reputational risk analysis that will take place 
in this chapter regarding CNMC’s mining operations in Zambia. A final outlook on the risks 
presented to CNMC and its operations will be presented in the concluding section of this 
chapter.  
 




5.2 Zambia’s Rollercoaster Mining History  
Mineral exploration began in the 20th century in Zambia with the first commercial mine 
established in 1928 (Sikamo, et al., 2016:491). Copper has been and still is the main mineral 
resource of Zambia. Mining has governed much of Zambia’s economic, political and social 
histories (Bebbington, et al., 2018:5). In 1964 Zambia was granted independence from British 
colonial rule and was thereby under the leadership of President Kenneth Kuanda, although only 
two mining companies70 maintained control. At the time of independence, 96% of Zambia’s 
exports were copper, accounting for half of Zambia’s GDP and 12% of global copper output 
(Sikamo, et al., 2016:492). Despite the wealth accumulated by copper extraction and exports, 
little translated into infrastructural development; the only area of Zambia that experienced 
significant copper-related development was, of course, the area along the Copperbelt region71 
(Bebbington, et al., 2018:6).  
The post-independence period brought on an era of nationalization of the Zambian mining 
industry; in 1969, Matero reforms saw the Zambian government gain 51% ownership of their 
mines. The Mining Development Corporation managed the mines during the period of partial 
nationalization; by 1973, full nationalization had taken place and all companies were integrated 
into the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) (Bebbington, et al., 2018:7). This year 
also saw another great change in Zambia: the constitution was revised and Zambia became a 
one-party state (Sikamo, et al., 2016:493). Between the years of independence and 
nationalization, Zambia also became the first Southern African country to launch diplomatic 
relations with China (Hugland, 2008:555). China played a key role in the construction of the 
TAZARA railway between Zambia and the Tanzanian coast, allowing for much easier 
exportation of copper. This is an event that is still stressed by both Zambia and China when 
speaking of their relations and how they came about.  
The positive rhetoric of nationalization and the success of the TAZARA railway did not last 
long. During the 1970s copper prices fell immensely, leading Zambia into a debt crisis and 
therefore borrowing heavily from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank 
in the late 1980s to try recover their economy (Li, 2010:5). It is common for loans from the 
 
70 The copper mines of Zambia were owned by two companies during the colonial era and into the 1970s – Anglo-
America Corporation owned by the South African Oppenheimer family, and American Roan Selection Trust 
chaired by British businessman Sir Ronald Prain (Bebbington , et al., 2018:5).  




IMF and World Bank to be accompanied by policy prescriptions – since this period, Zambia’s 
economic policies have been heavily policed by these institutions. One of the policy conditions 
that Zambia had to assign to at the time of loan implementation was the privatisation of ZCCM, 
which caused upheaval in the country.  
Violent protests and an attempted coup pressured President Kuanda to change the constitution 
again in 1990, finally allowing multi-party elections to take place in 1991, in which Kuanda 
lost his position as Zambian President (Sikamo, et al., 2016:494). This change in government 
was accompanied by the start of privatization of the mines in 1991; despite the policy 
prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank, privatization of the mines only started in 1996 
and the process was eventually completed in 2000 (Sikamo, et al., 2016:494). The company 
was sold to several foreign companies – one of these companies being CNMC. CNMC bought 
Chambishi mine and started the long-lasting relationship between China and Zambia’s copper 
industry.  
5.2.1 CNMC in Zambia  
This section offers a brief outline of CNMC’s history in Zambia, with past and current relations 
being focused on. CNMC72 is the parent company of Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFCA) 
having an 85% shareholding in NFCA (ZZCM Investment Holdings, 2019). NFCA was 
established in 1998 as the holding company of Chambishi Copper Mines, which was part of 
the privatization process of Zambia’s mining industry. When CNMC acquired Chambishi, it 
had been inactive for 13 years and had been deemed unprofitable by numerous other companies 
(du Toit, 2013:12). CNMC currently mines at Chambishi main mine and Chambishi West 
mine; in 2018 CNMC invested US$832 million into a new Zambian copper mine, developing 
Chambishi South East mine. This investment extends the company’s lifespan by 20 years in 
Zambia, ensuring that operations in Zambia will continue for the next 20 years (Reuters, 2018). 
Copper concentrate is mined at these mines and taken up by Chambishi Copper Smelter, a 
sister company to NFCA, also owned by CNMC (ZZCM Investment Holdings, 2019).  
In 2009 CNMC also acquired an 85% shareholding stake in Luanshya Copper Mines (Li, 
2010:6). The company had to transfer 5% of their shares to ZCCM to heed to acquisition terms 
and thus maintains a position as an 80% shareholder. The original owners of the mine pulled 
out due to low international copper prices, however, China’s risk appetite saw this as an 
 
72 CNMC is a state-owned enterprise under the direct management of State-owned Assets Supervision and 




opportunity. In 2018, the mine had a turnover of US$268 million, producing 43 177 tonnes of 
copper, more than what was predicted (ZZCM Investment Holdings, 2019).  
CNMC has recently been surrounded by public debate regarding their mines’ labour practices. 
This bad publicity became the centre of Michael Sata’s presidential campaign in 2011, creating 
an anti-Chinese sentiment and rhetoric in Zambia (du Toit, 2013:17). This was built on the 
incidents that had occurred in 2008 and 201073. This bad reputation can already expose the 
firms to risks such as public protest or violence. Furthermore, the firms can become targets of 
governmental action – after Sata won the election, three extraction licenses held by Chinese 
companies in copper mines were cancelled. After these events, CNMC realised the importance 
of reputation and the negative actions that can occur after bad incidents; health and safety 
regulations were thus rectified, and standards became better than they had been in the past (Li, 
2010:9). The relationship between CNMC and its Zambian counterparts will be looked at in 
further detail under the Know Your Client indicator of this chapter. This brief history of CNMC 
in Zambia has offered a contextualisation of its operations and provided insight into the 
multiple resources they have invested in Zambia.  
5.3 Reputational Risk Analysis  
A reputational risk analysis will now be conducted for CNMC as they have invested large 
quantities of time, money, effort and resources in Zambia. Although there are smaller Chinese 
companies that operate in Zambia, CNMC is the largest and is under the direct supervision of 
the Chinese government. As discussed in chapter three, every risk factor has multiple indicators 
which will be rated accordingly out of five points and justification for these ratings, after careful 
consideration of the available data, will be provided. Finally, an overall rating out of fifty points 
will be presented in a table that allows for quick reference. This follows the layout of the 
previous chapter in order for the findings to be consistent for both cases.  
5.3.1 Who  
5.3.1.1 Know your Client  
Zambia is considered a more stable country compared to other African countries due to various 
aspects. There are democratic elections held every five years, with the next election being held 
in 2021; the government of Zambia is a unitary republic, with a Supreme Court and a legislative 
branch consisting of a National Assembly (KPMG, 2013:5). Despite this, a long-lasting legacy 
 




of Zambia’s post-colonial political rule is still the concentration of power in the hands of the 
executive branch. There is also an inordinate undermining of institutions of accountability, 
such as the judiciary and parliament (Bebbington, et al., 2018:16). This undermining of 
accountability has also transferred into the oversight of business deals – including in the mining 
industry. The formal structures involved in these processes are also being undermined by the 
office of the president, political parties or other political actors (Bebbington, et al., 2018:27). 
The patronage system is therefore integrated into Zambia’s state institutions.  
 President Edgar Lungu, who represents the Patriotic Front Party, was elected in 2016 in a 
closely-contested election (The World Bank Group, 2019). Lungu replaced Michael Sata, who 
was from the same political party. Sata won the 2011 election on a largely anti-Chinese 
sentiment that he created, going as far as to say that he wanted the old colonial rule to return 
and for the Chinese to leave (Li, 2010:13). In 2013, three Chinese mining licenses were 
cancelled by the Zambian government (du Toit, 2013:17). Chinese investment was indeed 
highly politicised in populist politics by Sata, and this anti-Chinese rhetoric has continued even 
after Sata’s passing74, posing threats to Chinese presence in the mining sector (Euler Hermes, 
2019).  
Civil society also has little influence in Zambia, with their ability to mobilize citizens being 
restricted by the government. The government has also exercised greater influence over NGOs 
– registration fees and disclosure requirements have created operational issues for NGOs 
looking to establish themselves and have led to the closure of some NGOs already in existence 
(GAN Integrity, 2017).  These actions make Zambia a more controversial client to be dealing 
with. Zambia’s rank for investment attractiveness is falling as a result of these issues. For 
example, in 2016, the Fraser Institute ranked Zambia 43rd out of 104 countries in their annual 
survey on investment perceptions amongst mining companies - only a year, later this ranking 
had fallen to 71st (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:3). Companies stated that increased political 
instability and concern over the tax regime75 raised concerns when wanting to invest in Zambia.  
Another aspect that CNMC must consider is that the government is not the only client they are 
dealing with as mining activity moves away from the Copperbelt and into other provinces. 
Despite this expansion, it is still traditional chiefs that “own” 94% of Zambia’s land (KPMG, 
2013:10). These chiefs have a great role in mining, especially seeing as they are the primary 
 
74 Michael Sata passed away in 2014, before the end of his 5-year term.  




decision makers in the resettlement of their tribes; traditional leaders clearly hold strong 
political lobby and need to be approached by companies when wanting to develop mines. 
Traditional leaders also have a strong influence over their people and if they are not pleased 
with mining companies, they can lobby their people to act. Traditional leaders, however, 
receive a lot of their income from the government which influences their decisions regarding 
mining companies and their business ventures (Bebbington, et al., 2018:34). Reputation is 
based off stakeholder perception, and these traditional chiefs are another stakeholder that 
CNMC needs to consider and manage. If the current anti-Chinese rhetoric continues, local 
chiefs will likely be influenced against CNMC and pose a threat to their operations.  
Risk Rating: 5 (High risk).  
5.3.1.2 Source of Wealth  
Zambia’s wealth is governed nearly entirely by copper and it is the second leading producer of 
copper in Africa. In addition to copper, Zambia produces cobalt, uranium, gold, diamonds and 
manganese (Global Edge, 2019). This extensive mineral wealth has led to great investment in 
the country’s mining industry, but international companies have stated that they often pay 
kickbacks and bribes during the tender process for contracts granted by the Zambian 
government (GAN Integrity, 2017). In 2011 Zambia achieved middle-income country status 
due to impressive economic growth76 from 2004-2014 (The World Bank Group, 2019). Despite 
this notable growth, Zambia still ranks amongst countries with the highest levels of inequality 
with 58% of the population earning less than the international poverty line77. Zambia, similarly, 
to South Sudan, suffers from a high dependency on one commodity and has a poorly-diversified 
economy. Despite this commodity dependency, Zambia’s current growth levels are higher than 
average Sub-Saharan levels, sitting at 3.4% (PwC, 2019:3). Improved international copper 
prices assisted with this growth, which emphasises Zambia’s overreliance on copper for 
economic growth.  
In 2017, copper accounted for 76.3% of Zambia’s exports (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:1).  
However, international trade in Zambia is often hindered by inescapable corruption and crime 
in customs (GAN Integrity, 2017). Bribes and irregular payments are common, with the 
clearance process and time taken for import procedures being ranked as poor by companies 
 
76 Economic growth averaged 7.4% for the years 2004-2014 (The World Bank Group , 2019).  
77 The international poverty line is $1.90/day. The average number of people living below the poverty line in Sub-




operating in or trading from Zambia. Import and export bans also occur in a random manner. 
Corruption and crime in customs have led to violence and loss of life – in 2014, several truck 
drivers were killed by Zambian custom authorities after refusing to pay bribes when crossing 
the borders. Trucks carrying goods are often attacked and looted when waiting to cross the 
border into Zambia (GAN Integrity, 2017).  
A fiscal deficit and high debt levels – that trace back to the 1980s – are also present in Zambia 
(Euler Hermes, 2019). Zambia’s current account has a deficit of -3.5%. The poor financial 
performance of the country’s accounts was used to garner popular support in the elections of 
2015; however, this was financed through loans, thereby increasing debt. Zambia’s external 
debt currently sits at US$9.4 billion accompanied by domestic debts that bring their total debt 
burden to approximately US$17.2 billion (Euler Hermes, 2019). As previously mentioned, 
Zambia was provided with loans from the World Bank and IMF and is currently in talks with 
the IMF for another loan. These loans are often tied to policy prescriptions, as the previous 
loans were78, that can affect businesses that are operational in Zambia.  
Zambia has great mineral wealth but has not capitalised on it which has led to the government 
focusing on increasing tax revenues from mining through new tax measures79. These new tax 
measures will increase the burden on those companies in the mining industry, impacting jobs, 
investor confidence and investments (PwC, 2019:3). Investment from 2004-2016 was US$12.3 
billion, accounting for 70% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Zambia (Liebenthal & 
Cheelo, 2018:5). FDI is an important source of wealth for Zambia and attempts should be made 
to retain this source. The current business climate is not of great concern and still attracts FDI 
and is an interesting new foreign investment (Euler Hermes, 2019).  
In order to monitor revenue collection from the mining sector, Zambia joined the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)80 and created their local organization – Zambia 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (ZEITI) (Sikamo, et al., 2016:495). The 
organisation monitors what mining companies declare they have paid to government and 
respective government agencies versus what the government recognizes receiving from the 
 
78 The previous loans were provided on the condition that Zambia privatised its mines again.  
79 The tax regime in Zambia is one of instability and has been changed multiple times. This will be expanded upon 
under Regulatory Compliance further in this chapter.  
80 EITI is an international organization that advocates for transparency in the statement of earnings and revenues 




mining companies. ZEITI publishes yearly reports and shows great agreement between what 
government states that it receives and what mining companies declare they have paid to the 
government. Authoritative reports and data were published by ZEITI until 2015, however there 
have not been more recent reports published that offer the same kind of data (Liebenthal & 
Cheelo, 2018:7; GAN Integrity, 2017).  
The Zambia Revenue Authority is another organisation that exists and has seen increased 
success in gaining increased government revenue. The authority was subject to allegations of 
a substantial corruption scandal whereby they inflated the costs of a contract that is presumed 
to involve embezzlement and misappropriation of funds (GAN Integrity, 2017). No 
persecutions have been made; these contracts are not only made with locals but also foreign 
companies, placing them at risk of corruption scandals. Despite this, corruption in the mining 
sector is moderate due to its importance to the Zambian economy.  
Corruption is present in the Zambian government; the collection of bribes in return for tenors 
is a prime example of this (MVO Nederland, 2019). Transparency International (2018) ranks 
Zambia 105/180 countries with a score of 35/100. The issues that present the greatest threat to 
CNMC is the murder of truck drivers for refusing to pay bribes (GAN Integrity , 2017). CNMC 
is under direct supervision by a government commission that discourages any form of bribery 
or corruption. Chinese employees that refuse to pay bribes to customs officials can face the 
same outcome as the truck drivers who lost their lives – loss of life is thus a great reputational 
risk and would greatly affect the stakeholders' trust. The other option (taking part in the 
corruption) also presents a reputational risk for CNMC as the public would lose faith in the 
company should they be aware of the corruption.  
The lack of ZEITI reports also presents a risk to reputation, albeit more minor compared to the 
bribery. The anti-Chinese sentiment created by politicians in Zambia is dangerous to CNMC’s 
reputation and the politicians go to great measures to create this sentiment. Chinese state capital 
is a source of wealth for Zambia; however, it is vulnerable due to the politicians who exploit 
and channel popular public opinion of resource nationalism again Chinese investment 
(Bebbington, et al., 2018:34). If there are no recent ZEITI reports to back up the revenues 
CNMC declare they pay to the government, politicians could state otherwise. Despite these 
two risks, the country’s high debt levels and overreliance on copper does not present 
reputational risks to CNMC. The continued FDI flows into Zambia are also a good indication 




Risk Rating: 3 (Medium risk) 
5.3.1.3 Intent with Wealth  
Zambia’s intention with wealth is not as questionable as some of its neighbours; their wealth 
is mainly just mismanaged, as is the case with most African countries. During Zambia’s period 
of nationalization, ZCCM provided most of the social services81 in most of the mining areas. 
When the mines underwent privatisation, these duties fell to local authorities who were not 
equipped with the financial and organizational assets necessary to deliver the same standard of 
services (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:8). The result of these shortcomings on the local 
government's behalf is that the responsibility has fallen to companies that operate in the 
Copperbelt, including CNMC. There is a lack of attention given to revenue-sharing control 
between central and local government, which often leads to insufficient financial revenue being 
provided to local authorities to provide social services.  
Zambia is currently on the receiving end of great debt relief and loans from international 
institutions. Information on how these borrowed funds are spent by government is not available 
– there is no indication of whether the borrowed funds are used correctly to meet the economic 
and social criteria set out by the institutions (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:16). Zambia does have 
the goal of reducing its debt problem, yet there is little mention of how this will be achieved. 
Information is not available on how the government will reduce the cost of its burdensome civil 
service and repay the outstanding debt (both external and internal) (PwC, 2019:4). Debt service 
costs have increased from 20% in 2018 to 27% in 2019, taking up more of the national 
expenditure budget. Zambia has been declared as being at high risk of debt distress by the IMF 
and World Bank (PwC, 2019:4).   
In 2015, the Zambian government introduced a sovereign wealth fund in the budget. This 
budget indicates that the government is thinking about long-term development. However, this 
budget is the result of Norwegian cooperation partners and the Norwegian Embassy’s influence 
(Bebbington, et al., 2018:15). Yielding to this indicates the extent of these Norwegian 
institutions influence and adds an additional stakeholder to consider when conducting business 
in Zambia.  
The Zambian Minister of Finance, Hon. Mwanakatwe, stated in her budget speech for 2019 
that the government would be focusing on controlling the growth of the government wage bill 
 




(PwC, 2019:2). Zambia has a spending pattern that focuses on salaries, making personal wages 
the largest share of recurrent expenditure (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:17). Further details on 
how the Zambian government planned to achieve this goal were not given. The Public Finance 
Management Act was passed in 2018 and aims to improve fiscal judiciousness and provide 
retributive measures for those who are found abusing and misusing public funds (PwC, 
2019:2). The Planning and Budget Bill was also passed in order to improve the management 
of public resources. 
Zambia’s intent with their wealth does not represent a great reputational risk to CNMC. The 
greatest risk that emerges from this indicator regards the responsibility of social service 
delivery in the mining regions falling to foreign companies operating in those areas, including 
CNMC. If the communities are not pleased with the level of social services, it can fuel the anti-
Chinese sentiment already present or lead to protests. However, this responsibility of providing 
social services, mainly the financing of them, falls on the shoulders of all foreign companies 
operating in mining regions and not just CNMC.   
Risk rating: 2 (Low to medium risk)  
5.3.2 Where  
5.3.2.1 Location  
Zambia is a landlocked country in South-Central Africa. It is bordered by the DRC, Tanzania, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Angola. The DRC and Zimbabwe 
represent the highest risk neighbours, each having a high political risk and a medium security 
risk (Control Risks, 2019).  Angola, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique all have a medium 
political risk with Namibia and Botswana being low. The security risks also range from 
medium to low. Due to its landlocked position, Zambia is reliant on communication routes of 
its neighbours to access key international transport and communication routes (Global Edge, 
2019).  
Zambia shares key geographical and economic features with Zimbabwe, most notably Lake 
Kariba and its hydroelectricity capacity (The World Bank Group, 2019). One of Zambia’s 
greatest weaknesses is its poor electricity generation and it is nearly exclusively reliant on 
hydroelectric power generation (Global Edge, 2019). Previously Zambia did not have 
hydroelectrical stations on their side of Lake Kariba making them reliant on Zimbabwe. After 
recent political shocks, Zambia established five hydroelectric plants on their side of the lake 




Zambia does hold agreements with South Africa, Zimbabwe and DRC whereby they export 
through the Port of Durban in South Africa, which is used for much of its copper exports 
(KPMG, 2013:14). Most of the transport takes place via road routes as the railway system is 
unreliable. Nevertheless, this method of exportation has worked well for Zambia in the past 
and the mining companies operating it have not reported any incidents thus far. Zambia’s 
location, therefore, carries a low risk to the reputation of CNMC.  
Risk Rating: 1 (Low risk).  
5.3.2.2 Regulatory Environment   
This disregard for regulations can be traced back to the process of privatization that occurred 
in the 1990s. The Mines and Minerals Act was passed in 1995 to assist in privatizing ZCCM 
and dismantling the organisation into individual companies (Bebbington, et al., 2018:8). The 
Act created a path for negotiations of Development Agreements with individual companies 
instead of a stable tax regime, as well as a set of conditions that would regulate how private 
mining companies were to operate in Zambia. The process has been covered in controversy. 
The Development Agreements have also never been made public through official publication 
but were leaked to the public and media (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:5). In the years after these 
“closed-door” negotiations were conducted, many of the state-officials that were involved were 
subject to corruption charges and even convicted of these charges (Bebbington , et al., 2018:8). 
The Chiluba government82 has still not been able to account for US$35 million that it should 
have received during the privatization process as it sold the Roan Antelope Mining Corporation 
(Bebbington, et al., 2018:28). The privatization process evidently lacked great legitimacy. 
The current primary law governing Zambia’s mining industry is the Mines and Minerals 
Development Act No.1183 (Silwamba & Jalasi, 2018). This Act was passed in 2015 and 
repealed and replaced the Mines and Minerals Development Act of 2008. The current Act is 
read together with the Mines and Minerals Development (Amendment) Act No. 1484, passed 
in 2016. The judicial system, police system, land administration, customs administration and 
 
82 Frederick Chiluba was the second post-independence President of Zambia from 1991-2002.  
83 This act concerns mining rights, licenses, large-scale mining, gemstone mining, health and safety, 
environmental protection and geological services. Despite the Act’s existence, regulatory compliance by 
government and organizations in Zambia is still of very poor quality (Silwamba & Jalasi, 2018).  
84 Other acts regarding mining in Zambian legislation include the Mines Acquisition (Special Provisions) Act, 




the mining sector all suffer from widespread corruption (MVO Nederland, 2019). Foreign firms 
consider the Zambian administration structure to be highly corrupt, which often results in 
foreign firms’ property rights not being sufficiently protected or enforced (GAN Integrity, 
2017).  
Foreign companies further agree that bribery is common when doing dealings regarding 
environment inspections. Environmental standards were also negotiated with individual mining 
companies and vary between the different mining companies operational. Monitoring agencies 
do not have a country-wide regulation to follow but rather firm-specific regulations that make 
monitoring complex (Hugland, 2008:561). Furthermore, concessions on the environmental 
regulations for firms depends on their assets. As has been established throughout this study, 
the environment is one of the greatest sources of reputational risk as both the local and 
international community can create negative perceptions.  
Both foreign and local companies face bribery in nearly all business operations in Zambia. 
Company registration, acquisition of construction permits, utility set up and tax payments are 
processes that are highly subject to bribery and corruption in Zambia (GAN Integrity, 2017). 
International trade is also hindered by the corruption in the Zambian customs administration, 
as can be seen in the Fraser Institute’s annual Economic Freedom report ranks Zambia 83rd 
with a score of 6.84/10 (Fraser Institute, 2019). This ranking is based on the size of government, 
legal structures and property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally 
and regulation of credit, labour and business. Zambia’s lowest score is 5.22/10 for legal systems 
and property rights; in 2013, Zambia had been ranked 38th showing a steady decline in the 
above indicators (KPMG, 2013:6).  
The 2015 by-presidential election in Zambia was a close race and the candidates needed 
popular appeal to win. In order to create this popular appeal, a new Mining Act was passed in 
2014 by the government to assist in reducing loopholes in the tax system for mining companies 
and tax evasion (Bebbington, et al., 2018:31). Barrick Gold85 responded to the new mining Act 
by stating that it would be suspending operations at the Lawana open pit mine. Edgar Lungu 
won the by-presidential election and the mining tax rates were renegotiated and the Act 
reversed, and operations by Barrick Gold then continued. Before this Act was passed, the tax 
 




regime for mining companies had been changed in 2008 and again in 2009 (Liebenthal & 
Cheelo, 2018:6). It was changed again after the pressure from Barrick Gold in 2016.  
In 2017, Zambia scored 50/100 on the National RGI – value realization scored 58/100, with 
enabling environment scored the same but revenue management was at 35/100 (Liebenthal & 
Cheelo, 2018:3). In comparison, South Sudan scored 80/100 despite the country’s high 
instability and ongoing suffrage after the civil war. The index rated ZCCM as the second-best 
governed state-owned enterprise in the sub-Saharan Africa region. However, as indicated 
above it is not the Minister of mining of ZCCM that often makes decisions, but rather the 
president. Terms of investment, insufficient labour laws and poor implementation of laws 
relating to mining operations by the government has led to issues such as poor labour conditions 
(Li, 2010:10). The regulations that govern the mining sector are thus outdated and offer little 
motivation to companies to be compliant, even though violations can lead to on-the-spot fines 
(Hugland, 2008:560). In 2008 these fines equated US$37, which, when compared to the profit 
these companies turn on a monthly basis, is hardly a demanding amount to pay.  
The Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development is the government body that is responsible 
for the mining industry in Zambia. The Mines Safety Department is run by the Ministry and is 
assigned the duty of monitoring health and safety performances of the mining companies 
operating in Zambia (Hugland, 2008:559). The Environmental Council of Zambia came into 
existence in 1990, mandated with assessing and monitoring national environmental impact 
assessments. The Council was established under the Environment Prevention and Pollution 
Control Act. Although these Ministries and Councils exist and should theoretically be 
accessible and regulate numerous business activities, the regulation of mining operations in 
Zambia is disadvantaged by a lack of skilled inspectors able to carry out physical inspections, 
as well as the resources necessary to cover the vast areas of mining operations. The poor 
salaries paid to these inspectors also makes them inclined to rent seek. The Environmental 
Protection Fund was also established under the Mines and Minerals Regulation of 1998. The 
fund’s purpose is to use money collected from mining projects to assist with the environmental 
rehabilitation of mining areas. The goals of the fund are a brilliant initiative, however, executed 
poorly (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:9).  
In 2011, the Environmental Council of Zambia became the Zambia Environmental 
Management Agency (ZEMA). ZEMA is an independent environmental regulator that follows 




ZEMA’s job includes safeguarding the sustainable use of Zambia’s natural resources that they 
are so abundantly blessed with. The legal framework of the mining sector is judiciously sound, 
yet the process of awarding and retaining of mining and exploration licenses have suffered a 
major lack of transparency and consistency (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:3). Many issues in the 
Copper-Belt have been framed by Zambian anti-Chinese sentiment as being issue-specific to 
Chinese companies but they are clearly Copperbelt-wide issues (Li, 2010:10). Gaps in 
institutional capacity, poor reporting, poor accountability and consistent political interference 
have long marked the Zambian regulatory context (Hugland, 2008:559).  
The regulatory environment of Zambia presents a medium-high risk to CNMC. Copper’s 
importance to the Zambian government and economy allows companies to apply pressure on 
them, as was seen with Barrick Gold and the tax regime change. Foreign firms are more 
influential than local firms and can create a regulatory environment favourable towards 
themselves. The main takeaway from the data presented in this section is that the corruption 
and gaps in institutional capacity do, in fact, negatively affect foreign firms. 
 Environmental regulations have been created to help govern mining companies and their 
ventures, and a Council has been established to monitor these regulations, but once again poor 
capacity hinders the performance of this Council. The lack of guidelines and implementation 
of these regulations offers little for CNCM to follow when conducting operations. If incidents 
occur as a result of the poor regulatory environment on Zambia’s part, CNMC is likely to be 
the “fall guy” and receive negative attention and therefore, damage to their reputation. This is 
the main risk presented to CNMC for its current or future operations.  
Risk Rating: 4 (Medium-high risk) 
5.3.3 What  
5.3.3.1 Products 
Copper is a product that is used mainly in electrical equipment, construction and industrial 
machinery. Copper mining dates to long before white settlers arrived in what is known now as 
Zambia. Mining in Zambia is a traditional practice and is a great part of the country’s national 
patrimony. Copper is an important mineral, hence the importance of Zambia’s Copperbelt and 
reserves, however, there is very limited data available on its extraction capacity. The latest data 
puts the figures at 8.4 million tonnes of undiscovered copper in the Copperbelt and Central 
Provinces. This figure does not account for the copper found in the North-Western Provinces 




Province was also not accounted for in this figure of undiscovered copper. Mineral reserve 
assessments and reports are also not readily available for further inspection.  
Copper production has seen many ups and downs in Zambia. In 1969, production was at 
720 000 tonnes per year. This was also when talks of nationalization began. As nationalization 
occurred, production dropped to 700 000 tonnes/year; by 2000, production had dropped to an 
all-time low of 250 000 tonnes/year (Sikamo, et al., 2016:494). Privatization saw a boost in 
investment and refurbishing of the neglected mines, recovering production to 763 000 tonnes 
in 2013. In 2018, copper production reached over 860 000 tonnes (ZZCM Investment 
Holdings, 2019). The increase in production is a good sign for foreign companies but when the 
history of production is considered it is intrinsically linked to the history of political changes. 
Mining production in Zambia is subject to the regime that is in charge at the time and, with the 
increase in political instability in Zambia, this is something that must be continuously and 
consistently monitored. If nationalization were to occur again, CNCM would not only lose their 
investments in Zambia, but also their reputation as decided by the Zambian government would 
weaken for not being able to foresee this development in the industry.  
Being operational in the extractive industry immediately exposes a company to greater 
reputational risks compared to other industries. It must be reiterated here that corruption, poor 
governmental regulations, civil unrest/on-ground opposition, political instability, 
environmental activism and war are common threats that face the extractive industry. CNMC 
does face some of these risks in Zambia – poor regulations, corruption, instability and some 
on-ground opposition – but Zambia is a less risky environment when compared to other 
countries. Continued monitoring could assist in mitigating and managing any events where 
CNMC’s reputation is at stake in Zambia.  
Risk Rating: 4 (Medium-high risk) 
5.3.3.2 Capability to Manage Product  
Zambia was forced to privatise their mines as part of the most recent debt-relief policy 
prescriptions from the IMF and World Bank. The way in which this process took place is the 
first indication of Zambia’s lack of capability to manage their product – copper. The poor 
institutional capacity to offer effective monitoring and other services, such as effective law 
enforcement, has brought to the surface many governance issues (Cronje, et al., 2017:14). 
These governance issues occur on all levels in the mining sector and hinder benefits for the 




The poor process of negotiations regarding privatisation and the development agreements are 
the roots of many issues. The government, the mining communities and people of Zambia, and 
the foreign firms have a strained relationship as a result of these agreements (Li, 2010:6). The 
main issue is that the mines were sold when copper prices were low, putting the government in 
a position of weakness. This is still the issue today resulting in the government having little 
capability in managing their product. While the copper price has recovered, the Zambian 
government is still in a position of weakness, lacking the ability to even collect greater revenues 
from their mines.  
Another example of this poor capability is the lack of response when community members 
reported multiple times that copper from the mines was being moved out of the country via 
trucks at night. This act is illegal and despite several reports from community members, no 
feedback has been offered regarding actions taken against this illegal transportation (Cronje, et 
al., 2017:14). Sub-par labour and environmental practices and the poor community 
contributions by the government can also be traced back to these agreements (Li, 2010:6; 
Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:8). The lack of capability in managing products is not the matter of 
companies but is an indicator of the problems of the agreements made at privatisation.  
The Zambian people are the ones who benefit the least due to Zambia’s lack of capability to 
manage copper and the benefits that should accompany the production levels that Zambia 
maintains. The lack of trickle-down effect has led to most of the Zambian population still living 
under the universal poverty line, as previously stated. However, this does not pose reputational 
risks to CNMC. The main reputational risk posed to CNMC is that issues or blame regarding 
labour, the environment, revenues and community investment that stem from the Zambian 
government's poor capability can be shifted to the companies involved in the mining sector. A 
report written by the World Bank (2016), eluded to this fact stating that the monitoring agencies 
in Zambia need to be strengthened. This is not to say that firms may not be at fault but even 
when they are not, it is the poor capability and capacity of the Zambian parties involved that 
are the root cause of the problem.  
Risk Rating: 3 (Medium risk) 
5.3.3.3. Commercial Purpose of Product 
Zambia’s copper exports account for 69% of their total exports (Euler Hermes, 2019). They 
export most of the output that they produce as a primary resource. Zambia then imports 




such as construction and electronics. Thus, the commercial purpose of copper in Zambia does 
not present reputational risks to CNMC. 
Risk Rating: 1 (Low Risk).  
5.3.4 How 
5.3.4.1 Sustainable Business Practices  
As indicated in the previous chapter, sustainable business practices consider social, 
environmental and economic feasibility. Again, regulatory compliance did cover the aspects of 
environmental regulations that govern the Zambian mining sector. Discussed under this section 
is the Environment Management Act of 2011 and the Environment Prevention and Pollution 
Control Act that exist with ZEMA established under the latter Act. ZEMA acts to safeguard 
and ensure sustainable usage of Zambia’s natural resources, although its existence is not 
enough, as the lack of resources and capacity hinder the Agency is carrying out their duties. 
Zambia has been mining for over 100 years, leaving significant environmental damage that has 
not been addressed correctly. Lead pollution, sulphur dioxide emissions, soil erosion, air and 
water pollution, acid rain and crop damage have all been recorded in Copperbelt towns 
(Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:9). The Kafue River has been affected by pollution and, as a water 
source for many communities, has drawn the attention of international activism by international 
NGOs.  
The Zambian government has strongly navigated away from taking part in community 
activities that would be considered Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This action leads 
to mining companies, including CNMC, having little direction on how to prioritise and take 
part in CSR (Cronje, et al., 2017:15). The governments abandoned role to communities and 
lack of taking responsibility for their people strongly affects their social feasibility; 
hopelessness and mistrust are adjectives communities use to describe how they feel towards 
their government. During the privatisation process government and local authorities were left 
with addressing this damage, hence the established of the Environment Prevention and 
Pollution Control Act and the first Agency in 1991. Again, the lack of technical and financial 
capability greatly affects how they can address this environmental damage and lack of CSR to 
mitigate the damage (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:9). Bribes are also often paid to 
environmental inspectors as their salaries are far below average, a result of the lack of resources 
made available to the Council. Environment officials admit to not taking necessary disciplinary 




2017:15). There are also constant reports of illness from mining communities due to 
environmental degradation. Lead contamination in Kabwe and sulphur-dioxide produced by 
the mines causing respiratory issues and skin diseases are just some examples of this fact (MVO 
Nederland, 2019).    
Standards regarding environmental practices were negotiated with individual companies and 
an across-the-board standard was not created. These negotiations regarding the environmental 
standards took place during the negotiations of the Developmental Agreements with firms 
during the privatisation process – a process that is still considered to have been incredibly 
corrupt. Many issues pertaining to social and environmental feasibility are linked back to these 
agreements, issues such as neglect of labour and environmental standards (Li, 2010:6). The 
post privatization period has still not seen a demarcation of who is responsible for 
environmental damage clean-up.  
Zambia’s potential has been identified by multiple agencies and companies, which resulted in 
the Zambia Green Jobs Programme, started with the help of the United Nations and 
Government of Finland (United Nations Zambia, 2015:3). The programme is aimed at 
sustainable development, targeting private sector expansion for inclusive green growth. The 
programme also focuses on more and better jobs, especially for the younger and female86 
populations. The programme aims to create 5000 decent green jobs and improve the quality of 
2000 jobs in micro, small and medium-sized enterprises87.  
The programme has seen some success, creating 2660 new green jobs88 thus far and improving 
2018 existing jobs (United Nations Zambia, 2015:4). The programme is helpful in boosting 
Zambia’s sustainable business practice reputation, focusing on social, economic and 
environmental feasibility. However, the last report and information published on the 
programme was in 2015, with no further up-to-date information on its successes available.  
The copper resources that Zambia produces do offer economic feasibility for the country. The 
geological reports that have been made available show great potential for future investment in 
copper and other mining resources (Sikamo, et al., 2016:495). It is the revenues that the 
 
86 Over 50% of Zambia’s working population and country population is female (United Nations Zambia , 2015:3; 
The World Bank Group , 2019).  
87 The goal for this initiative was 2018 but was not fully reached.  
88 Green jobs are jobs that preserve or restore the environment in the more traditional sectors such as construction 




government claims that may not offer feasibility. Estimates ranging from by the World Bank 
was that revenue could be US$1.5 billion89, another estimate by the United Nations 
Development Programme was US$4 billion and another estimated US$1 billion – 5-7% of 
GDP (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:4). The estimate ranges are large and indeterminate, partly 
due to the everchanging tax regime in Zambia.  
In 2005, Zambia qualified for debt relief yet again, this time under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country Initiative (KPMG, 2013:6). Today, the country still suffers from escalating debt levels, 
so high that the IMF has warned that Zambia is at risk of debt distress (PwC, 2019:2). Debt 
distress would be accompanied by further loans and possible policy prescriptions that could 
affect the operations of mining companies, including CNMC. KPMG’s mining guide 
(2013:14), indicated nearly 50% of energy and power infrastructure projects were being funded 
partially or fully by other countries. Seven years later Zambia still faces high debt and lacks 
the tools to ensure total economic feasibility.  
Zambia also lacks a resource revenue management strategy to help ensure that its revenues are 
used to maintain economic feasibility (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:10). This lack of revenue 
management strategy affects funding for things such as road maintenance, both a social and 
economic aspect for the country (Liebenthal & Cheelo, 2018:16).  Another aspect is the 
struggle between managing mining revenues and the benefits of mining activities with 
environmental degradation resulting from mining (Cronje, et al., 2017:15).  
Zambia’s potential has been identified and supported with foreign aid as seen with the Green 
Jobs Programme, offering aspects of sustainable business practices. The copper resources 
Zambia possess are also enough to offer economic feasibility if there are better revenue 
management strategies put into place. This lack of strategies negatively affects the Zambian 
population and environment.  Lack of resources and tools made available by the government 
also negatively affects Zambia’s environment. This is probably the greatest threat to reputation 
emerging from sustainable business practices indicator. Another source of risk is Zambia’s debt 
levels that affect their economic feasibility. Debt relief is commonly accompanied by policy 
prescriptions set out by international financial institutions that a country must abide by in order 
to receive debt relief. These policy prescriptions can affect companies conducting operations 
in the country and it would not be possible for CNMC to predict what these prescriptions would 
 




be. This is, however, a general political risk that faces CNMC and not a specific reputational 
risk.  
Risk rating: 3 (Medium risk).  
5.3.4.2 Transparent and Timely Reporting  
The privatisation process is again at the centre of issues that are facing Zambia. During the 
process, the government was advised that it would be too expensive for firms that were going 
to buy into the sector to upgrade their systems; the firms received poorly-maintained 
technology that would not be able to reach compliance with Zambia’s constitutional standards 
(Hugland, 2008:561). Self-reporting is thus complicated and, as with most standards that 
emerged from the privatisation process, are not common standards. Monitoring agents are not 
equipped with the resources to handle all the firm-specific standards, leading to incomplete or 
non-submissions of reports.  
Under the source of wealth indicator, Zambia’s membership of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative was discussed as was the establishment of their local organization, 
ZEITI (Sikamo, et al., 2016:495). Membership of this international body is a positive 
indication, however, the last report published by ZEITI was in 2015. ZEITI focuses on the 
earnings and revenues companies say they have paid to the government and whether this 
correlates to what the government says they have received. Not publishing reports can call into 
question whether the widespread corruption in Zambia has affected these revenues or what 
other reasons they might have for not having published a report in over four years.  
Zambia’s debt crisis has also started attracting greater attention from the international 
community. The country’s debt management plans are not clear, thereby reducing public 
support for the government and their decisions. Information is not available on how funds are 
spent and whether they are used correctly to meet economic and social standards (Liebenthal 
& Cheelo, 2018:16).  PwC (2019:4) recommends transparent, comprehensive and regular 
reporting in order to gain back public support for the government. Losing public support can 
lead to conflict and pushback from the citizenry. These situations present reputational risks to 
CNMC and their operations.  




5.4 Overall Analysis 
Below are the tabulated results of the risk analysis, simply stating the indicator and the 
corresponding risk rating. The risk ratings are added up to give an overall risk rating out of 50 
points. This is an outline of the above analysis’ results and offers a quick and easy overview of 
what has been discussed in this chapter. 
Indicator  Risk Rating 
Know Your Client 5 
Source of Wealth  3 
Intent with Wealth  2 
Location  1 
Regulatory Environment  4 
Product  4 
Capability to Manage Product  3 
Commercial Purpose of Product  1 
Sustainable Business Practices  3 
Transparent and Timely Reporting  2 
Overall Risk Rating  28/50 
 
Table 11: Overall Reputational Risk Evaluation for Zambia.  
Source: Author’s analysis  
Zambia’s overall risk rating of 28/50 shows that while Zambia is not a top investment 
destination, it currently does not present great reputational risks to CNMC; it is therefore 
considered a medium risk country. As with all risk, continued monitoring should take place to 
ensure that this does not change. The threat of greater political instability, weak state 
institutions resulting in poor regulatory compliance and an anti-Chinese sentiment can change 
this outlook. There has been a slow decline in Zambia’s ranks as an investment climate for 
mining companies, indicating that these issues increasingly come to the surface.  
5.5 Zambia’s Outlook: Gloomy or Safe?  
Zambia presents a difficult case for CNMC. The country runs into numerous issues in the 
extractive industry and presents reputational risks in areas such as their poor regulatory 
environment and high corruption levels. However, the country is considered by many 




environment. The presence of other international firms from countries such as Canada 
illustrates this. The highest-ranking risk to CNMC is Know Your Client. Zambian politics has 
turned to an anti-Chinese sentiment – targeting both firms and citizens. With the increase in 
Chinese migration to Zambia, this does place their people at risk too. Despite the mining sector 
being of great importance to the Zambian economy and investment from China being worth 
billions of dollars, the threat to their presence in the mining sector still exists.  
CNMC, as with many international Chinese firms, is a state-owned enterprise. CNMC is under 
the direct supervision of a branch of the Chinese government, the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, again relying on them for funding. Any threats 
to Chinese citizens and firms from the Zambian government would be the biggest reputational 
risk for CNMC but there have been no serious incidents yet, keeping their most important 



















Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction  
The final chapter of this study is an overall assessment of the study that has taken place - tying 
together findings, summarizing these findings and providing recommendations for future 
research. The first section of this chapter focuses on the process of how this study started and 
has come to its end. The aims, rationale and relevance of this study will be considered again as 
along with the research question. The second section of this chapter focuses on answering the 
research question, looking into each case study and creating a comparison between the two. 
This fulfils both the answering of the research question and fulfilling the research designs goals.  
The third and final section of this chapter will conclude with recommendations for future 
researchers taking on the challenge of reputational risk through a political science lens. This 
section also offers an opportunity to reflect on the study that has taken place – no study is 
perfect. This is the section to identify the challenges or “imperfections” of this study in the 
hopes of assisting future research.   
6.2 The Evolution of this Study  
Africa, the ‘dark continent’ of the world, has become the investment capital for countries such 
as China. Investing billions of dollars in a continent that is still filled with poor economic 
development, instability and weak state institutions presents various political risks to firms, 
many of which can manifest into reputational risks. These risks are exacerbated when firms are 
operational in the most sensitive of all industries, extraction. These are the points that are 
brought forward at the start of this study. The aim of the study was to explore the reputational 
risks facing Chinese firms active in the extractive industry in Africa and consider implications 
for their operations. 
The relationship between China and Africa is one that has been studied greatly, but frequently 
from the African perspective. This study offers an in-depth look at the relationships between 
China and South Sudan and China and Zambia from a Chinese perspective, an area that is often 
understudied in Africa. The rationale of the study was to offer not only contextualisation of 
this aforementioned relationship but of reputational risk too. Reputational risk has not been 
explored in great depth in political risk analysis, as the links between the two are not always 
clear, hence most of the literature being anchored in the financial field. This study has looked 




The study has been explanatory and descriptive in nature. A qualitative approach was made 
use of, focusing on secondary sources that are available to the public to gather information. A 
multiple case study design was the research design for the study, focusing on Zambia and South 
Sudan. The research design is also inclusive of a comparative aspect, looking at the similarities 
and differences presented by the two African countries. South Sudan presented itself as a more 
obvious case study, with the civil war and humanitarian crises the country is facing having 
created various risks to international firms. Zambia, on the other hand, a not so obvious choice 
– Zambia, according to most firms and risk ratings, is a more stable African country that ranks 
higher for doing business. It is Zambia’s relationship, specifically the Copperbelt’s 
relationship, with China that makes Zambia suitable for this study. Both Zambia and South 
Sudan are single commodity-dependent economies, creating the link between the two.  
The preliminary literature review presented these case studies. An introduction to terms such 
as political risk, reputation and reputational risk is also offered in the preliminary literature 
review. Another introduction in chapter one that is vital is that of the model to be used in the 
coming chapters to conduct the reputational risk analysis. The information provided in the 
preliminary literature review forms the basis of the contextualisation in chapters two and three, 
indicating the necessity of chapter two as these terms are difficult to define and required more 
detail. The final takeaway from chapter one was the formulation of the primary research 
question - What are the reputational risks to Chinese companies conducting operations in 
extractive industries in Africa?  
Chapter two discussed the theoretical frameworks and concepts important to this thesis. 
Decision-making and problem-solving theories are the theoretical foundations of this study, as 
they have formed and continue to form the foundation of political risk analysis as a field of 
study and practice. Terms used throughout the study were also defined and conceptualised. 
These terms include risk, political risk, reputation and reputational risk. As a field, political 
risk has evolved and will continue to evolve as the world changes. Rice and Zegart (2016:6) 
offer the definition followed throughout this study, focusing on the probability that political 
action can affect a firm’s business and normal operations. This is not uncommon from other 
definitions, however, these authors place emphasis on risk generators originating from outside 
the usual realms of politics. Reputational risk often originates from areas that are not considered 




The above conceptualisation leads to the definition of reputational risk that is also provided in 
chapter two. O’Callaghan (2007:109) defines reputational risk as a risk that comes from a range 
of threats which can weaken a firm’s ability to function as a business and harm the firm’s 
community standing. O’Callaghan’s definition is older, however his emphasis on a range of 
threats, from business, social or political realms agrees with the definition of political risk as 
set out by Rice and Zegart. The final focus of chapter two is the discussion of the main risks 
facing companies in the extractive industries, demonstrating the close links between political 
risk, reputational risk and the extractive industries.  
The analytical tool used for this study needed a full chapter to provide necessary detail and 
understanding. The model created by Swanepoel et al. (2017) is a qualitative model used to 
measure reputational risk. Four factors are focused on – who, what, where and how – followed 
by indicators used to measure these factors. Numerical values between 1 and 5 are used to 
measure the risk and a risk rating of either low, low-medium, medium, medium-high or high. 
This chapter then also focused on the changes that were made to the model for it to suit the 
field of this study – political risk analysis. Certain indicators were eliminated as they were not 
necessary or could not be measured. Other indicators were adjusted slightly in order to meet 
the requirements of the political research being conducted.  
Chapters four and five made use of the analytical tool introduced in chapter three. The tool 
assisted in measuring the reputational risk to the respective Chinese companies operating in 
South Sudan and Zambia. These chapters are set out to answer the primary research question 
as set out in chapter one. Each indicator of the model was applied to South Sudan in chapter 
four and Zambia in chapter five, with a numerical value and risk rating being assigned to the 
indicator. The overall risk rating for both countries was presented in a tabulated form (refer to 
Table 10 and Table 11).  
Reputational risks were identified facing Chinese companies in both chapters, with South 
Sudan ranking riskier than Zambia. The relationships between the countries and the Chinese 
companies operating there are also vastly different. Zambian government officials and CNMC 
do not have as good a relationship as the South Sudanese government and CNPC. This indicator 
is where South Sudan ranks lower than Zambia, but the other 7 indicators rank high or medium-
high risk. Zambia’s median ranks are medium risk, presenting a safer reputational risk 
environment for investment, although there are still clear risks present to Chinese companies 




can result in actions taken against Chinese citizens. This is a factor that needs to be 
continuously monitored, as with all political risk. 
6.3 So What?  
As indicated throughout chapters one and two, reputational risk and its place in political science 
is complicated. Existing research on reputational risk is mainly sourced from the commerce 
field but looking at the works presented from a political perspective, its importance in risk 
analysis is clear. Reputation is an intangible asset but is of the utmost importance to companies, 
even to companies such as CNPC or CNMC.  
South Sudan was assigned an overall rating of 36/50, and Zambia, 28/50. Chinese operations 
in South Sudan have seen an increase in pushback from the South Sudanese public and there 
have been incidents where opposition has turned violent. However, some of this sentiment 
stems from Chinese actions and is therefore not a reputational risk presented by South Sudan. 
The sentiment in Zambia is a strong anti-Chinese one, creating on-ground opposition to 
Chinese presence in the country.  
South Sudan’s source of wealth stems from oil, being the most oil-dependent country in the 
world. Humanitarian aid is the other source of wealth for South Sudan, a source that is often 
extorted to benefit the government.  Zambia shares a similar dependency, with their wealth 
being governed by copper. Zambia does present a safer investment environment for 
international companies, with many operating in their mining industry. This attracts and 
contributes greater FDI than in South Sudan, contributing further to their national wealth. 
Despite this, Zambia is still highly reliant on debt relief, having a debt burden of over US$17 
billion. Zambia does not have the correct systems in place to help them capitalise on their 
mineral wealth. These issues can be traced back to the privatisation and nationalisation 
processes in Zambia’s past. Corruption is present in both countries, but more so in South Sudan 
than Zambia. All Chinese state-owned enterprises are pressured by government to maintain a 
clean bill regarding bribery and corruption. South Sudan also suffers greatly from black market 
rent-seeking, contributing to its contentious sources of wealth. South Sudan’s sources of wealth 
present themselves as more controversial than Zambia’s, hence the higher ranking of 5/5 versus 
Zambia’s 3/5 under this indicator.  
The intent with wealth is another indicator where South Sudan far outweighs Zambia. South 
Sudan emphasises security spending with half their total government spending being on this. 




purposes. The same can be seen with the extortion of humanitarian aid; only 6% of government 
spending is on health and education in a country with the world’s largest spill over 
humanitarian crisis. These are the reasons for the rating of 4/5. On the other hand, Zambia is 
far less controversial in their spending. The greatest threat stems from the responsibility of 
social service provisions falling to companies in the Copperbelt, including CNMC. Zambia is 
on the receiving end of much debt relief and loans. How these funds are spent has not been 
disclosed to the public, however, there has not been obvious extortion as seen in South Sudan. 
Zambia’s main issue is mismanagement of wealth, presenting no real threats to CNMC’s 
reputation. The rating for Zambia was a 2/5.  
Location is one of two indicators where South Sudan and Zambia are relatively equal. Both 
rank on the low risk side, South Sudan with 2/5 and Zambia 1/5. South Sudan’s reliance on 
Sudan for export pipelines and ports is what increases their rating slightly. The shutdown of oil 
production showed the upper hand Sudan has over South Sudan. There are also oil fields that 
are still contested along the border that could be under CNPC’s control if Sudan was not 
contesting them. CNPC is reliant on the transit system in Sudan, which does leave the 
relationship vulnerable to conflict. Other than this no other threats exist. Zambia is also reliant 
on other countries for exportation routes; however, no incidents have been reported along these 
routes and they have posed no threats to CNMC. Both countries are bordered by countries with 
higher security and political risk ratings, but nothing has occurred between South Sudan or 
Zambia and their neighbours that would be a threat to CNPC/CNMC’s respective reputations.  
The regulatory environments of both Zambia and South Sudan are contentious and present 
medium-high risk levels in both cases. Knowledge of the legal and regulatory environment of 
a country a company wishes to operate in is vital to maintaining a positive reputation and 
reducing reputational risk. A study conducted by Han et al (2018:130) found that most Chinese 
companies operating in Africa face political risks that have arisen from volatile institutional 
contexts and underdeveloped regulatory environments. This places further emphasis on the 
importance of this indicator and the role it plays in creating risk. 
 Both South Sudan and Zambia have poorly enforced regulatory environments that are often 
volatile.  The RGI scored South Sudan 80/100 and Zambia 50/100. South Sudan’s ambitious 
agenda allowed for the greater score than Zambia however, the score does not reflect 
enforcement, an area in which South Sudan is far less apt than Zambia. CNPC has comfortably 




and other investors. Nevertheless, environmental regulations need special attention as not 
abiding by these can lead to great pushback from citizens or NGOs. South Sudan’s lack of 
institutional quality on this aspect therefore poses a risk to CNPC. A similar situation can be 
seen in Zambia. The other factor to consider in Zambia is that foreign companies are often the 
‘fall-guy’ when the countries poor regulations lead to negative issues. The anti-Chinese rhetoric 
in Zambia results in much of the negativity being focused on CNMC.  
The next indicator considered is product – in South Sudan’s case oil and Zambia, copper. Since 
the most recent oil shutdown, South Sudan has struggled to increase its output to investors 
(CNPC) expectations. Zambia’s copper production is very impressive but is historically linked 
to the political changes in the country, making for a volatile environment. This, coupled with 
Zambia’s increased political instability, requires continuous monitoring. Both CNPC and 
CNMC have exposed themselves to the increased reputational risks of being operational in the 
extractive industries. This is a topic that was touched on in chapter two and again in chapters 
four and five. Any operations in the extractive industries, regardless of where one is operating, 
immediately increases reputational risk exposure. There are multiple common threats that face 
companies active in the extractive industries, of which any can manifest into reputational risks. 
South Sudan’s current humanitarian crisis therefore places CNPC at even higher risk than 
CNMC. South Sudan was ranked 5/5 for this indicator and Zambia 4/5.   
South Sudan’s capability to manage its product – oil – is a high-risk factor for CNPC. A loss 
of 14 Chinese workers lives in 2018 as a result of security risks in the oil industry presents 
extensively high reputational risks to CNPC. The civil war may have ended in 2018 but the 
instability still exists and challenges the government’s capability to efficiently manage their 
product. Grievances from locals against the government’s mismanagement of oil, oil producing 
areas and oil revenues are often aimed at operational companies. In South Sudan’s case, CNPC 
is the main company operational and therefore the target of these grievances. These factors 
contributed to a rating of 5/5 for South Sudan. Zambia’s rating of 3/5 stems from the 
government's poor position it was placed in during the privatisation process, a problem that has 
not yet been rectified. CNMC is not faced with reputational risks resulting from this poor 
position of the government. The greatest risk facing CNMC is the shifting of blame for issues 
from the government to companies operational.  
Both Zambia and South Sudan rate 1/5 for the commercial purpose of their respective products. 




them from acquiring the vast amounts of oil they produce. Zambia also has little use for copper 
in its primary form; Zambia exports their copper to countries that will turn the product into 
secondary or tertiary goods that Zambia then imports. These processes carry no reputational 
risk to CNPC or CNMC.  
How South Sudan and Zambia conduct business was the last factor to be considered under each 
chapter, looking at sustainable business practices and transparent and timely reporting thereof. 
Socially and environmentally responsible business practices are lacking in South Sudan. The 
economic feasibility of the oil fields is also uncertain, with one recent exploration, bringing the 
rating to 4/5. CNPC’s reputation is at risk when choosing to be operational in a country that is 
the focus of much media due to its humanitarian crisis, placing CNPC’s operations under a 
media microscope. Environmental issues have also been brought to light due to the 
government’s poor administration of oil areas and environmental regulations, a serious source 
of reputational risk with multiple stakeholders affected. This can be seen in the assessment of 
Zambia – the attention of international environmental NGOs has been focused on areas 
negatively affected by mining, which has resulted in substantial environmental damage. 
Socially, Zambia has aimed and achieved in creating some sustainability through their Green 
Jobs Programme, which contributes to their rating of 3/5, signifying medium risk to CNMC’s 
reputation. The economic feasibility of Zambia’s copper resources further promotes this risk 
rating. The reliance of the country on debt relief and the policies that accompany this must be 
acknowledged but is not considered a reputational risk.  
The final indicator is that of transparent and timely reporting. Both countries suffer from 
corruption throughout all institutions, already increasing the risk value as the Chinese 
government has strict policies regarding corruption. EIA experts in South Sudan were quoted 
on the lack of transparency that the oil sector suffers from, combining two major sources of 
reputational risk. Furthermore, Nilepet90 has not published yearly audit reports, creating the 
precedent that other companies do not have to follow suit. For Zambia, the lack of information 
provided on the privatisation processes that led to many issues in the copper industry is already 
an issue of poor reporting. Revenue declarations by ZEITI have also stopped being produced 
and information on debt management plans are unavailable. The threat presented here is a loss 
of public support that can lead to on-ground opposition. South Sudan was rated 4/5 and Zambia, 
3/5.  
 




For Chinese companies, the largest stakeholder and one of massive concern is their own 
government. CNPC and CNMC are both state-owned enterprises under the supervision of 
branches of government and receive funding from government, therefore it is vital that they 
maintain a positive reputation with the Chinese government. However, China has started 
changing the way they conduct business as has been eluded to throughout this study. They have 
acknowledged that the host-country’s government’s assessments of their operations can be 
strengthened by the public. Social groups and actors are stakeholders they need to consider, as 
how they perceive Chinese firms’ operations can influence the host government and 
policymakers’ decisions (Han , et al., 2017:142). Acknowledgement of this has seen the 
increase in community interaction and CSR from Chinese firms, including CNPC and CNMC.  
CNPC is the only major international oil company operating in South Sudan, monopolising the 
industry. The continued positive relations between the two governments is a factor that might 
play a role in CNPC choosing to stay in a country where the reputational risks are so high. 
CNMC competes with other international companies in Zambia, however production levels 
maintained in Zambia are very high and worth the risk of remaining in a country where the 
anti-Chinese rhetoric is strong. Both countries do not have diversified economies and have a 
lack of capability in managing their products, relying on international firms for economic 
growth and investment. Reducing reputational and political risk, in general, is something that 
will assist these two countries in attracting further investment in the hopes of developing their 
nations and economy’s. Reputational risk is of increasing importance and cannot be neglected 
by any parties involved in business deals and practices.  
 6.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
Several recommendations and deductions can be taken away from the research and analyses 
conducted in this study. Chapters one and two eluded to the links between political and 
reputational risk, although there is not a plethora of academic literature linking the two. Most 
of the literature surrounding reputational risk is still anchored in the commerce field, as seen 
from the sources of information used. This can create a lack of understanding of how important 
reputational risk and the way in which is should accompany political risk analyses. Further 
research into reputational risk should be conducted within the political risk field to assist in 
creating these links and further understanding.  
Secondly, as seen in chapter three, there are not many analysis tools available to assess 




qualitative model made available. Many of the existing models are used by the commerce field 
and focus on quantitative methods. This is not completely suitable to the field of social sciences 
or political risk, hence the changes that occurred for this study’s model. A further 
recommendation for future research would be the possible design of a completely new model; 
indicators such as commercial purpose of product did not add value upon reflection. This could 
be accredited to the fact that many African, and other developing countries, do not have the 
tools to manufacture their natural resources and rather export them as primary resources. This 
indicator could have more value for developed countries where there can be controversial use 
of products. This study has proven that there is a necessity for reputational risk analysis to take 
place and that the current model does hold value, however, a specific model for the political 
field would be the next step for reputational risk analysis.  
A major challenged faced during the research phase of this study was the lack of information 
available on South Sudan. The country is only eight years old and has been withered by civil 
war for the past five years. This factor should be considered for future research and hopefully, 
as time goes on, more information will be made available to improve the analysis for South 
Sudan. Unfortunately, due to the ongoing instability and aftereffects of the recently ended civil 
war, field-based research is not a safe option. Reaching out to fellow academics present in 
South Sudan or employed at South Sudanese universities could assist in overcoming this 
challenge.  
A final implication that has emerged from this research regards the Chinese and their way of 
conducting business. Most of the Western media and the Western world has scrutinised the 
way in which China conducts business with Africa. In some cases, this scrutiny is most 
definitely necessary, but in other cases it is not. As has been deduced, China has started to 
adopt and conform more to ‘Western’ ideals of conducting business, placing increased focus 
on community interaction and CSR. CNPC and CNMC have often stepped in to provide where 
the respective governments have not, mainly due to poor capacity. Companies operating in 
foreign countries are also guided by the regulations and government of that country – two areas 
where both South Sudan and Zambia are lacking. Further research into China’s changing 
attitude and the effects it is having on African countries, where most of their business is 
focused, would be a great contribution to this subject. Further research into this would also 
offer insight into the changing global power dynamics that have been witnessed over the past 




6.5 The Finale  
This final section brings an end to this study. The research in this study formed part of the 
wider discussion in political science, with a focus on political risk and political risk analysis. 
Reputational risk, often a consequence of realised political risk, was investigated. The 
relationship between reputational risk, Chinese state-owned enterprises operating in the 
extractive industry and African countries was the main concentration of the last forty thousand 
words. Political risk, as indicated in chapter two, is an ever-evolving field. Reputation did not 
carry the same risk fifty years ago as it does today. As seen through the case studies of this 
study, reputation can make or break a company and their ability to function as a profitable 
entity.  
This study also tackled the subject of Chinese investment in Africa, a subject often studied in 
political science and international relations. The relationship between the two has been placed 
under a microscope over recent years, with many seeing China as the new ’coloniser’ of Africa. 
The investment relations between China and Africa are, however, not often focused on the 
Chinese perspective, as in this study. This offers an additional contextualisation of this 
investment relationship and insight into how China is changing its business practices.  
Many African countries are still considered to be troubled territories for investment, with their 
reputations sometimes deflecting investment opportunities. Companies find it difficult to invest 
time, money and other resources into a context where their reputation with their respective 
stakeholders can be harmed. This factor is something that Chinese companies take advantage 
of. Investing in South Sudan when very few other companies would, due to the ongoing 
violence and humanitarian crisis, has allowed CNPC to monopolise the oil industry. 
 CNMC has also found success in Zambia’s Copperbelt, consistently producing profits despite 
facing a strong anti-Chinese sentiment on the ground. The reputational risks presented by these 
two investment climates has not steered Chinese investment away. This may be attributed to 
these company’s greatest stakeholder being their own government. This does not imply that 
they have it easier than other companies, the Chinese government places great emphasis on 
monitoring their state-owned enterprises and their operations. What it does mean is that the 
reputational risks Chinese companies’ priorities are different from those of other companies, 





A reputational risk analysis should be a component of the decision-making processes of any 
company when considering starting operations in a new territory. The analysis can also take 
place even if companies are already operational, as it did in this study. This assists in identifying 
areas where risk mitigation is necessary. In a world where information can travel across the 
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